{"id":4427,"date":"2013-10-13T22:45:35","date_gmt":"2013-10-14T03:45:35","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/library.brown.edu\/modernlatinamerica\/?page_id=4427"},"modified":"2013-10-13T22:45:35","modified_gmt":"2013-10-14T03:45:35","slug":"testimony-of-joy-olson","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/library.brown.edu\/create\/modernlatinamerica\/chapters\/chapter-16-latin-america-in-the-world-arena-1990s-present\/moments-and-events-in-contemporary-us-latin-american-relations\/testimony-of-joy-olson\/","title":{"rendered":"Document #43: Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) statement on Honduras"},"content":{"rendered":"

Testimony of Joy Olson,\u00a0Executive Director,Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA),\u00a0July 10, 2009,\u00a0before the\u00a0House Committee on Foreign Affairs,\u00a0Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere<\/strong><\/p>\n

My name is Joy Olson. I\u2019m the Executive Director of the Washington\u00a0Office on Latin America (WOLA). WOLA has a long history of working with civil\u00a0society partners in Honduras, and I spent two formative years early in my career\u00a0living there and working in community development. You have asked me to\u00a0comment on the recent coup in Honduras, the U.S. response, the mediation\u00a0efforts now underway, and the role of the Organization of American States\u00a0(OAS).<\/p>\n

What Happened?<\/strong><\/p>\n

On June 28th there was a coup. The Honduran military forcibly removed\u00a0democratically-elected President Jos\u00e9 Manuel \u201cMel\u201d Zelaya, by gunpoint from the\u00a0presidential palace, and put him on a plane to Costa Rica.<\/p>\n

The immediate cause of the coup has to do with the ousted president\u2019s\u00a0efforts to advance a process to create a new constitution. Several months ago,\u00a0President Zelaya began to talk about a \u201cconsultation\u201d or non-binding referendum\u00a0on installing an additional ballot box in this November\u2019s federal elections where\u00a0the population would vote on whether or not to establish a National Constituent\u00a0Assembly to reform the constitution. This \u201cconsultation\u201d was to take place on\u00a0June 28.<\/p>\n

Opponents of President Zelaya, however, argued that he wanted a\u00a0constituent assembly to rewrite the electoral laws, allowing him to run for another\u00a0term in office. It is important to point out that there is no concrete proof that this\u00a0was his intent, much less any guarantee that an assembly, if called, would\u00a0include a clause on presidential re-election in a new constitution. Even if the\u00a0non-binding referendum had been approved, and a second vote in November\u00a0called for a constituent assembly, any potential reform of the constitution would\u00a0have happened well after President Zelaya had already left office.<\/p>\n

Despite, or because of, the president\u2019s silence about the content of the\u00a0constitutional reform he was seeking, political positions began to polarize.\u00a0President Zelaya\u2019s own political party allied with its traditional opponents in the\u00a0Congress to oppose the initiative. They alleged that President Zelaya\u2019s goal for\u00a0the referendum was to permit him to return to power. The coup itself in part\u00a0reflects the weakness of Honduran democracy and the inability of the state to\u00a0manage political disagreements between the three branches of government.<\/p>\n

As the date for the \u201cconsultation\u201d approached, political leaders in the\u00a0Congress grew increasingly nervous about the upcoming vote. In the days\u00a0before the coup, the Congress sought to halt the \u201cconsultation\u201d and the Supreme\u00a0Court ruled it unconstitutional. President Zelaya did not back down, and ordered\u00a0the military to organize and conduct the vote. When military leaders refused,\u00a0citing the Supreme Court decision, President Zelaya fired the senior commander\u00a0and the Defense Minister in accordance with the powers granted to the president\u00a0in the constitution. The Honduran Attorney General granted an appeal to\u00a0reinstate the Minister; tensions continued to rise and coup rumors to circulate.<\/p>\n

Accompanied by some popular movement leaders, President Zelaya\u00a0personally seized the ballot boxes that were stored at a military base, and\u00a0announced plans to move ahead with the vote. On the evening of June 27,\u00a0rumors circulated claiming President Zelaya planned to consider the vote binding\u00a0and use it as a mandate for calling a constituent assembly.<\/p>\n

