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HAPPENING IN WHAT IS BRAZIL

Estimates of the numbers of political prisoners currently held in Brazilian jails run as high as 12,000. These people are denied the right of habeas corpus, are often tortured and are held incommunicado for long periods. Scores have died from the tortures and beatings, others have been permanently mained and handicapped.

The situation of the political prisoners is just the tip of an iceberg of repression crushing popular dissent in Brazil. For example, all candidates for election in labor unions, student organizations and political parties (those that have not been banned) must be approved by the government, the press is self-censored, public demonstrations against government policies are prohibited and freedom of speech is non-existent (for a fuller documentation of the laws of repression see "Terror in Brazil" American Committee for Information on Brazil, Box 1091, New York, NY 10027)

In the face of increasing international outrage over the state of repression and terror in Brazil, the government has consistently denied mistreatment of prisoners -- with one small exception: in early December 1970 the first admission by a high-ranking government official of tortures of political prisoners was made by Minister of Education Jarbas Passarinho while being interviewed on a Sao Paulo television program. The admission was a highly qualified statement: "To say there is no torture would be to avoid the truth....to say there are no tortures, even in the countries that accuse us of it, would also be a lie, because in some prisons torture and violence exist. It is the police violence that we are all familiar with from the time we read LES MISERABLES by Victor Hugo." (as reported in O GLOBO of Rio the following day, the only paper in Brazil to cover the statement; LOS ANGELES TIMES, December 3, 1970)

Besides denying mistreatment of prisoners, the government has also refused to allow international investigative bodies permission to make independent inquiries into the conditions of detention of political prisoners and the existence of torture. Requests from international commissions are met with notes such as the following, which was sent to Sean Mac-Bride, Secretary General of the International Commission of Jurists, by Alfredo Buzaid, the Minister of Justice (O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, August 4, 1970):

I confirm the terms of my previous note in which I answered, on behalf of the Brazilian government, in a complete and definite way the accusations made against Brazil. I am

extremely surprised that you have not accepted the word of the Brazilian government which cannot, in any case, accept that its declarations leave room for doubt, when, on the other hand, you accept the calumnies spread abroad by terrorists and agents of international communism. Distinguished salutations. Alfredo Buzaid, Minister of Justice.

MacBride replied:

I have received your telegram and thank you. We maintain our original position, which is, that an investigation by the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights and the inspection of the places of detention by the International Red Cross and by an international commission are necessary in order to clarify the situation. Respectfully, Sean MacBride (as quoted in the BRAZILIAN INFORMATION FRONT BULLETIN, September, 1970, London).

Rather than change the conditions within the country which have created the international outcries against Brazil, the government has embarked on a massive propaganda campaign to change the nation's image from one of a country living under a repressive regime to one of a booming "miracle" of economic development with the highest economic growth



rate in Latin America. Sympathetic foreign correspondents and columnists are invited for exclusive interviews (see, for example, Joseph Kraft's columns in THE WASHINGTON POST on December 13 and 15, 1970) while correspondents the government doesn't like are intimidated. THE LOS ANGELES TIMES of December 25. 1970, in a dispatch from Rio reporting on the expulsion order against the head of Agence France Presse, Francois Pelou, commented that "...observers saw the action invoked against Pelou Wednesday as the opening gun in an attempt to bring foreign press representatives under control similar to that imposed on domestic newsmen." As this bulletin went to press, we were informed that the NEW YORK TIMES correspondent in Brazil, Joseph Novitski, had been threatened and that an ASSOCIATED PRESS stringer had been beaten.

Other parts of the government's propaganda campaign include visits by government ministers to foreign countries (especially in Europe) to "correct" Brazil's image and the use of advertising and special reports in leading foreign newspapers --such as the 14 page supplement, "Brazil Meets Challenge of the '70's" in the JOURNAL OF COMMERCE on December 21, 1970 and the ten page section in the NEW YORK TIMES on January 25, 1971.

The next major effort to shed light on what is actually happening in Brazil will come in March when Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Latin American Affairs subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations committee will conduct hearings on the extent of U.S. involvement in and support for the repression and torture in Brazil -- especially in terms of economic, military and police aid the United States has provided the military government since the 1964 coup. The hearings are also expected to investigate the growing disproportionate distribution of income -- the rich are getting richer, the poor are getting poorer and the foreign investors are riding a gravy train.

Naturally, the U.S. and Brazilian governments and investors are strongly opposed to such an investigation and have mounted considerable pressure to try to prevent the hearings. In the forefront of the opposition lobby is the Council on Latin America (CLA), which claims its member companies account for over 80 percent of all U.S. private investment in Latin America. Jack Wyant, CLA director in Brazil made a special trip to Washington to dissuade the Foreign Relations Committee staff from holding the hearings. (Wyant, son of U.S. missionaries to Brazil, was press attache at the U.S. Embassy in Rio before joining the CLA staff in 1967).

Despite the pressure, the hearings are still scheduled. Readers are encouraged to send relevant documents and testimonies to Senator Church and to this Bulletin.



MURDER OF EDUARDO "BACURI" LEITE

According to Brazilian authorities, Eduardo Leite, known as "Bacuri", was shot and killed on December 8, 1970 by the Sao Paulo police.

In an article in O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO dated December 9, 1970 it was reported that "Bacuri" had been at large since the capture and killing of Joaquim Camara Ferreira on October 24, 1970. Camara Ferreira had assumed the leadership of the National Liberation Alliance shortly after the police killed Carlos Marighela in Sao Paulo in November 1969. The paper claimed "Bacuri" had been captured previously, had led the police to Camara Ferreira and had then escaped during the confusion of the ambush of the ALN leader.

"Bacuri" was discovered again, so the newspaper story goes, on the morning of December 8 and was killed during an exchange of gunfire "while he was trying to drive a Volkswagen bus through a police cordon heading towards Sao Sebastiao".

