{"id":576,"date":"2012-10-18T13:35:41","date_gmt":"2012-10-18T18:35:41","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/library.brown.edu\/modernlatinamerica\/?page_id=576"},"modified":"2012-10-18T13:35:41","modified_gmt":"2012-10-18T18:35:41","slug":"the-castro-touch-populism-and-ambiguity","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/library.brown.edu\/create\/modernlatinamerica\/chapters\/chapter-4-cuba\/moments-in-cuban-history\/the-castro-touch-populism-and-ambiguity\/","title":{"rendered":"The Castro Touch"},"content":{"rendered":"

Populism and Ambiguity
\n<\/strong>By Jennie Mazucco<\/p>\n

Fidel Castro presented his \u201cHistory Will Absolve Me\u201d speech on October 16, 1953, in defense of his attempted overthrow of the repressive Batista regime. A call for nationalist sentiment around the Revolution, the speech set the stage for later revolutionary success and for Castro\u2019s Communist dictatorship. Castro achieved long-lasting rule largely by employing populist rhetoric, and by establishing broad, vague opposition to capitalism and to the Batista government. This non-prescriptive revolutionary invocation established early ambiguity and moderation that allowed him to gain widespread support while minimizing his chances of alienating any specific group. The particular socio-political climate in which Castro rose to power\u2014long-standing foreign economic hegemony, brutal dictatorial repression that ignited popular discontent within Cuba, and the rise of populist movements throughout Latin America\u2014also helped launch his populist revolution into its later, more radical stages.<\/p>\n

Historical Context: The Batista Regime<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

One cannot understand the appeal of Castro\u2019s nationalistic populism without first examining the economic weakness, political corruption, and associated working-class discontent that marred Batista\u2019s Cuba in 1953. Even after the Platt Amendment was rescinded in 1934, foreigners (namely Americans) continued to exert economic hegemony in Cuba to the detriment of the Cuban masses. Treaties such as the Jones-Costigan Act, which favored U.S. economic interests in Cuba in addition to extensive and foreign direct investment, contributed to the economic and social inequality between foreign and domestic elites and the peasant masses. The concurrent growth of mass media and a particularly strong communications industry alerted the masses to the growing disparity between their own poverty and the consumer culture of the elite. This helped to foment populist impulses for change.<\/p>\n

The mono-crop, export-based nature of the economy left it subject to the fluctuations in the world market, high unemployment, and economic uncertainty that caused foreign investment to waver (Farber, 12; 26). In response to fluctuations in foreign investment, economic stagnation, and worker militancy, Castro\u2019s predecessors implemented state regulation and intervention. This, in turn, exacerbated economic and political woes. For example, a 1937 law that set a minimum wage in the sugar industry may in fact have augmented unemployment in the countryside, \u00a0reinforcing \u201cvicious cycles\u201d of economic stagnation, state intervention, and working class discontent (Farber, 24). So, the 1950s Cuban political economy created ripe conditions for Castro to appeal to the masses by reaffirming national pride around the Revolution, and by vaguely opposing Batista\u2019s regime and unbridled capitalism, with populist rhetoric.<\/p>\n

Indeed, it is clear that Castro invoked nationalism to gain support for the Revolution. He argued that the strongest justification for rebellion was that his fellow countrymen were \u201cCubans, and to be Cuban implies a duty [to oppose injustice].\u201d He also cited a \u201clove for [our] country\u201d and quoted the national anthem (Castro, 13; 78). However, more notably he used populist rhetoric and ideology to bolster such nationalistic appeals in the name of the Revolution. He declared that legitimacy is derived \u201cdirectly from a sovereign people,\u201d which is, in turn, defined as the \u201cvast unredeemed masses\u201d (Castro, 13; 26). So, he aligned himself with the majority of Cubans who had been marginalized by Batista through, for example, the dissolution of the Senate, closure of universities, control of the press, and fraudulent elections (Lecture, 3\/23\/2010; Farber, 48). Furthermore, he presented industrialization, moderate land reform, shared employee profits, and nationalization of the electric power and telephone industries as alternatives to Batistia\u2019s raw capitalism. His proposed economic policies were therefore equally relevant and appealing to the masses, who opposed both \u201cruinous [international] competition\u201d and elite extravagance (Castro, 32; 35).<\/p>\n

Early Populist Movements<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

The pre-existence of populist movements in Cuba during the 1930s and 1940s reinforced the success of Castro\u2019s brand of populism. Populists briefly reigned under President Ram\u00f3n Grau San Martin after the 1933 rebellion against the Machado dictatorship, and a new wave of populist Ortodoxos<\/em>, who supported a \u201cvague and moderate version of land reform,\u201d and nationalization of U.S.-owned public facilities, attracted professional middle classes, students, and rural and urban working classes (Farber, 46-7). The broad ideals of this classless, amorphous populist movement, which responded to conditions under the Batista regime in the late 1940s and early 1950s, aligned with Castro\u2019s rhetoric and ideology. This suggests that Cubans were indeed receptive to his calls for reduced rural unemployment, industrialization, improved public health, housing, and education.<\/p>\n

But it was not just Castro\u2019s well-timed populism, but also his ambiguity, that consolidated widespread public support of his Revolution. The vague and un-descriptive nature of his proposed solutions to Cuba\u2019s economic and social ills further portrayed the Revolution as moderate and inclusive. This, in turn, minimized his early opposition. For instance, Castro spoke broadly of placing in power \u201cmen removed from all political machines,\u201d of \u201cmobilizing all inactive capital,\u201d and distributing land (Castro, 30-1; 35). He unclearly posited that unemployment would \u201cautomatically disappear,\u201d and public health would necessarily improve as a result of land redistribution and education reform (37). What\u2019s more, he opined that the revolutionary government could defray the cost of new social programs by the mere fact that corrupt officials would be deposed, embezzlement would plummet, and additional funds would accrue (38). Castro also reinforced the uncontroversial ambiguity of such portended initiatives by referring to \u201ca revolutionary government,\u201d instead of associating himself directly with a specific future government. Further, he repeatedly used the conditional tense when he referred to it (\u201ca revolutionary government would\u2026\u201d). This uncontroversial language augmented the broad appeal of his un-prescriptive commentary to struggling peasants (who already opposed Batista and unbridled capitalism, and sought refuge with the enemy of their enemy).<\/p>\n

