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In the Introduction, Bethge notes that his account is merely the starting point in what must be a more searching and detailed study of Bonhoeffer. Certainly one thrust of further study must be to elaborate the tantalizing suggestions concerning Bonhoeffer's ecclesiastical career, especially in relation to the forces within the ecumenical movement on the international scene to whom the Confessing Church was either a nuisance or anathema. For example, it emerges that the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the

Churches (predecessor to the WCC) throughout the 1930's took a quite compromising position vis à vis the German Christians, sacrificing the Christian to the expedencies of "unity."

Bethge's book is bound to commence a new round of Bonhoeffer evaluation in the US. Let us hope that the issues of violence and the performance of the institutional church, then and now, will not be ignored during this perilous hour in America. Perhaps there is still time to learn from recent history.

STEPHEN C. ROSE

An Exploration into US-Brazil Relations

An Interview with Marcio Moreira Alves

WAYNE H. COWAN

Readers will recall that in our March 16 issue we published the first full-length magazine article—William L. Wipfler's "The Price of Progress in Brazil"—to appear in this country documenting torture in Brazil. Now, as a part of our continuing examination of various aspects of United States involvement in Latin America, we are pleased to bring you an interview with Marcio Moreira Alves. Mr. Alves, who now lives in exile in Chile, is a well-known journalist and ex-member of the Brazilian Congress, in which he represented the State of Guanabara (which is the city of Rio de Janeiro). Because of his opposition to the abuses of power by the ruling military regime, the army demanded that he be stripped of Congressional immunity so that he could be tried by a military court. When the Congress refused, President (General) Costa e Silva closed the Congress on Dec. 13, 1968, and ordered the arrest of Mr. Alves, who escaped to Chile, and other leading persons. We invited Mr. Alves, a leading spokesman of the "Catholic Left," to our offices when he was in the US recently on a speaking tour. Joining Editor Wayne H. Cowan in the interview is Prof. Margaret E. Crahan, who teaches Latin American history at Lehman College, City University of New York.

Cowan: Compared with other Latin American nations that were colonies of Spain, Brazil has generally been viewed as less doctrinaire and rigid, and as more flexible and pragmatic. How do you explain the changes there in the last decade?

Alves: I don't think there is a striking difference between Brazil and the rest of Spanish America. What has always happened in Brazil is horizontal

violence similar to the violence in the rest of the Latin American countries only not on such a national level. What I mean by horizontal violence is a dispute, a violent dispute of power, between factions of the same class.

What has never occurred in Brazil until now is vertical violence from the bottom up. Oppression by small groups of a large percentage of the population has been routine: the land owners and the industrial powers have always resorted to violence when their privileges were threatened. But now revolutionary violence is building up because the previous possibility of accommodation under civil rule no longer exists.

The negotiations between classes that characterized the decade before 1964 and that kept Brazil in sort of a social balance was interrupted by the military coup. And this generates violence, repression and armed struggle that is uncharacteristic of Brazil. Now with the increased structuring of Brazilian society, with the growing proletarian consciousness of the urban working classes, with the revolutionary mood of the students and of a fairly sizable part of the church, the elements for revolution are there.

For the first time in Brazilian history the military has intervened to stay. The accompanying oppression has caused revolutionary pressure to build. The military is very messianic and cut off from much of civilian society. They think that they have the formula for saving Brazil and that they are the only sector of Brazilian society free enough of class bonds to enforce the development model that would

take the nation from its present underdeveloped state into the modern world. However, tensions are produced when, for instance, they institute a wage squeeze and reduce the buying power of the general public. This isolates them more and more from the rest of the country.

Their model is not only messianic but it is also highly elitist. Thus a small military elite allies itself with a very small technocratic elite. This technocratic elite, mostly the economists, is influenced by the economic thought of the US and is very pro-American. There is also a lot of involvement by Brazilian industrialists. These two latter groups are very much in favor of foreign investment and of modernizing the industrial structure by mergers, by corporate growth and by investing more in machines than in jobs.

The result of this policy has been a spectacular increase in the gross national product in the last two years. But the vast majority have not benefited by these gains. The new industries create very few jobs. More and more people who become old enough to work are not incorporated into the system, not even into the service sector in the partial way they were before.

This is what has been happening. First, repression builds reaction; second, mechanical development is not a bonus or guarantee of social incorporation; and, third, the military elite may be changed by the military themselves.

Cowan: Up to 1964 the army was frequently referred to as the balance wheel of Brazilian society, a moderating force. What happened to change this role at that time?

Alves: The Brazilian army had often intervened briefly into the nation's political life. In 1964, however, there was a significant change. For the first time the military united on an ideological base. There had always been two groups in the Brazilian army—one pro-American and one nationalistic. In 1964 they united. President Goulart had been very reckless with his military policies by not moving strongly enough to quell the sergeants' and sailors' rebellions. Consequently the military began to feel threatened in their societal backbone, military discipline. And they united to reestablish it.