While there is no clear impeachment process in Honduras, there are legal\u00a0mechanisms in place to remove a public official from power. It is indisputable\u00a0that due process was not followed in Zelaya\u2019s case. Any legal accusations\u00a0against President Zelaya should have been heard in Honduran courts. There\u00a0was no reason to remove him from the country instead of presenting President\u00a0Zelaya before judicial authorities.<\/p>\n

When all was said and done, many of the actors in the play seem to have\u00a0overstepped their legal authorities. In this story, there are no heroes of\u00a0democracy.<\/p>\n

The Coup in the Broader Context<\/strong><\/p>\n

The coup must be understood in the context of a broader political crisis in\u00a0Honduras. Historically and even since the transition to formal democracy in the\u00a01980s, the political and economic systems of Honduras have been profoundly\u00a0unresponsive to the needs and aspirations of the poor.<\/p>\n

Honduras is one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere,\u00a0along with Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Haiti. According to the 2007\/2008 UNDP\u00a0Human Development Report, 50.7 percent of Hondurans live below the poverty\u00a0line. As with many of its neighbors, Honduras also has high levels of economic\u00a0inequality, with the poorest 10 percent of the population accounting for only 1.2\u00a0 3\u00a0percent of the country\u2019s income, while the richest 10 percent accounting for 42.4\u00a0percent. (1)<\/p>\n

Along with its extreme poverty, Honduras is characterized as a country\u00a0where the political parties are not known for their policy differences and for\u00a0rampant government corruption. Nearly 60 percent of the electorate does not\u00a0vote in elections because they view the choices between the political parties as\u00a0meaningless. And, as recently as 2008, Honduras failed the corruption indicator\u00a0of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a requirement for continued funding.\u00a0Simply put, over 20 years of \u201cdemocratic\u201d transitions in the country have done\u00a0little to address the political and economic marginalization experienced by the\u00a0majority of the population.<\/p>\n

While President Zelaya did not originally distinguish himself as an\u00a0economic or political radical, he did become more populist towards the end of his\u00a0term. He developed modest but real new domestic initiatives, including\u00a0dramatically raising the minimum wage which infuriated the business community.\u00a0And he began to collaborate with the foreign policy initiatives of the Bolivarian\u00a0Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), the Venezuelan-led political alliance. In\u00a0March 2008, the Honduran Congress approved a contract signed by President\u00a0Zelaya and Petrocaribe to receive discounted oil, similar to communities in the\u00a0United States. Consequently, his populist rhetoric and programs won him a\u00a0degree of domestic political support from typically excluded sectors, peasant\u00a0organizations and some trade unions.<\/p>\n

President Zelaya also gained support of marginalized sectors and popular\u00a0organizations for the \u201cconsultation\u201d scheduled to take place on June 28, the day\u00a0the coup was carried out. Indeed, some social leaders and members of civil\u00a0society didn\u2019t necessarily support Zelaya, but supported the idea of implementing\u00a0significant reforms to the Honduran political system in order to make it more open\u00a0and participatory. The possibility of a constitutional reform offered the possibility\u00a0of real change in a country marred by longstanding poverty and inequality.<\/p>\n

While President Zelaya\u2019s populist rhetoric and programs won him some\u00a0popular support, it infuriated others, especially the dominant economic and\u00a0political forces. The political class turned away from President Zelaya and he\u00a0lost the support of his own political party in the Congress. The stage was set for a\u00a0clash between the branches of government, a clash that escalated with mistakes\u00a0and overreaching on all sides, little appetite for compromise, and weak and\u00a0contradictory institutional mechanisms for arbitrating the conflict.<\/p>\n

Regional Trends of Constitutional Change<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/strong>The committee asked that I address the crisis in Honduras within the\u00a0context of broader regional trends in constitutional change.<\/p>\n

Part of the Honduran crisis is based on the fear that President Zelaya\u00a0would open the constitution to modification allowing his re-election. Some\u00a0justified the coup as preventing the subversion of democracy under the guise of\u00a0constitutional reform. It is important to remember that Honduras was three steps\u00a0away from making any changes to its constitution and President Zelaya would\u00a0have been out of office by the time they got around to it.<\/p>\n