This was the official version of his death. What actually happened, it was learned later from reliable sources, was the following: Shortly before his death "Bacuri" was in Sao Paulo in the infamous Tiradentes prison, where other prisoners heard him screaming from his cell that his eyes had been gouged from his head and his legs broken. Afterwards he was transferred to the DOPS prison in Sao Paulo and was killed the day the Swiss ambassador was kidnapped, December 7, 1970.

"Bacuri" had been the coordinator of numerous armed actions and had participated in the kidnappings of the Japanese consul and the West German ambassador. He would have undoubtedly been among the first persons demanded in exchange for the Swiss ambassador. But the Brazilian authorities, fearful of the discovery that "Bacuri" had been so badly tortured, were quick to set the stage for a plausible death and the immediate removal of the body.

(Source: Front Bresilien d'Information, Bulletin #17, December 1970.)

THE LAWS OF REPRESSION:

INSTITUTIONAL ACT NUMBER 5, ARTICLE 10*

The guarantee of habeas corpus is suspended in the cases of political crimes, against the national security, economic and social order and the popular economy.

The documents presented in this Bulletin speak for themselves. They show how the above law is interpreted today in Brazil.

DEMAND RIGHT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS!

*A full translation of the Institutional Act Number 5 and the Complementary Act 38 is published in the pamphlet, TERROR IN BRAZIL, A DOSSIER, available from THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR INFORMATION ON BRAZIL, P.O. Box 1091, New York, N.Y. 10027.

70 Prisoners Released by Brazilians Charge Torture

By JUAN de ONIS Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, Jan. 15 — Seventy political exiles from Brazil said today that the kidnapping of a Swiss diplomat to obtain their release from jail was an act of "legitimate defense" against the torture of prisoners by Brazilian authorities.

Many of the released prisoners, who arrived here yester-day, showed recently healed scars, burns and bruises on their bodies to support their charges of torture of political prisoners in Brazil.

Guerrillas who kidnapped the Swiss Ambassador, Giovanni Enrico Bucher, pledged to release him when Brazil freed the 70 political prison-ers, but the Ambassador has not yet been released.

The freed prisoners spoke outside a vocational school ship, said she had not been

where they are lodged here. Five of the group's spokesmen said at a news conference that they had been repeatedly tortured with techniques that included application of electric shocks through cathodes attached to genitals, feet, mouth and face.

Elinor Brito, a former stu-dent leader at the University of Guanabara, said she was under torture 44 days until last Monday. She had scars on both ankles and she limps. She said tendons in both legs had been damaged by long periods of hanging from an iron bar, head down, with arms and legs manacled together.

A sixth spokesman, Nancy Mangabeira Unger, 22 years old, whose late father was a United States citizen, and who said she had dual United States and Brazilian citizen-

physically tortured six months imprisonment.

when she was arrested in In a declaration, the former Recife in July. She was also prisoners said that the threat hospitalized for six weeks be- of assassination and torture by cause another bullet pierced Brazilian security forces had her liver, she said.

Brazilian security forces had led to kidnapping of diplomats

Miss Unger said she was in Brazil as a means of "legiti-suspended from the faculty of mate defense." philosophy at Rio de Janeiro's Federal University for organizing student demonstrations.

"Almost anyone who expresses ideas against the Government in Brazil goes to prison," she said in English. Miss Unger spent a month in solitary confinement at the Recife women's prison and saw other women tortured by the political police, she said.

during minicans in São Paulo had been sheltering "comrades Her thumb, she said, was sought by the police who were blown off by a police bullet threatened with torture."

The former prisoners accused the military and political po-lice in São Paulo of having killed Eduardo Leite, a leftist prisoner whose body found a few hours after the kidnapping of Ambassador Bucher.

Two men here, who shared a jail cell with Mr. Leite in October, said he had been so badly tortured that he could walk only with difficulty. The A Dominican priest, the Rev. Tito de Alençar, said he had been arrested and then tortured during 15 months in prison because he and other Dotument with the revenue of the state of the sta

The New York Times, January 16, 1971

Brazil Announces Slaying Of a Banished Terrorist

RIO DE JANEIRO, Feb. 6-Security officials said that a banished terrorist who had returned to Brazil was killed today when he resisted arrest.

The terrorist, Aderbal Alves Coqueiro, was among 40 prisoners flown to asylum in Algiers last June in exchange for the release of the German Ambassador, Ehrenfried von Holleben, who had been kidnapped by leftist guerrillas. The 40 prisoners subsequently were banished from Brazil by presidential decree.

The official announcement said that Coqueiro was found in an apartment here this afterannouncement The added, "He violently resisted arrest and was killed on the spot." A continued search for other banished Brazilians who were believed to have returned was announced.

Brazil has sent a total of 130 prisoners to other countries in exchange for the release of four kidnapped diplomats within the last year and a half.

The New York Times, February 7, 1971



We are able to affirm that in Brazil, there are fewer political prisoners every day ". MARCHA, 6/18/70

THE TRANSAMAZON HIGHWAY

OPENING THE AMAZON FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS

In June, 1970 the Brazilian government approved a \$500 million road building project in the Amazon basin with the ostensible purpose of "integrating" the nation, improving national security, providing land for the landless peasants of the Northeast, and opening up the vast wilderness for colonization and exploration. ¹ A close look at the project, however, reveals that the main beneficiaries of this "infrastructure" project will be the large foreign (especially U.S.) corporations which have their eyes on the region's extensive natural resources.

The highway projects approved in June call for construction of two roads cutting through more than 2,000 miles of jungle. One would parallel the Amazon River from existing roads in Brazil's northeast to the border with Peru. Another road would connect Cuiaba, capital of Mato Grosso state, with Santarem, a port about 500 miles up the Amazon from its mouth at Belem. These two roads will form a triangle with a third road being extended from Cuiaba to the Peruvian border -- thus covering the major portion of the Brazilian Amazon with a trunkline network. All these projects are to be completed by 1975.