Generals who were known to be nationalists and pro-Goulart rebelled against him because they thought that their military establishment was at stake. When the coup came, it was quick and bloodless. Though he could have done so, Goulart did not resist. There was only one group with a pro-

gram to rule the country, and this was the pro-American group based at the Higher War College. They had been at work at least since 1949 building an all-embracing ideology of national security.

Their ideology insisted that national security had to do with education, transportation, agriculture, labor relations, industrial growth. It was aimed against internal foes. The idea behind it was that in World War III, which they believed to be inevitable, the role of small powers like Brazil and their armies was to make their countries fortresses for democracy and not to fight pitched battles abroad, as they had in Italy during World War II. That is, Brazil should be saved by its own army from the menace of its national leaders. It should side uncritically with the United States. And this is the policy that created the present economic structure of the country and brought the present repressive system to power.

Cowan: I gather that the nationalists were taken over by the pro-Americans.

Alves: Yes. For the first time there was a purge of most of the nationalist officers. This eliminated what had in the past been a balance of power inside the army.

Crahan: Where does the present nationalist group come from?

Alves: At present there is a growing nationalist group from the lower echelons—lieutenants, captains, majors—people who regard the government as a government of the generals. There is a generation gap there. All the presidents of Brazil since 1964 have been over 60 years old, and were all four-star generals. This younger group, which is inclined toward the Peruvian model, includes captains and majors who are working with the troops and not inside the government. They feel no loyalty to its leaders.

Crahan: Why aren't they purged?

Alves: Either they were in too low levels in 1964, or they were not yet in the army; they were still in military academy.

Cowan: What was the US involvement in the coming of the military regime?

Alves: First, during 1963 and the beginning of

1964 the US practically cut off all financial aid to Goulart and started to finance pro-American governors in the states of Guanabara, São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Norte.

Cowan: Directly?

Alves: Yes, direct aid to state governments opposed to the central government. Second, the American Embassy knew of the conspiracy before the coup and knew when the military was going to move. Third, the military conspirators . . .

Cowan: You base this on . . .

Alves: I base this on several sources, especially a statement by Ambassador Lincoln Gordon at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings before he was made Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs during the Johnson Administration. I also base it on a book by General Olimpio Mourão Filho, commander of the troops that moved against Rio, as well as statements of other military leaders.

Cowan: Was there a particularly close relationship between the American and the Brazilian military during that period?

Alves: Yes. The head of the American military mission to Brazil at that time was Colonel (now General) Vernon Walters, who had been the liaison officer between the Brazilian Expeditionary Force and the American Fifth Army in Italy during World War II. Most of the generals who gained power in 1964 were majors and colonels at that time. Walters maintained very close relations with them, especially with the founder of the Higher War College, Marshall Cordeiro d'Farias.

Further, the governor of Minas Gerais, the state from which the military marched on Rio, called on the American Consul in Belo Horizonte a few days before the coup to inform him of the date. He received assurances that if a struggle developed the US would recognize a state of belligerency in Brazil and would help furnish ammunition and raw materials to the conspirators. I got this information from the ex-minister of foreign relations, Afonso Arinos, who happens to be my uncle. He was then a senator and was asked by the governor to be his secretary of state if a struggle developed.

Thus, the Americans influenced the coup, first, through the governors; then by having previous

knowledge and not informing the government to which they were accredited as diplomats; third, by assuring the conspirators of the possibility of help; and, fourth, two days after the coup a squadron of the American Navy suddenly called on Rio for a visit. This is a very concrete demonstration of the previous knowledge of the American Government and of its intent to intervene if need be.

The US recognized the new Brazilian Government even before President Goulart had left the country. This was the first time in the history of American diplomacy that a new government was recognized while the old government was still in existence and inside the country. Further, the financial help given to the Brazilian Government, which had dwindled to around \$20 million in 1963, was increased to more than \$500 million between April, 1964, and September, 1965. These figures were given by Ambassador Gordon in a speech in São Paulo.

Moreover, Mr. Gordon immediately approved the coup by public statement. In a major speech at the Higher War College in Rio he went so far as to say that "this event can indeed be included along with the Marshall Plan proposal, the Berlin Blockade, the defeat of Communist aggression in Korea and the resolution of the missile crisis in Cuba as one of the major turning points in world history in the middle of the 20th century."

In September, 1965, when the regime was already extremely repressive and torture cases were published almost every day in the newspapers, Ambassador Gordon told businessmen in São Paulo that the US considered the military regime in Brazil a model of what it wanted the Alliance for Progress to encourage in South America.

Cowan: What do you see as the most useful model for developing a nation such as Brazil?