Other South American countries have had referendums and constituent\u00a0assemblies to reform their constitutions, namely Venezuela (1998-1999), Bolivia\u00a0(2007-2008) and Ecuador (2007-2008). Critics have considered these to be\u00a0essentially anti-democratic power grabs. However, the depiction of these\u00a0processes as anti-democratic is just wrong. In each case, the reforms came\u00a0about as the result of broad-based social demands. The constitutional reform\u00a0processes and outcomes in these countries, whether we like them or not, were\u00a0expressions of democratic self-determination, not the subversion of democracy.<\/p>\n

This is not to say that the new constitutions are flawless, or that thei\u00a0governments are paragons of accountable, democratic governance. But\u00a0equating constitutional reform with the undermining democracy is nonsense. In\u00a0fact, results of the respected Latinobar\u00f3metro annual surveys suggest that\u00a0among Venezuelans, Bolivians and Ecuadorians, \u201csatisfaction with democracy\u201d in\u00a0their own countries increased after reform processes were launched. (2)<\/p>\n

The Obama Administration\u2019s Response<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Good:<\/strong> The Obama Administration was swift to condemn the coup in\u00a0Honduras and to call for President Zelaya\u2019s return to power. The U.S.\u00a0government\u2019s decision to use the OAS in its diplomatic attempts to resolve the\u00a0conflict in Honduras was also a welcome change from the history of U.S.\u00a0interventions in Central America. In the days following the coup, President\u00a0Obama spoke against \u201coutside interference\u201d and for the respect of national\u00a0sovereignty.<\/p>\n

The Administration has also talked about changing the U.S. government\u2019s\u00a0modus operandi by working through multilateral institutions. The region was\u00a0watching to see how the Obama Administration would handle this crisis. In this\u00a0case, they walked the walk – both in the days after the coup and by backing\u00a0Costa Rican President Oscar Arias in the role of mediator. We applaud the\u00a0Administration in this regard. The situation has de-escalated and the two sides\u00a0are talking.<\/p>\n

The Bad:<\/strong> Nonetheless, the days following the coup were riddled with mixed\u00a0messages from the Administration about whether a \u201ccoup\u201d really occurred. The\u00a0execution of a coup in any country triggers a suspension of U.S. assistance\u00a0under Section 7008 of PL 111-8, the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, which\u00a0states:<\/p>\n

\u201cNone of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to\u00a0titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance\u00a0directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly\u00a0elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree:\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n

It seems that the Administration wanted to use aid as leverage to push the two sides to the table \u2013 a noble goal, but the law is clear. Aid to a government must be suspended if there is a coup. If the military sending a President into\u00a0exile in his pajamas doesn\u2019t qualify as a coup, what does?<\/p>\n

Here are a few quotes about aid and the coup from recent State\u00a0Department press conferences.<\/p>\n

6\/29 Sec. Clinton, \u201c\u2026we do think that this has evolved into a coup\u2026\u2026, we\u00a0are withholding any formal legal determination.\u201d<\/p>\n

6\/30 Mr. Kelley, \u201cWe need to a have our legal experts look at the law, look\u00a0at the facts on the ground and make a determination.\u201d<\/p>\n

7\/2 Mr. Kelley, \u201cWe are trying to determine if Section 7008 of the Foreign\u00a0Assistance Act must be applied. In the meantime, we\u2019ve taken actions to hit the\u00a0pause button, let\u2019s say, on assistance programs that we would be legally required\u00a0to terminate if it is determined\u2026.\u201d<\/p>\n

7\/6 \u201cWe are suspending, as a policy matter, assistance programs we\u00a0would be legally required to terminate if the events in Honduras are found to\u00a0have triggered section 7008.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Administration was sending very mixed messages about whether or\u00a0not they thought this was a coup. These messages could be interpreted as\u00a0tolerance of the coup.<\/p>\n

As Congress moves to rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act, I would\u00a0suggest that you consider further clarifying Section 7008, what should be\u00a0suspended and the process by which the suspension is determined. I would also\u00a0suggest making it clear that military assistance provided through the Department\u00a0of Defense should be suspended by law as well.<\/p>\n

Being wishy-washy about applying 7008 for well over a week after the\u00a0coup sets a bad precedent for others.<\/p>\n

