

# BRAZILIAN INFORMATION BULLETIN

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## NEW BRAZILIAN GOVERNORS NO CHAMPIONS OF DEMOCRACY

On March 15th, twenty-two new state governors were inaugurated in Brazil. Chosen by President Medici, they were obediently "elected" by the State Assemblies to govern their states for the next four years. Their state programs will have one thing in common: total solidarity and obedience to the federal government.

VISAO, a weekly magazine from Rio de Janeiro, recently published an article on March 29th about eight of the new governors, as well as an interview with four of them. Here is what they are thinking, as they start their four-year terms.

Governor Triches (a retired Army colonel) of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, says that the 5th Institutional Act, which was issued by President Costa e Silva to close down Congress in 1968, is not an obstacle to the redemocratization of the country because, in his words, "we live in a democratic regime." For a politician who should know better (he had been a Congressman from the State of Rio Grande do Sul), he seems to have a strange notion of democracy.

Governor Magalhaes, of the State of Bahia, agrees with Governor Triches that there is no obstacle to redemocratization in the 5th Institutional Act (which gives the President not only the power to close down Congress but also to decree intervention in state and municipal governments as well as suspending political rights, among other things.) Governor Magalhaes goes on to say that "a campaign against the 5th Institutional Act will only damage those who really desire its revocation." How this revocation will ever be achieved is not, however, explained by the new Governor.

Governor Cals (also a former Army colonel), of the impoverished State of Ceara, thinks that the redemocratization of the country is a matter for the President to decide in a kind of god-like fashion, saying, "He is the one that has at his disposition all the necessary data - the global vision of the country." Maybe this reflects Governor Cals' former career in the Army where all decisions come from above.

Raymundo Padilha, a 71-year-old Congressman, will be the Governor of Rio de Janeiro State. An ex-member of the "Acao Integralista", the Brazilian fascist party, he was one of the Governors that did not answer VISAO's interviewer. But he'll have no problems with the President. A known hard-liner, he is perfectly attuned to the federal government's policy and for this reason had been one of the leaders in Congress.





The situation in the State of Guanabara (where the city of Rio de Janeiro is located) is unique. It is the only state where the official "opposition" to the government - the MDB party - holds a majority. In recognition of this fact, President Medici nominated as governor an "opposition" politician, ex-Congressman Chagas Freitas, owner of two newspapers in Rio which specialize in crime coverage.

Asked about the decrease of authority of a governor not elected by the people, Bahia's Governor Magalhaes denied there was any such decrease. "The important thing", he said, "is to administrate with the people's applause." How this applause - or an eventual booing - will be heard without an election was left unclear.

Asked the same question, Governor Triches not only said there would be no decrease in his authority but felt it might even be enhanced because nomination of all State governors by the President would give the people "a degree of national unity that will strengthen the power of the Governors to carry out their programs."

But, as a matter of fact, the appointed governors, whom VISAQ believes constitute a "state ministry", will not have too much power. The all-important Departments of Security and Finances in each state will be directly nominated by federal authorities. All names of their assistants will be carefully scrutinized by the SNI (the National Information Service which is the Brazilian equivalent of the FBI) to check their fidelity to the regime.

The office of State Governor, once an important position in the political scenario, is now meaningless. More and more, political and executive power is concentrated in a small group of military leaders who go on deciding amongst themselves what is good for the people of Brazil.

## Foreign Landholders

President Emilio Garraza Medici may soon sign a bill relaxing restrictions for non-resident foreigners purchasing rural land in Brazil-- provided they present plans to develop the land within ten months.

Early in 1969, the government banned such sales, charging that such a measure would put an immediate stop to land speculation by American real-estate operators, some of whom have thousands of lots with doubtful titles.

From: The Christian Science Monitor, February 19, 1971.



Division of labour, U.S.-style  
La Voz Proletaria (Colombia)

## Anonymous Letter from Brazil

We are reprinting an anonymous letter that was sent to the American Friends of Brazil and mailed in Miami.

Sao Luiz, Maranhao  
April 12, 1971

- 1 - Case of: Maria de Lourdes Siqueira
  - Only daughter, about 33 years old, teacher
  - Taught for MEB until the revolution, dedicated, well-qualified
  - In 1967 was chosen to study in Mexico on a UNESCO grant for teachers of adult education courses.
  - Presently working for INCRA, governmental organization (Instituto Nacional de Cooperativismo e Reforma Agraria)
  - Employed in Rio de Janeiro but traveled to Recife to do some special work for INCRA a few months ago. Has an apartment in Rio.
- 2 - What Happened: About two months ago Lourdes disappeared from her job in Recife and has not been seen since.