The extent of the resources that will be opened for exploitation by these roads is not known exactly, though newspaper reports liken the whole operation to the California gold rush of the 1800's and the "opening of the Western frontier" in the United States. It is already known that the area has vast deposits of iron, manganese, tin, gold and diamonds. In addition, the Amazon contains 16 percent of the world's timber (Georgia Pacific, the largest U.S. producers of plywood, already owns 600,000 acres of land near the proposed Transamazonic Highway.) ²

TIN IN RONDONIA

Here we will give just two examples of the foreign firms that will benefit from these highways. The first is Cia. de Mineracao Ferro-Union S.A. (FERUSA), which operates a 720,000 acre tin mining concession near Porto Velho, the capital of the state of Rondonia. ³ FERUSA, a Brazilian subsidiary of Billiton, a unit of Royal-Dutch Shell, has invested over \$3 million in the tin operations over the last nine years. FERUSA manager, Nicholas Orsby, an Englishman who has spent ten years mining in the Malaysian and Nigerian tin fields, describes the deposits found so far as some of the richest in the world -- richer than Malaysia. "We have proved deposits of 4,000 metric tons worth about \$44 million but we are just beginning our explorations."

With the construction of the new road network, the mining of these fields will be greatly facilitated. When the company began operations, there was no road and all the equipment and supplies had to be flown in or brought up the Amazon and Madeira Rivers by boat. Now, with a 50 mile access road to the trunk line, ore and supplies are trucked to and from Sao Paulo in 10 days. As the road is improved, this transit time will decrease.

In the Porto Velho area alone, 12 big companies are exploring and three are already operating tin mines. There is a theory that the deposits are part of a belt of tin which runs from Bolivia through the Brazilian states of Rondonia, Amazonas, Para and Amapa and up into French Guiana and Surinam. FERUSA now employs 8 foreigners and 300 Brazilians, making it the largest private employer in the state of Rondonia.



IRON IN PARA

The second beneficiary of the roads is the U.S. Steel Corporation whose wholly-owned Brazilian subsidiary, Cia. Meridional de Mineração, joined with the government-owned iron ore producer, Cia. Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), to form Amazonia Mineracão, S.A. to exploit the rich Serra do Carajas iron deposits in the state of Para. The joint venture is 49% owned by U.S. Steel and 51% by CVRD. 4

Brazil has some of the largest iron ore deposits in the world. It has over one fifth of the known reserves. The quality of the Serra do Carajas deposits is reported to exceed that of the famed "iron quadrangle" of Minas Gerais state (the Minas Gerais deposits are operated by another U.S. company -the Hanna Mining Co.) 5 Brazil's iron ore deposits, like those of Canada, Australia, Venezuela and India, have taken on strategic importance for U.S. iron ore producers (like Hanna and U.S. Steel) since the post-World War II depletion of their primary domestic supply, the Mesabi range in the Great Lakes region. About half Amazonia Mineracao's output will be for export, with U.S. steel having first call on that amount. With the completion of this \$300 to \$400 million project in the Serra do Carajas, iron ore will become Brazil's second largest export -- second only to coffee.

A careful look at the Transamazon Highway plan reveals that the road will pass remarkably close to the U.S. Steel Serra do Carajas concession. Remarking on this and other such coincidences, Brazilian senator Jose Emirio de Moraes, a prominent industrialist and minerals expert, denounced the plans for the road: "This road will not make the integration of the Amazon region -- it will be its sell-out!" 6

Officially, it appears the decision to undertake construction of the recently announced huge new road network was made rather hurriedly. The press noted, in numerous commentaries, how quickly the building of such an important road system had been decided, without any previous study having been mentioned. The director of the Amazonas state Department of Roads, Jose Sergio Monteiro de Castro, was quoted as being surprised at the opening of public bidding for the construction before the project plans had been finished. 7 In defending the project before Congress.

the Minister of Transportation claimed he had met with the ministers of Agriculture and the Interior, at the request of President Medici, to discuss the occupation of the Amazon region. It was at that meeting, he claimed, the study of the two big roads was entrusted to the Ministry of Transportation, four months before final approval of the project.

However, four months is not sufficient time to map out and plan over 2,000 miles of road through one of the world's most impenetrable and least explored regions. What most likely happened was that the road was planned by U.S. technicians using the information available from the major potential investors in the area and from the most comprehensive survey yet done of the Amazon -- an aerophotogrametric survey begun in 1964 by the U.S. Army's Geographic section under the authorization of Marshall Castello Branco, the first head of state after the 1964 military coup.

WORLD BANK LOANS

The cost of the roads -- the two announced in June will cost \$500 million -- will be met by diverting money from industrialization plans in the northeast and from massive loans from international lending agencies, primarily the World Bank. In April, 1970 the World Bank authorized a \$100 million loan (at 7 % interest) for major highway improvement in the northeast and the country hopes to land four more \$100 million loans for roads over the next four years. 8

The Amazon has been the focus of several previous foreign penetration attempts -- the most famous being the "rubber boom" sixty years ago when Henry Ford began colonizing the area to get raw rubber for his mass produced automobiles. More recently, there was the Hudson Institute's "Great Lakes Plan" for flooding large portions of the basin in order to open up the more inaccessible highlands and provide cheap hydroelectric power. 9

What appears to be happening this time is that foreigners, primarily Americans, have mapped and surveyed the entire region, selected and secured the areas which seem to contain the most valuable supplies of raw materials, and have advised the Brazilian government where to build the roads to open up this wealth. The Brazilians, in turn, are paying the Americans for the road, since the major lenders to and beneficiaries from the World Bank are the U.S. government and the leading Wall Street financial houses.

FOOTNOTES

- The main sources of information on the trunkline road network were the following: BRAZILIAN INFOR-MATION BULLETIN (BIFB), London, September 1970, #13; THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 30, 1970; THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, December 21, 1970; THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, August 23, 1970; THE MIAMI HERALD, June 18, 1970; THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 11 and July 7, 1970; and THE WASHINGTON POST, June 5, October 12 and November 15, 1970.
- 2. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, February 7, 1968.
- The source for this entire section on tin is THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, October 12, 1970.