Alves: The revolutionary model; this is a growing option. It will take time, it will be very bloody, it will cause a lot of destruction, but more and more as every other one fails, you will have to choose between tyranny and revolution.

Crahan: Do you envisage a socialist model?

Alves: I think that every country will develop its own form of socialism. There is no other way for underdeveloped countries to develop themselves in Latin America or in the Third World. The capitalist model is meant to keep underdeveloped countries underdeveloped.

Cowan: To what extent is underdevelopment a condition for the maintenance of the developed nation, capitalist or communist?

Alves: I think that the relations between socialist countries is different from those between capitalist countries. Eastern Europe is, to a notable degree, exploited by the Russians. But, this is much less violent and extreme than the economic exploitation the US imposes on Latin America.

Crahan: What about domestic exploitation? Aren't you perhaps giving the US too much credit? If we could imagine a situation in which the US did not exist, wouldn't there still be exploitation by the domestic elite and their international allies?

Alves: Of course, but Latin America's structures were developed as complementary structures of a capitalistic world, first in the merchant society of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries exporting gold and silver, and later raw materials. At first this was inside the system of the British empire; now this is inside the American empire. And the ruling classes of Latin America were always—and this is Andre Gunter Franck's argument, which I think is iron-clad—linked with the ruling classes of the central powers (either Spain or Portugal, Britain, or the US).

The elite exploited the people for their own benefit and that of the metropolitan powers. And this exploitation forms the whole of the economic and social structure of Latin America. Our educational system is underdeveloped, but it was the perfect educational system for the ruling elite. It marginalized more than 90 percent of the population and formed small ruling elites according to its own values and the values of the metropolitan powers.

Cowan: Do you see the multinational corporation as effecting any kind of change in this situation?

Alves: I don't know much about it; I'm not an economist. However, there have been some studies, and what becomes apparent is that these organizations have a tendency to dry up the economic soil in which they are planted. For instance, in the case of the Central American Common Market, it is clear that the only people who benefit from increased commerce between these small countries are the large international firms. They are the only ones with credit, commercial outlets, managerial experience and the technological know-how to be able to operate in all of these different countries. All this

probably benefits the large international firms more than local private enterprise.

Crahan: Isn't it argued that this would be the initial impact but that eventually the well-being of the populace in general would be improved?

Alves: Well, this would be the same thing as saying that, first, let's get General Motors a \$10 billion budget in order to provide some prosperity for the shopkeeper in Harlem. That is throwing sand in the eyes of the small businessman in Latin America. It's obvious that they would never be able to compete.

Crahan: But obviously the more that GM grows, the more people will benefit in terms of jobs, etc.

Alves: Do they? One of the peculiar things about the US is that this country, the richest empire in the world, the largest and most successful capitalistic organization, is not able to absorb into its own economy 20 percent of its population and, therefore, has not produced social justice. This does not come mechanically.

If I were an American capitalist, I would throw all the money I could into absorbing these Negroes and Puerto Ricans and the poorer minorities, because as the system has failed here, it cannot be exported as a model for anyone.

Crahan: But 80 percent of the people have seen, generally within their own life times, improvement in their own economic status. Nobody believes that any economic system is going to benefit *all* of the people 100 percent, so obviously you have . . .

Alves: Most of the people have seen progress for themselves in quantitative terms, but I wonder if they have qualitatively. And what about the people in the Third World?

Cowan: A common charge against the US is that it always supports dictators, particularly in Latin America. In August, 1962, John F. Kennedy cut off diplomatic relations and aid from the US when the Peruvian military took over. And yet he was immediately criticized in very strong terms by the governments of Argentina, Chile and Brazil. Why was that?

Alves: I don't know. I don't remember the exact argument that was brought up at the time. In any case, what the US does or does not do in Latin

America is always intervention. Its economic weight is so great that there is no way out of intervention.

Cowan: Are we, then, in a situation where the US can do no right? can do no good?

Alves: I think that whatever the US does is really marginal. The US is not going to pull out American investment. In the case of Brazil it could stop military aid and the training of the military, which would not overthrow the Brazilian regime, though it could have a significant symbolic importance. For the moment, however, it is very obvious that the military has the total support of the US. This will make things very difficult for future governments to even keep commerce going between the two countries.

Cowan: How do you mean that? Why would it?

Alves: If the tendency goes as it has in the past with the US reacting in favor of and protecting its own business down there, this will cause tremendous tension between the two countries. It might even cause a rupture of diplomatic relations. . . .

Cowan: As in Peru?

Alves: More so than Peru. In Peru diplomatic relations were saved in the nick of time by Richard Goodwin. He analyzed the stupid position the American Embassy was taking in favor of the International Petroleum Co. in a critical article in the *New Yorker*, and that carried a lot of weight at that time. Although there was a reappraisal of policies, diplomatic relations are still strained.