Why: The reason for the imprisonment of Lourdes was obviously the discovery of a banished terrorist, known by the name of "Baiano" in the apartment that belonged to Lourdes. Aderbal Alves Coqueiro was one of the 40 prisoners who was released in exchange for the German Ambassador and sent to Algiers. He was found in the apartment where Lourdes' 70 year old mother was staying while she, Lourdes, was in Recife. 50 gunmen, dressed in civilian clothes, surrounded the apartment and shot the terrorist before he could escape.

Results: Since this time Maria de Lourdes has not been seen. (More than two months ago.) Her goods have been confiscated and her mother returned to Maranhao in fear. Both Lourdes and her mother are from Maranhao originally.

- 3 - Other Facts: The lawyer for the case has attempted to make some contact with the prisoner. He placed an official request to withdraw the state of "incomunicado" so as to begin to process the case, but was refused. Later he made another request for habeas corpus, with no success.

Some feel that the frail constitution of Maria de Lourdes would not sustain the treatment in the jails.

Some groups are mobilizing to pressure the government but the red-tape is difficult to get through.

Outside publicity could help reveal the facts about this case. Whatever you can do will be appreciated.

We depend on contributions to cover the costs of this publication. Please make checks payable to AMERICAN FRIENDS OF BRAZIL, Box 2279, Station A, Berkeley, Ca. 94702. Many thanks to those of you who responded so generously to our work.



# The Myth of Brazil's Economic Development

The following article is adapted from a longer piece, "Brazil 1970", by Paulo Schilling which originally appeared in *Marcha* (a Uruguayan weekly) and was translated and reprinted in *Front Bresilien D'Information*, February 1971.

A "Retrospective View of the Decade of the 60's", published by the Getulio Vargas Foundation (the government's bureau of statistics) shows the following percentage increases in the country's gross national product:

Decade 1949-59.....	87.5 percent
Annual average....	6.5 "
Decade 1959-69.....	77.9 "
Annual average....	5.9 "
1960.....	9.7 "
1961.....	10.3 "
1962.....	5.3 "
1963.....	1.5 "
1964.....	2.9 "
1965.....	2.7 "
1966.....	5.1 "
1967.....	4.8 "
1968.....	8.4 "
1969.....	9.0 "

The results for the last three years (1967, 1968 and 1969) are, according to the Getulio Vargas Foundation (GVF), only "preliminary estimates". This is unusual and raises the question of credibility. In the past, the GVF has always considered the statistics of just the last year as "temporary". It seems strange to apply this "temporary" status to three consecutive years without any final adjustment of figures in the meantime, unless, of course, these statistics are not meant to be held up to close scrutiny. But why? Is this an attempt to offer "official figures" of Brazil's economic gains to attract additional foreign capital?

If the economic growth rate is as remarkable as the GVF figures claim, why then is there such a disparity between these statistics and those of other reliable institutions for the same period?

The Agricultural Secretariat of the State of Sao Paulo, for instance, reports that the real income of agricultural enterprises of that area has actually fallen from an index of 173 in 1965 to 141 in 1969.

Another example is the figure given for the agricultural income for the entire country. The UN's Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) reports that in 1969 there was only an increase of 1 percent over the previous year while the Ministry of Agriculture's figures say that the increase was 6 percent for this same period.

Even more confusing is the GVF data for "job openings in production" (data obtained by the Foundation through the analysis of advertisements in the press). Starting from an index of 100 in 1953, the GVF says that it reaches 700 in January of 1964 and then falls off to 530 in December of 1969.



But let us examine this in more detail. We know there exists a definite correlation between the increase in industrial production and the consumption of electricity. This is not a fool-proof indicator, since many other sectors besides industrial production use electricity, but it is a fairly reliable one. In the six years between 1960 and 1966, the consumption of electricity increased 40.23 percent and industrial production increased 46.71 percent. This situation, however, seems to have changed radically in recent years, if the government's figures can be believed. Official statistics show a growth rate of 8.4 percent in the GNP and 13.2 percent in industrial production, but the consumption of electricity only increases from an index of 107 to 114, or 6.5 percent. The same seems to occur in 1969. While the national income is shown as increasing 9 percent and industrial production as increasing to 10.8 percent, the consumption of electricity only increases 5.26 percent.