Castro\u2019s lack of explicit Communist rhetoric in 1953 also contributed to his perceived moderation, and therefore, support. He cited industrialization\u2014not people\u2019s ownership of modes of production\u2014as the antidote to raw capitalism. What\u2019s more, Castro amalgamated the traditional working class with the traditional \u2018bourgeoisie\u2019\u2014small businessmen, doctors, engineers, and lawyers\u2014to describe those hurt by the Batista regime (Castro, 27-8). His populism therefore maintained a broad demographic scope and broad economic solution that could not be construed as Communism or radical socialism. This was important because, although Communists had maintained a small political presence in Cuba during the 1940s, the Communist alliance with the widely abhorred Batista, and the inception of the Cold War, blemished and sidelined the Party in the 1950s (Farber, 38). Rather, by favoring a less ideological and more emotional brand of populism, with vague socialist twinges, Castro unified the Cuban Left and flailing masses under the Revolution. Only after firmly establishing his support did Castro turn to explicit Communism. It was not until 1960 that he formally opened diplomatic relations with the Soviets, and 1965 that he created the united Cuban Communist Party (Farber, 45; 85).<\/p>\n

The Castro Touch<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Castro mirrored such populist ideology with a personal, humanistic style of speech that likely attracted the struggling masses. He cited specific Cubans who died in the name of the Revolution and at the hands of iniquitous dictators: Mario Mu\u00f1ez, the first prisoner killed in Santiago de Cuba; Marcos Marti, the last youth murdered; and Hayd\u00e9e Santamaria, the woman who invoked revolutionary nationalism when questioned by the army (Castro, 48-9). He therefore showcased Cuban peasants\u2019 revolutionary heroism and sacrifice, while simultaneously indicating the \u201cgrisly acts\u201d of the dictatorship (50). Further, Castro described his revolutionary goals in human terms by way of population statistics. For example, he noted that 85% of small farmers paid rent and faced eviction, and that 2,800,000 peasants lacked electricity (31-2). He also differentiated between iniquitous institutions\u2014such as Batista\u2019s court and the army \u2013 and the innocent Cubans who were mere puppets to the brutal leadership. Indeed, \u201ccourageous soldiers\u201d were \u201cnot to blame for Cuba\u2019s miseries\u2026 but [were also] victims of this nefarious situation\u201d (54). So, Castro\u2019s projected populist message becomes clearer: He aligned himself with\u00a0real<\/em>\u00a0people, and sought to improve peasants\u2019 wellbeing.<\/p>\n

This was bolstered by reference to revolutionary precedents \u2013 in China, India, ancient Greece and Rome \u2013 and revolutionary invocations by respected philosophers and jurists, such as Martin Luther and Saint Thomas Aquinas (73). And by drawing parallels to the 1895 Revolution, he further developed his Revolution as a righteous movement founded on just precedent. For example, he referred to Cuba as the \u201cland of Marti,\u201d and Maceo, Gomez, and Agramonte as \u201cglorious example[s] of heroes and martyrs\u201d (78). That he would continue to invoke such parallels (perhaps even more explicitly) to the \u201cthwarted\u201d 1895 Revolution when he rose to political power in 1959 illustrates the long-lasting success of such rhetoric (Perez, 126-7). Therefore, by conflating nationalism and populism through uncontroversial appeals to precedent within Cuba and from antiquity, he highlighted the justice and moderation of his Revolution. This allowed Castro to gain broad support for his movement under a nationalistic banner while minimizing popular opposition to the Revolution. His rhetorical style mirrored his substance in order to appeal to the general sentiments of the masses in opposition to the Batista regime.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Castro\u2019s populist influence\u2014coupled with the ambiguity of his policy, and bolstered by precedent set the stage for widespread public acceptance of the early Cuban Revolution. While political and economic trends within Cuba created populist social undertones that made the public particularly amenable to the ideals of the Revolution, populist impulses abroad may have also played a role. Populist leaders such as Carranza in Mexico, Per\u00f3n in Argentina, and Ar\u00e9valo in Guatemala \u00a0came to power throughout Latin America from the 1930s to the 1950s. They espoused nationalistic economic policy (largely through import substitution industrialization, expropriation and nationalization of industries) and emotional appeal to the masses, creating a precedent that may have rendered Castro\u2019s populism more convincing to Cubans. What\u2019s more, the Mexican and Bolivian Revolutions (the latter specifically cited by Castro in his speech) had already occurred and perhaps further warmed public opinion to like uprisings.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

Bibliography:<\/span><\/p>\n

Castro, Fidel. \u201cHistory Will Absolve Me.\u201d Document on HIST1630 Website.<\/p>\n

Farber, Samuel.\u00a0The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered.<\/em>\u00a0Chapel Hill: The University\u00a0of North Carolina Press, 1996.<\/p>\n

Green, James, History Professor. Class Lecture. March 2010, Providence.<\/p>\n

Perez, Louis A.\u00a0The War of 1898.\u00a0<\/em>Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998.<\/p>\n

Skidmore, Thomas, Peter Smith and James Green.\u00a0Modern Latin America.<\/em>\u00a0New York: Oxford\u00a0University Press, 2010.<\/p>\n

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