Cowan: In any case, you don't think the US could have any immediate effect on the military rule?

Alves: I don't think so. It could perhaps shorten its life, but it could not cut it off.

Cowan: Would you see any possibility of the military regime being changed?

Alves: Of course. In the short run the nature of the regime can be changed by a coup inside the coup, the "Peruvianists" in the army.

Cowan: The young nationalists in the lower echelons?

Alves: Yes. If this does not occur, the only possibility in the long range would be a revolution.

Cowan: How large a segment of the church is in revolt against the government?

Alves: I should say that an immense majority of the young clergy and of all the youth and social action movements. As far as the bishops go—Brazil has 246 bishops—about 30 are in favor of the government, 50 are outspokenly against it, and the rest try to survive.

Cowan: What about the Protestant churches?

Alves: The Protestant churches suffer from a minority complex in Brazil. There are many cases of Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists who have been arrested. Some have been tortured; others have lost political rights and have been banned from the country. Those in the church structures, however, try to keep away from politics. If they favor political action, they are generally pro-government. The largest Protestant community, the Pentecostals, work in the slums. Their approach, of course, is to get away from the world: don't get mixed up in politics, just pray for heaven—a very unworthy theology.

Cowan: Could you indicate what factors, both internal and external, could lead to a normalizing of life in Brazil?

Alves: Well, the normalizing of life in Brazil depends on the overthrow of the military. You have to do that before you can have normal life.

Cowan: How can that come about? Is there any other country besides the US that has any influence?

Alves: If the American influence is marginal, then that of other countries is even more so.

Cowan: You mean marginal on the military?

Alves: On changing the system. Perhaps in the future we will have to face *direct* American intervention. That will not be marginal. But this—if it does happen, and I hope it doesn't—will be on the side of the present military regime.

Cowan: Do you think this is an essential reason why Americans should be concerned about Latin America in general and Brazil in particular?

Alves: Certainly. I think that people here who are questioning the whole war in Viet Nam, the inva-

sion of Laos and now the invasion of Cambodia, should be concerned about Latin America, because there is also the possibility of an invasion of Brazil. There is the possibility of the Santo Domingo intervention repeating itself. And there is the possibility that such intervention would develop into a new protracted war.

Cowan: Yet you say that the US influence is very marginal.

Alves: Only in changing the regime. It is not marginal, and it will not be marginal if it is going to maintain the regime. If, for instance, the regime is threatened and 42,000 Marines, on the pretext of protecting American lives and property, as in Santo Domingo, start shooting the revolutionaries—no, that's not marginal. What I think is marginal today is the possibility of outside influence, American or otherwise, overthrowing or helping to overthrow the military.

Cowan: Do you think that the American economic influence is marginal?

Alves: Not at all; the American economic influence is very great. American business dominates the best parts of Brazilian private industry.

Cowan: Can you be more specific?

Alves: More than 50 percent, certainly.

Cowan: What industries?

Alves: It dominates the most dynamic industries. It has a large part of the automobile industry, though it shares that with the Germans. It controls most of the petrochemicals, the business machine industry, appliances, and it has very large influence in heavy industry.

It is present everywhere. In Brazil, we feel the dominating presence of the US. The toothpaste you buy is American; the ice cream you buy is American; the soap is American, buses are American, the typewriters are American, the elevators are American, the tires are American, although sometimes they are also Italian.

Cowan: How about culturally? What is the influence of American magazines, television, etc.?

Alves: Most TV consists of canned American shows. You have all sorts of American consumer items that are promoted via television, which imparts the values of the American consumer society. Films are to a large extent American.

The Agency for International Development (AID) has an immense editorial program in Brazil. Thus, the textbooks tend more and more to be American. They are American approved because they are financed by AID money. Even the organization of the educational system is now being shaped by

American counsel on agreements between the Ministry of Education and the USA. So the cultural domination is extreme.

Cowan: Do you feel that the average American benefits from the domination of Brazilian industry you describe?

Alves: Yes. I think that the bread is made here, but the butter comes from outside. I believe that 13.5 percent of the profits of American industries comes from abroad. This makes quite a difference: as I say, it is the butter to put on your bread. Even more important, you represent 6 percent of the world's population but I believe you use 45 percent of the world's raw materials.

And Americans are largely unaware of this. The concept of a US empire and of US imperialism are taken by the average American to be some sort of pornographic concept or personal accusation. This is very naive. This is the product of the bad history teaching you have here. The British rationalized their empire with the concept of the white man's burden. Your empire is larger than the British and has more military strength than they ever had. You have close to 3,000 military establishments outside the frontiers of the US. That is an immense imperial military establishment, but the average American does not recognize it as such. The US is the first empire that thinks that "empire" is a dirty word.

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