It is possible that the decrease in "job openings in production" can be explained by an increase in productivity due to technological innovations. But shouldn't this progress imply an accrued increase in the use of electrical energy higher than the amount reported? Is "Light and Power" lax in furnishing complete figures for total consumption of electricity? Or, are the government's figures in error?

As far as the effects of this so-called economic growth on the living conditions of the entire population is concerned, the glowing reports of the GVF are a cruel deception. The truth is that the majority of people in Brazil are worse off today than they were several years ago. One only has to examine two of the most basic consumer goods: food and clothing. In the State of Guanabara, the consumption of beef dropped from 41.49 kg. per capita in 1961-62 to 37.6 kg. with beef prices rising from 3.27 cruzeiros per kilo in January 1970 to 5.08 cruzeiros in the fall of 1970. The per capita consumption of sugar also fell from 41.95 kg. to 34.68 kg. In compensation, the consumption of rice and beans rose from 39.96 kg. to 49.36, and from 22.92 kg. to 26.21 kg., respectively.



But a closer examination of the GVF statistics, does reveal their admission of a drastic fall in the sale of "clothes, shoes and cloth" in 1969: 25.5 percent. One reason for this is the drop in real wages for the average worker. The GVF gives the following table for the State of Guanabara:

	Minimum Salary Index	Cost of Living Index
1964	100	100
1965	157	160
1966	200	234
1967	250	305
1968	309	373

The production of automobiles, on the other hand, is increasing at a startling rate: 15 percent increase in 1970, with a production of 400,000 units of which only 15-to-16,000 are tractors. While the vast majority of the population eats less and dresses more shabbily, a small sector of Brazil's population is enjoying the rewards of a "consumer economy".



SUDENE - A FAILURE

Looking at the nation as a whole, Brazil's much-publicized economic growth seems to be benefitting a small upper-and middle-class elite at the expense of ever increasing numbers of urban and rural poor. This is especially true in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo where two-thirds of the new investments were made in the last few years. Sao Paulo, alone, accounts for 54 percent of the nation's total of new investments.

This may be explained by the failure of the government's plans for regional development which were begun during the government of Juscelino Kubitschek in the late 1950's. SUDENE (Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast) was formed in 1959 to correct the enormous lag in the development of the Northeast in comparison to the central and southern regions. A number of incentives were offered to business and industry in hopes of accelerating the development of this part of the country. To encourage private investment, an industrialist needed only to furnish 12.5 percent of the initial investment necessary to set up a factory in the Northeast and he would also then be assured of tax relief benefits for the remainder of his holdings in the rest of the country.

In the ten years of its existence, SUDENE's accomplishments have been meagre in comparison to the amount of time and money invested by the government. Part of the failure is due to poor planning and a lack of understanding of the sociological conditions of the Northeast. One of SUDENE's greatest mistakes was to try to install highly technical factories in a region where the overwhelming majority of the labor force is illiterate and untrained.

In these ten years, SUDENE created less than 150,000 additional jobs, whereas the population has increased by nearly 8 million. In 1968, with an investment of 953 million cruzeiros (about 200 million dollars) SUDENE created only 22,470 jobs; in 1969, with an investment of 1,080 million, only 13,000 new jobs were created. These figures are from SUDENE itself, in the supplement of the periodical *Veja's* "Guide to fiscal advantages".

The failure of SUDENE to provide sufficient employment in the Northeast may explain, in part, the government's sudden new plan to build the Transamazon Road. This is a road from the Northeast to the Bolivian Andes which crosses the entire "green hell" area of the Amazon basin. Rather than exploring new alternatives for providing additional employment in the Northeast, or attempting any serious reform of the semi-feudal structure of the land-holdings there where almost 80 percent of the land is immobilized in unproductive "latifundios", the government has embarked on a new "solution" of offering jobs to a massive number of Northeasterners in the "green hell" of the Amazon. This plan, because it was so hastily improvised, has been criticized on all sides. Even such reactionary voices as that of Marshall Juarez Tavora of the Army's Superior Military War Academy has strongly condemned this so-called "work of the century" of General Garrastazu Medici. It is feared that this project will result in a kind of genocide, as during the days of the famous rubber boom when so many workers died in the jungles. It has also been criticized as a plan that will provide a cheap labor force - temporarily at least - for the Yankee latifundistas who have bought up half the land north of the Rio Negro.