Source: THE NEW YORK TIMES July 7, 1970

- THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, December 21, 1970; THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 20, 1970. See also BIFB, op. cit.
- 5. For the story of the Hanna Mining Co. and its operations in Brazil, see Edie Black and Fred Goff, The Hanna Industrial Complex, North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), 1969. This pamphlet is available for 45¢ (including postage) from NACLA at Box 57, Cathedral Stn., N.Y., N.Y. 10025 or Box 226, Berkeley, Calif. 94701.
- 0 ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, July 20, 1970, as quoted in BIFB, op. cit.
- 0 ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, June 28, 1970, as quoted in BIFB, op. cit.
- THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 30, 1970;
 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 2, 1970.
- For a summary of the Hudson Institute proposals see FORTUNE, December 1967.

COST OF LIVING AND MINIMUM WAGE

In the Brazilian magazine VEJA of April 29, 1970, there is a study comparing the cost of living with the minimum wage in Sao Paulo (which provides a good sample since Sao Paulo contains 50% of the entire working class in Brazil, though it should be noted that the situation there is definitely better than anywhere else in the country). Taking an index of 100 in 1958, the cost of living had reached an index of 7,362 in March 1970, whereas the minimum wage had only reached an index of 2,644.

In a balance sheet for those twelve years, Brazilian economist, Paulo Schiling, estimates that in real terms, wages are 36% below what they were, and that the Brazilian working class has lost 2/3 of its purchasing power.*

*BRASIL, SEIS ANOS DE DICTADURA, Cuadernos de Marcha, May 1970, Montevideo.

A TYPICAL CASE

The following is a statement written by Lina Penna Sattamini, a translator for the State Department's Agency for International Development (AID). Her son, a 29-year-old geologist is one of the thousands of Brazilians who have been imprisoned, tortured and held incommunicado because of their political beliefs. (This is the statement Jack Anderson referred to in his nationally syndicated column on February 1, 1971. According to this same column, the U. S. government has invested \$7.6 million in training and supplying Brazil's police.)

"This is the story of my son, Marcos Penna Sattamini de Arruda, a Brazilian geologist, 29 years old. He was arrested by the police on a street in Sao Paulo in May 1970 -- over six months ago. He is now in the Central Army Hospital in Rio de Janeiro, crippled and disabled after being tortured by the police at Operacao Bandeirantes.

"On May 13, I received a telephone call in New York from my mother, in Brazil, telling me that Marcos had been arrested. For 24 days the family did everything to locate him at the three famous prisons of that city, without success. Finally, on June 6, he was found at an army hospital, Hospital Militar da 2a Regiao Militar.

"My mother rushed there and was told that he had arrived in a hospital cart, dying. Other prisoners who had seen him later told my lawyer that his face was completely misshapen and that they only recognized him by his clothes. The first word he could say was 'Priest!' A priest was called and four police agents came along to listen to his confession. The father refused to confess him under those conditions and gave him absolution in extremis.

"Those same prisoners said that he had been beaten brutally. When he could take no more, because he passed out and entered into convulsions, he was tied to a chair to watch others being tortured.

"On July 8, my mother was told that he had been sent back to Operacao Bandeirantes to write a statement and to be interrogated in front of the girl who was arrested with him.

"During the five days at OBAN (Operacao Bandeirantes) he was violently slapped, sworn at with all kinds of insults and put next door to the girl who was being tortured. At night he had to listen to the screams of pain of the others who were undergoing the same 'treatment'. When they told him he was going to watch the girl receiving electric shocks in her vagina, he passed out. He was left in the cell for three days, unconscious, without food or medical attention, until someone from the 2nd Army, under my mother's pressure, found him and brought him back to the hospital. He remained unconscious for three or four more days, taking serum and all kinds of medicine because by then they knew he was being watched by important people and they didn't want him to die.

"All this time I was being informed by phone of every detail but until then, I could do nothing!
My heart was breaking. I went to Brazil and finally on August 3, again recommended by friends, I went to the General Headquarters of the 2nd Army, accompanied

by my brave 75-year-old mother who had been there so many times. Thanks to two generals, and after stating that I work for the U.S. State Department, we were allowed to see Marcos -- after 87 days of his being held incommunicado.

"My son is an invalid!

"His left leg is paralyzed. His right eye is totally closed and his left eye is just half open. His body moves in small convulsions all the time. He has difficulty in swallowing. (I consulted a neurologist who said, without seeing Marcos, that these are symptoms of a blood clot on his brain caused, most likely, by a blow.)

"I was allowed to see him three times. He complained of strong head-aches and dizziness. He told me, between quick intervals of being watched by guards, that besides being beaten when arrested, he received very strong electric shocks in his ears, mouth, legs and testicles. Whenever he mentioned the tortures, his body was taken by hard convulsions.

"I have done everything possible to get him out. I have seen the secretary to the Minister of Justice and the secretary of the Army Minister. I have hired lawyers since no real charge has been made against him and nothing at all has been proved.

"The lawyers explained that his case is typical. They say there are over 12,000 such cases. Most of the people are actually kidnapped by the police since the arrests are not communicated to the courts as the law requires. Officially, my son was never arrested and is a free citizen. But, in fact, he remains incommunicado and the visits were suspended when I had to leave Brazil.

"I am now going back to Brazil but now, as of November 16, as a citizen of the United States. I will stay until Marcos is free. They say they will not release him until he has recovered, but he will never recover as long as he is a prisoner in a military hospital.

"Marcos is one of a thousand -- many thousands of young Brazilian men and women. He is not a
terrorist. He is a good man who wants only justice

and freedom for everyone. Before becoming a geologist, he studied to become a Jesuit and he has often spoken of his life as one of service to man.