The Role of the Organization of American States<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is the kind of situation that makes clear the need for the OAS. No\u00a0other country or regional group is equipped to deal with this kind of crisis. A\u00a0unilateral intervention on the part of the United States or countries such as\u00a0Venezuela would have dramatically heightened tensions. It cannot be stressed\u00a0enough how important it is that the U.S. government worked within the OAS.\u00a0The fact that governments of all political stripes were unified in their\u00a0condemnation of the coup and the suspension of Honduras from the OAS did two\u00a0things. It made clear that no matter how many people dislike a president, coups\u00a0are no longer accepted in this region. Furthermore, it helped push this crisis\u00a0toward mediation.<\/p>\n

Another critical role the OAS played in the last week was to monitor the\u00a0situation of human rights in the country. The Inter-American Commission on\u00a0Human Rights, the body within the OAS mandated to protect human rights in the\u00a0hemisphere, was one of few actors diligently following the aftermath of the coup.\u00a0The IACHR followed up on reports of violence against Zelaya supporters,\u00a0compiled detailed lists of individuals at risk or missing, monitored restrictions on\u00a0freedom of speech and association and consistently pressed the de facto\u00a0Honduran regime to respect civil and human rights.<\/p>\n

It is fairly easy to find fault and wish for more from multilateral institutions\u00a0such as the OAS. That is certainly the case in this crisis as well, and there are\u00a0no doubt lessons to be learned to improve the efficacy of the institution. But we\u00a0should also remember that, as unsatisfying and messy as such multilateral\u00a0diplomacy can be, it is still better than the alternatives. Some have asked why\u00a0the OAS, with its Democratic Charter, didn\u2019t get involved in the situation well\u00a0before coup when there were clear violations of the separation of powers. But\u00a0the rules of the OAS only allow it to become involved once requested to do so by\u00a0the member government affected. For good reasons, participating countries are\u00a0reticent to intervene in disputes over constitutional interpretations and the\u00a0separation of powers in another country. This is a real challenge for the\u00a0international community, with no neat solutions: how to mediate so as to prevent\u00a0conflicts from flaring into full-blown crises, yet avoid taking sides and infringing on\u00a0local democratic self-determination in situations that arouse intense political\u00a0passions.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

There is now a mediation process in place to seek a resolution in thedispute between President Zelaya and the de facto government in Honduras. All\u00a0should be supportive of President Arias as this process moves forward.<\/p>\n

There can be opportunity in crisis. The question is, Will the end result of\u00a0the mediation be a limping along of democracy until the next election, or some\u00a0real introspection on both sides about the more fundamental crisis of Honduran\u00a0democracy and existing political parties?<\/p>\n

Endnotes:<\/strong><\/p>\n

(1) UNDP Human Development Report 2007\/2008, \u201cFighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in\u00a0a Divided World, http:\/\/hdr.undp.org\/en\/media\/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf<\/p>\n

(2)\u00a0\u00a0In each country, the survey shows that satisfaction with democracy was typically lower\u00a0than the Latin America-wide average in the several years prior to constitutional reforms, after\u00a0which satisfaction with democracy rose significantly and has typically been higher than or on par\u00a0with the regional average.<\/address>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Testimony of Joy Olson,\u00a0Executive Director,Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA),\u00a0July 10, 2009,\u00a0before the\u00a0House Committee on Foreign Affairs,\u00a0Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere My name is Joy Olson. I\u2019m the Executive Director of the Washington\u00a0Office on Latin America (WOLA). WOLA has a … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":38,"featured_media":0,"parent":4419,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"sidebar-page.php","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-4427","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/library.brown.edu\/create\/modernlatinamerica\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4427","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/library.brown.edu\/create\/modernlatinamerica\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/library.brown.edu\/create\/modernlatinamerica\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/library.brown.edu\/create\/modernlatinamerica\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/38"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/library.brown.edu\/create\/modernlatinamerica\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4427"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/library.brown.edu\/create\/modernlatinamerica\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4427\/revisions"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/library.brown.edu\/create\/modernlatinamerica\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4419"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/library.brown.edu\/create\/modernlatinamerica\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4427"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}