## Of Interest...

### Senate Hearings

The Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs will probably hold hearings to discuss the U.S. posture towards military dictatorships during the first part of May. These hearings will be closed to the public and press but we have been assured that a report of their talks will be released.

Anyone with information concerning U.S. involvement and support of the present military regime in Brazil is urged to write to:

Mr. Pat Holt  
c/o Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20010

Another hearing, under the chairmanship of Sen. Wm. Proxmire, will be held "sometime in July" to re-examine government expenditures abroad, especially USAID programs in Brazil and projects underwritten by the U.S. through international banks.

### Dom Helder's Visit

Dom Helder Camara, Archbishop of Recife, is tentatively scheduled for a brief two-day visit to Washington in late May. His primary purpose will be to meet with leaders of Poor Peoples' Non-Violent Movements, a meeting he proposed at the SCLC Convention in August of last year when he received the Martin Luther King, Jr. Peace Award. Hopefully, he will also have a chance to talk privately with several key senators.



# Where the Soldiers Learn to Rule

One of the widely-heralded findings of Governor Nelson Rockefeller on his mission to Latin America for President Nixon in 1969 was the discovery of a "new type of military man (who) is coming to the fore and often becoming a major force for constructive change in the American republics."<sup>1</sup> For U.S. policy-makers, there is probably no better example of this "new type of military man" than the current Brazilian military chiefs of state.

However, what is seldom discussed publicly, either by Mr. Rockefeller or other government strategists, is that this new military man did not emerge haphazardly on the scene. He is, rather, the fruit of years of careful training -- training administered primarily by the United States.

In the case of Brazil, this training has been conducted chiefly at the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), or War College. An article on the ESG in a recent issue of the Bank of London and South America (BOLSA) Review quite frankly admits that the ESG was established by the armed forces in order "to make their own arrangements for the creation of an elite" capable of governing the country.<sup>2</sup>

The Rio-based ESG is now known in the Brazilian ruling circles as "the Sorbonne" and has been a primary source of the military government's planning and strategy. The top officers in the armed forces are all ESG graduates and Marshall Castelo Branco, the first chief of state placed in power after the military coup in 1964, was himself a top administrator at the ESG in the late 1950's.

The BOLSA Review advises its readers that.

"knowledge of the role of the Escola Superior de Guerra today is an indispensable element in understanding the thinking and attitudes of Brazil's principal leaders, since the ESG is the laboratory in which the ideology and doctrine of the 1964 Revolution have been worked out and formulated."<sup>3</sup>

The ESG was established twenty years ago by U.S. military advisors and Brazilian staff officers. It was patterned after the U.S. National War College and to this day receives generous financial support from the Pentagon. In addition, at least one U.S. military advisor is assigned full time to maintain liaison between the ESG and the Pentagon.

Contrary to what the name implies, the ESG is not solely a military college. It is, rather, a high-level meeting ground where officers, technocrats and the top businessmen and financiers in the country are brought together to work out common strategies for development. To date the college has graduated over 2,200 officers and civilians.

The curriculum at the ESG is concentrated in three courses:

1. The armed forces command and general staff course attended by some 30 officers from the three services.
2. The intelligence course which came into full operation in 1965 after the creation of the Servico Nacional de Informacoes (the SNI, Brazil's FBI, was headed by Emilio Garrastazu Medici before the generals named him chief of state in 1969). This course is limited to 18 or 19 civilians and officers.



Forming an elite: A classroom at Brazil's Superior War School

3. The advanced war course (Curso Superior de Guerra), a ten month full time course for 80 to 90 participants, the majority civilians.