"In a letter to me from prison, written in very shaky hand-writing, he said, 'Christ suffered for men. The disciple is not better than the Master. One thing I know -- my suffering is not in vain. Elizabeth Leseur wrote, 'When a soul elevates itself, the whole world is elevated.' I pray especially for peace in this world.'

"Marcos and thousands like him have suffered enough! When will the world wake up?"

(Signed) Lina Penna Sattamini December 14, 1970 After 15 months of arbitrary imprisonment and persecution, 22-year-old Marijane Vieira Lisboa, 22-year-old Marta Maria Klagsbrunn and 24-year-old Marcia Savaget Fiani asked the Chilean Embassy in Rio de Janeiro for political asylum. The date was November 17, 1970. According to latest information (JORNAL DO BRASIL January 15, 1971), they were finally able to arrange permission from the Brazilian government to leave the Chilean Embassy and they traveled to Chile on January 12, 1971.

Accused of participation in subversive activities, the 3 girls had been in prison since September 2, 1969 when they were taken to the Ilha das Flores prison in Rio's Guanabara Bay where the Brazilian Navy has its center of political "investigations".

Marcia Savaget Fiani had worked as a secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Relations until the day she was arrested. Her interrogators forced her to strip, beat her, and applied electric shocks which, used in combination with cold showers to increase the intensity of the shocks, caused a partial paralysis of the fingers of one of her hands. She was then put in solitary confinement for 14 days.

Marijane Vieira Lisboa was a student of sociology at the University of Rio de Janeiro. Accused of belonging to the Popular Action group, she too was forced to strip during "questioning" and sustained beatings and electric shocks which were stopped only after she had suffered a heart attack.

Marta Maria Klagsbrunn, a student of liberal arts at the University of Rio de Janeiro, is the wife of Victor Hugo Klagsbrunn who was an undergraduate in sociology at the same university. Although she was not physically tortured, she was repeatedly told that she would be taken to where her husband was being tortured and forced to watch his suffering.

When the "interrogation" was over, the girls were still kept in prison and on October 22, 1969, more than a month after the arrest, a "prison warrant" was issued against them. At the beginning of 1970 they were transferred to the Women's Penitentiary of Bangu, a suburb of Rio de Janeiro, where they were quartered as common criminals. Then, almost a year later, on June 26, 1970 the Military Supreme Court issued a "habeus corpus" in their favor on the grounds that the maximum of 3 months of preventive arrest had expired and there was no evidence to substantiate the charges against them.

However, Mr. Joao Nunes das Neves, a judge of the Air Force courts, disregarded the ruling of the Military Supreme Court and issued another warrant of preventive arrest for them. The girls' lawyers once more requested a hearing at the Military Supreme Court, which again ordered the girls' release.

Shortly after midnight, on October 6, 1970 the girls were finally released and were about to enter the cars where their families and a lawyer awaited them in the inside patio of the Penitentiary, when 8 men armed with machine guns stepped out of two Volkswagens, menaced the startled relatives and lawyer, forced the three girls into the Volkswagens and sped off. The prison guards, who are under

strict orders to forbid the entrance of unidentified persons onto the prison grounds, passively watched the kidnapping and made no attempt to interfere.

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

That very same day, the mother of Marijane Vieira Lisboa who had witnessed the incident, wrote to the President of Brazil.

To His Excellency, President of the Republic:

- I, Judith Vieira Lisboa, Brazilian, married, retired teacher, residing at 200 Rua Senador Vergueiro, apartment 915, in Rio de Janeiro in Guanabara State, mother of Marijane Vieira Lisboa, begs the honor of presenting to His Excellency the following facts, calling on his noble spirit of justice, and addressing him in his position as the Supreme Magistrate of our country.
- a) My unmarried daughter, Marijane Vieira Lisboa, a Brazilian, student in social science at the University of Rio de Janeiro, aged 23, was arrested on September 2, 1969, by the DOPS at the request of CENIMAR and accused of subversive activities.
- b) For three months no proof of guilt has been produced against her or against her two companions arrested at the same time; no proof of any act of violence, terrorism or kidnapping.
- c) She remained imprisoned incommunicado on the Ilha das Flores for 25 days; there she was subjected to electric shocks which brought on cardiac paralysis; further, she was subjected to annoyances of every kind when completely naked in the presence of several soldiers and vulgarly insulted.
- d) Having been transferred in April of this year to the prison of Bangu, she remained still untried until July, when the Military Supreme Court, at the request of lawyer Modesto da Silveira, granted her freedom in a 9 to 3 decision. This decision has not been honored on the pretext that my daughter was involved in another case as well. This latter case has never been pursued, yet she remained in prison for over 50 days.
- e) On September 16 the Military Supreme Court, having received another appeal from her lawyer, decreed unanimously that she be set free.
- f) From September 16 until October 5 I did everything I could on her behalf, trusting in the justice of my country and certain that she would be freed.
- g) The direct intervention by the President of the Military Supreme Court, upon learning that his decision of September 16th had not been respected, resulted in another order, issued at 4 PM yesterday, October 5, that she be freed.
- h) I, together with lawyer Antonio Modesto da Silveira and the mother of one of the other girls still imprisoned, went to the Bangu prison to meet our daughters.
- i) We arrived at the prison at 8 PM. Although we had fulfilled all the legal requirements, we were not allowed to enter the building and had

to remain in our car until 1 AM, today, October 6, despite the fact that on our arrival we had received a message from the Governor to the effect that we could enter.

- j) At 9 PM we saw a major who works for SUSIPE arrive in a car with some other people, among whom was an official of the prison. The gates were opened for them.
- 1) At midnight, another car carrying the Director of SUSIPE, Senhor Nerval Cardese, and some other men, went in and stayed for an hour.
- m) At 1 PM our lawyer, aware that the girls were about to come out, got out of the car and went to meet them inside the building. He met some police officers there, one of whom he said belonged to DOPS.
- n) The girls came out with the lawyer and came to join us, their mothers, in the car.
- o) Shortly before this, two Volkswagens had parked in a spot where the presentation of identity cards permits one to enter. One was red, the other cream, both with unofficial license plates and occupied by 8 men in civilian clothes who blocked the road and prevented our car from driving out.
- p) When our car came close to theirs, the 8 men got out, carrying sub-machine guns and revolvers, and threatened to kill us, pointing their weapons at our heads, and also our lawyer's head (his hand was wounded by being struck with the butt of a gun); they gagged me to prevent my protesting, while they grabbed the girls and took them to the 2 Volkswagens, dragging them along the ground. It was all done with the help of two military policemen in uniform, and under the very nose of the officer on guard (of the 9th Batallion of the MP)
- q) During all this, which can only be called a kidnapping, the military police who were on duty and standing guard, stood by unmoved and uncaring.
- r) The lawyer, faced with this indescribable horror, asked the soldiers of the Military Police who the kidnappers were, since they must have been identified or they would not have been allowed to park where they had. He got no answer. He then approached the duty officer of the PE and asked him the same question. The officer said he knew nothing of what had happened, even though the kidnapping had taken place in full view of a lot of his men.

Senhor President, Your Excellency is the father and supreme head of our country. Since you first became President of the Republic, Your Excellency has proclaimed that you would never allow our country to be accused of such acts of vandalism as the one I have just recounted. I believe in your word, just as I believe that Your Excellency is quite clearly having his trust betrayed and his orders disregarded; in my despair and anguish, I place the life and fate of my daughter and her friends in your hands, in the expectation that justice will prevail.

(Signed) Judith Vieira Lisboa Rio de Janeiro, 6 October 1970 Marijane, Marcia and Marta were finally released on October 27, 1970. But their good luck was not to last long. On November 4, 1970 the military judge, Teocrito Rodrigues de Miranda, asked the Army's Second Court to issue a new warrant for the girls' preventive arrest. Threatened with further persecution, they managed to escape into the Chilean Embassy where they were granted political asylum.

ABBREVIATIONS

OBAN: stands for "OPERATION BANDEIRANTES", a selected group of policemen specially organized "to do away with subversion". They are known as the worst type of torturers(see LOOK, July 7-14, 1970, "Brazil, Government by Torture", where Friar Tito describes his treatment under that branch of the police). OBAN headquarters is located at Rua Tutoya, 901, in Sao Paulo.

CENIMAR: stands for "Centro de Informacoes da Marinha", the Navy's intelligence agency renown as one of the worst torturers.

PE: is the "Policia do Exercito", the Army's Military police, also responsible for tortures.

DOPS: stands for "Department of Political and Social Order", the non-military federal agency in charge of political investigations-responsible for many tortures.

MAGNITUDE OF NON-MILITARY U.S. AID TO BRAZIL

"...Investment of U.S.-based companies in Brazil is estimated at up to \$2 billion. About the same amount of government assistance, mostly in low-interest loans, has come in since the military coup of 1964.

Director of the AID mission, William A. Ellis, pointed out that in 1965, U.S. assistance paid for a third of total imports and provided an eighth of overall investment in this nation of an estimated 92 million people.

Today, Brazil's foreign exchange reserves relative to its foreign trade are more ample than those of the United States. The aid program and the staff that filled half a skyscraper here are shrinking fast.

But Ellis said through rapidly expanded lending by the World Bank and other largely U.S.-financed institutions, 'The total U.S. aid to Brazil is higher than ever.' That is, it runs over \$450 million annually."

-- Lewis Diuguid in THE WASHINGTON POST, November 15, 1970. "Foreign Investment: Alive and Well in Brazil"

U.S. TRAINS BRAZILIAN

POLICE

"...These are critical days for law enforcement...In the world today, most wars are 'police actions'. Law enforcement officials are a very real first line of defense, and the fate of governments and nations hangs in the balance....People cannot achieve peace and security, cannot even insure their own safety except under the rule of law..."

-- Robert F. Kennedy, addressing the first graduating class of senior officers at the International Police Academy, Washington, D.C., February 28, 1964.

Since the late 1950's, a preeminent concern of American policymakers has been the preservation of social stability in Third World countries deemed favorable to U.S. trade and investment. The argument that indigenous internal security forces constitute "the first line of defense" against insurgency and subversion has prompted U.S. officials in the past decade to develop military and police assistance programs whose main purpose is to create "indigenous manpower organized into properly equipped and well trained armed forces with the help of materiel, technology and specialized skills furnished by the United States."

The beneficiaries of this policy are quite obvious. Domestic opposition to foreign operations is reduced because U.S. involvement is less visible and less costly; opposition abroad is reduced because people are not confronted with the overt presence of U.S. expeditionary forces; and finally, foreign military and police forces cost the United States much less to maintain. According to former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the aim of U.S. military and police assistance programs in Latin America is "to aid, where necessary, in the continued development of indigenous military and paramilitary forces capable of providing, in conjunction with police and other security forces, the needed domestic security". 2

The task of providing assistance to Latin police forces is the responsibility of the Office of Public Safety (OPS) of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). During hearings on the Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1965, former AID Administrator David Bell described the function of OPS as follows:

Maintenance of law and order including internal security is one of the fundamental responsibilities of government....

Successful discharge of this responsibility is imperative if a nation is to establish and maintain the environment of stability and security so essential to economic, social and political progress....

Plainly, the United States has very great interests in the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of law and order....When there is a need, technical assistance to the police of developing nations to meet their responsibilities promotes and protects these U.S. interests.

Under the auspices of the Alliance for Progress, the Brazilian and American governments initiated project #512-11-710-070 (in early 1960). Brazilian police personnel were brought to the International Police Academy (IPA) in Washington, D.C., a training center for senior police officers from the entire Third World. IPA, originally known as the Inter-American Police Academy, is operated by the Office of Public Safety.

The purpose of the Academy is "to impart, to police leaders of the free world, democratic concepts of responsible and humane police administration; provide them with professional knowledge that will assist in strengthening their police forces for the purpose of enforcing the law and maintaining the peace with a minimum of force; prepare them in countering subversion and insurgency; and teach them how to improve the character and the image of their forces..."

Table A, "Police Assistance to Brazil", indicates the amount of dollars per fiscal year provided under the OPS program. Through June 30, 1969, "self-help" contributions to the program by the Brazilian government total more than \$25 million, mainly for construction, supplies and related costs. AID expenditures in fiscal year 1970 were \$732,000 and the request for FY 1971 was \$456,000. This makes Brazil the largest recipient of OPS funds in Latin America. For comparison, see table B which gives figures for the amounts received between 1959 and 1970 by other Latin American countries.

TABLE A

POLICE ASSISTANCE TO BRAZIL 1961-69 (thousands of dollars)

1961	718	19641	,098	1967	699
1962	596	1965	774	1968	623
19631	,292	1966	754	1969	862

TOTAL ('61-'69)....\$7,416

SOURCE: U.S.AID, Statistics and Reports Division, Operations Report, data as of June 1961, through 30 June 1969. The earlier editions of this publication were issued by the International Cooperation Administration, AID's predecessor.

TABLE B

TOP 7 A.I.D. PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM EXPENDITURES IN L.A. (Fiscal Year 1959-70)

448	Country Amoun	nt (U.S. \$ 1	000) Period
	Brazil	7,562	'59-'70
	Colombia	4,567	'63-'70
	Peru	3,642	162-170
	Ecuador	3,476	'62-'70
	Panama	3,442	159-170
	Dominican Republic	3,053	'62-'70
	Venezuela	2,603	'63-'70

SOURCE: U.S.A.I.D., Program and Project Data Presentations to the Congress for FY 1971 The goal of the USAID police project is to:
 "improve the capabilities of the public safety agencies within Brazil to maintain law and order, to contain social unrest and to provide adequate levels of internal security during periods of change and adjustment". 5

Twelve states in Brazil, comprising one third of the country's area and about 80% of the population, will participate in the project. By encouraging Brazilian police agencies to centralize their management, communications and intelligence functions, the power of the central government is strengthened and the influence of the U.S. military and police advisory missions is increased.



Mauldin in the Chicago Sun-Times

The Progressive, December 1966

TABLE C

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE EXPENDITURES IN BRAZIL '50-'68 (dollars in millions)

Year or Period	Brazi1	Latin America (Total)
1950-63	150.6	388.8
1964	9.1	52.1
1965	11.4	55.9
1966	9.5	58.4
1967	13.4	59.1
1968	12.6	72.8
1950-68	206.7	687.0

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp.16-17.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE PROGRAM IN BRAZIL 6

- Through December 1969 the USAID "Public Safety" program in Brazil assisted in training over 100,000 federal and state police personnel. Additionally, 523 persons received training in the United States in various police skills (criminology, patrol, riot control, administration, counter-insurgency, etc.) at IPA and other U.S. police training centers. (See list below for names of some IAP graduates)
- The National Institute of Criminalistics and the National Institute of Identification, both aided by USAID are now operational in Brazil, providing support to the National Police and providing training to personnel from state police organizations. There is now one standardized and centralized identification system.
- As of December 1968, eight states had statewide communications systems designed by USAID. Similar systems are planned for an additional six states.
- The installation of equipment comprising a National Police Communications System is nearing completion with 10 of the 12 planned stations in operation.
- Ten co-operating states have adopted administrative reforms to improve operational efficiency of police forces and to apply modern management techniques. These states now have operating radio and mobile control systems and "Tactical Force" companies trained and equipped to handle emergencies in any area of the state.
- The National Training Institute was established in Brasilia. Here, Brazilian officers receive training from American experts in counter-insurgency, intelligence, riot control, etc.
- As of 1965 49,000 copies of 70 different training manuals were prepared and translated into Portuguese for distribution in Brazil.

U.S. PUBLIC SAFETY ADVISORS IN BRAZIL

Name	City	
Robert L. Barnes (PSA)	Brasilia	
Theodore D. Brown (PSO)	"	
Desiderio L. Crisostomo (Dep. P	SO) "	
Carlos R. Eckert (PSA)	0	
Gerald G. Greeley (PSA)	11	
Robert H. Jackson (PSA)	100	
Charles A. Redlin (PSA/ES)	oldstrant in the	
Carlton A. Rood (PSA)	11	
Stanley H. Shelton (PSA)	n .	
Richard C. Willig (PSA)	Belem	
Fred Lee Zumwalt (PSA)	Recife	
Albert L. Bryant (PSA)	Sao Paulo	

SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service List, Washington, D.C., October 1970.

PSA = Public Safety Advisor

PSO = Public Safety Officer (head of P.S. mission)

PSA/ES = Public Safety Advisor, Electronics Specialist

Dep = Deputy

TABLE D

BRAZILIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL TRAINED UNDER MAP (MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM) IN THE UNITED STATES

Period	Brazil	Latin America	
1950-1963 1964-1968	3,416 2,255	24,421 22,058	
TOTAL	5,671	46,479	

SOURCE: Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts (Washington, D.C., 1969), p.21.

FOOTNOTES

 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971. Hearings, 91st Congress, 2nd Session (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office 1970) p. 307.

- U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington D.C., USGPO 1967), p. 117.
- U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance Appropriations, 1965, Hearings (Washington, D.C., USGPO 1964), p. 72.
- 4. p. III of an AID Office of Public Safety brochure published in 1964. The source for this was a set of xeroxed pages of USAID documents not readily accessible to the public. These xeroxed copies were sent to us and unfortunately did not give a full bibliographic reference.
- U.S. Agency for International Development, <u>Program and Project Presentations to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1964</u>, p.111.
- U.S. AID, Program and Project Presentations to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1969, p. 34.

BRAZILIAN POLICE TRAINED IN THE U.S.

Listed below in alphabetical order are the names of 110 Brazilian police officers trained in the United States between 1964 and 1967 (not to be confused with the thousands trained in Brazil itself -- see article above). The AID Office of Public Safety which conducts the training, refuses to divulge a complete list of Brazilians trained, though it does reveal that the program trained 455 Brazilian police officers in the United States between fiscal year of 1961 and 69. (USAID, Statistics and Reports Division, Operations Report for each year).

The names for this list were compiled from International Police Academy press releases obtained by friends of this Bulletin in Washington, D.C. The list is not complete because press releases for all the classes were not

obtainable and because some police are trained at other academies, such as the FBI National Academy,

This is the first time such a list has been published. We hope readers will let us know additional information about these men and also any new names which should be added. (When avaiable, we have included the home state of the trainees to help in their identification). We hope to soon publish a list of the known torturers in Brazil and see how this list matches with the U.S. trained officers.

Antonio Claudio Barcellos de Abreu	Helio Guimaraes 1	Waldemir Rocha	
Moises Lins de Almeida	Amaro Torres Galindo 3	Antonio Selliti Rangel	9 Guanabara
Luiz Veloso de Almeida 1	Cherobino Vargas Guimaraes 9	Ademar Angelo de Resende	3
fanoel Antonio Fogaca de Almeida 1	Americo Bahia Galvao11-FP	Almir Maia Ribeiro	2
naldo Jose Alves 3	Jose Pimenta Gomes	Jose Barros de Resende Filh	o 3 M. Gerais
rigildo da Silva Amaral 2	Sebastiao de Oliveira Gomides	Carlo Salvador	
uiz de Almeida 2-MP-Brasilia	Pericles Gonsalves	Edival Jose dos Santos	8
dson Moura Alfradique 3-MP-Rio	Ignacio Bagueira Leal 1	Uilton Lopes de Souza	7
almor Araujo 2 R.G.Sul	Claudionor Doria Lacerda12	Walter A. Sobrinho	
air Gomes de Assunção 2	Odon Duarte Lopes 3	Rogerio Afonso Schmidt	
lzeario Honorio Sampaio Alves	Jose Romeiro Leite 2	Valdevino Francisco da Silv	
ldenor Abrantes 2-MP-	Edison Maingue 2-MP-Parana	Sinval Jose da Silveira	
rancisco de Assis 2 MP-Ceara	Alvaro Cardoso Machado 3	Miguel Santana da Silva	
edro Martins Bernardino	Saulo J. Marins	Jose Batista dos Santos Fil	
arlos Henrique Bressan 2	Milton de Mello	Jorge da Silva	
dmundo Jose Bastos, Jr 5	Teodulo Antonio de Mota 6-MP-Sergipe		
etchko Bohdan	Euripides Fernandes de Moura 2-MP-Goias	Harlei Avai dos Santos	
enato Teixeira Bessa	Mauro Fernando de Magalhaes	Valdeci Lopes da Silva	
ernando Basler	Luiz Sebastiao Malvasio	Joao Ramalho da Silva Filho	
lose Carlos Branco 1	Nilo Marques de Medeiros 2-MP-S.Cat.	Epitacio Torres	and the same of th
Aristides de Medeiros Brito 7	Manoel Marcilo Nogueira	Manoel Solange Fontes Teles	
Paulo Waldemar Brito	Nestor Jose do Nascimento	Walter Reinaldo Henrique Up	
rbano Jose Cariello	Heliodoro Rosa Neto 3	Delbio Ferreira Vieira	
loao Alves da Costa 1	Hugo de Oliveira 7	Adilson Alves Vanderley	
rasil Coury 1	Leonidas de Oliveira CG-Parana	Joao Alberto Xavier	
Valmir Magalhaes Castro 9	Benicio de Oliveira 9 Goias	Carlos Alberto Xavier	
edro de Oliveira Castro		Jose Mario Vieira Zaranza	
Jose Silvino de Carvalho14-DPS-Ceara	Jose Raimundo Salles de Oliveira 2	Jose Harro vierra caranca,,	
Francisco Pedro Cantuario 2 Alagoas	Valmir Braga de Oliveira13-DPS		
Adolfo de Castro 3	Francisco Roberto de Oliveira 2-MB-R.G.Sul	ABBREVIATIONS USED:	REAL PROPERTY AND ADDRESS.
Jercide Natividade da Costa Dorea11-FP	Sidney Carlos Pacheco	ACCOUNT STATE OF THE PARTY OF	
	Paulo Paciello	1 - Police Delegate	8 - Chief Inspector
ldeu Augusto da Fonseca	Antonio Alberto Rodrigues Pestana	2 - First Lieutenant	9 - Comissary
ose Fragoso 3	Antonio da Fonseca Pompilio	3 - Captain	10 - Detective
arlos Fucks 7	Evanildo Bathomarco Pastori 2	4 - Second Lieutenant	11 - Agent
Gilo Silva Ferreira	Wassimon Santos Pereira 3		12 - Director
lio Fernandes Guanabar	a Arnaldo Pagan 2-PF-S.Paulo	6 - Major	13 - Criminalist
Sebastiao Pires Ferreira 1 Piaui	Uzimael Gonsalves Pereira 3	7 - Inspector	14 - Investigator
elio Augusto Figueiredo 3	Olandim Trielli Pereira	Luspector	THE THEOLIGATOR
Sumercindo Rodrigues da Cunha Freire	Austragesilo Paulo Pessoa 2-MP-Ceara	MP - Military Police	DPS - Dept. of Public Safet
Pedro Paulo Lemos de Morais Farrapos 6	Paulo de Cairo Ferdigao 2-MP-Ceara	CG - Civil Guard	MB - Military Brigade
Heraldo Gomes	Ubirajara Pereira Rosette 3	FP - Federal Police	CP - Civil Police
Ivo Barroso Graça 1	and the same of th	11 - rederat fortice	or - civil tolice

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