It is in the Curso Superior de Guerra that there is the greatest interaction between the civilian and military elites. In the words of the BOLSA Review, the basic aim underlying this course is to

"supply a framework in which members of the Brazilian elites can work together and establish methods for the solution of national problems. The present commandant of the ESG...has stressed...that the College acts as a 'powerful instrument of cultural communion' between the civilian and military elites."<sup>4</sup>

The ESG is not merely a planning center for counter-insurgency and national defense strategy -- though this forms a solid part of the curriculum. In the words of BOLSA's Sao Paulo correspondent, Brazil's military rulers hold the belief that "national security is a function of the overall potential of the country rather than of its military potential, and that the way to achieve it lies in fostering the general development of the country". The armed forces thus "believe that they have an important stake, and even a right to intervene in the process of development."<sup>5</sup> Therefore, there is a heavy emphasis on political, social and economic problems of development in addition to the usual military and security studies.

The influence of the ESG in forming a cohesive elite in Brazil is further enhanced by its nationwide network of *adesguianos* or graduates (from ADESG, the initials of the *Associacao dos Diplomados da ESG*). ADESG holds refresher seminars for graduates and publishes a house journal on important national topics. Each ministry of the present government includes in its organization a department of security and intelligence headed by an *adesguiano*. Seven cabinet members are themselves ESG graduates.<sup>6</sup>

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The story of the Escola Superior de Guerra - told only very briefly here - is a good example of how a relatively small investment by the United States can have tremendous leverage in training a governing elite and shaping the ideology and destiny of a major country such as Brazil....all this with a very low U.S. profile.



The indications are that the ESG's influence will increase over the next few years. In his address to the College on the 10th of March, 1970, President Medici recommended that it should play an increasingly active and authoritative part in the governing process.



"It's more practical to divide the profits among 2,000 generals than among 10 million Brazilians." Rius in Siempre, Mexico City

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Nelson A. Rockefeller, "Quality of Life in the Americas". Report of a U.S. Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere, *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. LXI, December 8, 1969, pp. 502-15.
2. *BOLSA Review*, January 1971, p. 2
3. *Ibid*, p. 6
4. *Ibid*, p. 4
5. *Ibid*, pp. 4-5
6. *Ibid*, pp. 5-6
7. *Ibid*, p. 6

Note: The primary sources for this article, in addition to the cited BOLSA article, were "Where Soldiers Learn to Rule", *Newsweek*, January 5, 1970, p. 27, and information supplied by a veteran U.S. foreign correspondent with wide experience in Brazil.

## Maria Paiva's Desperate Plea for Justice

The following is a letter written by a woman whose husband's whereabouts and fate is still unknown.

To: The President and Members of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations

Honorable Sirs:

This letter is sent to you by a woman who had her house invaded by men with weapons drawn, calling themselves security agents. They came first to arrest her husband, Rubens Beyrodt Paiva, an engineer, without a court order or warrant from any military police authority, and then, a day later, herself and her adolescent daughter Eliana, 15 years old, leaving her other small children to fend for themselves.

This is also a letter from a mother who has been shocked to the very core of her soul to watch the arrest of her daughter, whose head was first covered with a bag, as was her mother's, and forced to submit - outside the mother's presence - to the psychological assault, so traumatic to one of her age, of the interrogation procedures prescribed by so-called military methods. For a Brazilian woman, herself the victim of sudden arrest, held incommunicado for twelve days, interrogated for hours on end, cut off from the world, in physical and human surroundings better not described, which - who knows - some day she may have the good fortune to forget.

What of the wife, who still today has no idea what happened to her husband, or what fate has been inflicted on him, or where he can now be found, or the specific accusations made against him? For almost a month has passed since this torment has fallen upon this family.

All this began on January 20th, Saint Sebastian's Day (Patron of Rio de Janeiro) around twelve o'clock, just as Rubens was returning from the beach with the children and we were together at home at 80 Delfim Moreira Avenue in Leblon.

Rubens was arrested then. My daughter and I, the following day. Eliana was freed the day after and I, myself, last February 2nd.

We were all held at the Military Police headquarters, on Barao Mesquita Street, here in Rio de Janeiro.

At the headquarters they showed me the registry book of their prisoners where I saw with my own eyes my photograph and that of Eliana and that of Rubens. At this headquarters they informed me, during the interrogations to which I was subjected, that my husband was also being held there.

On being released, on the second of February, I saw in the patio our automobile which Rubens had driven when arrested accompanied by security agents. I identified it and one of the officials told me that I could have the car soon.

As it was impossible for me to drive at the moment my niece, Renee Paiva Guimaraes, with my authorization, picked it up later having furnished a receipt, a copy of which is enclosed for your verification.

On leaving the prison, I learned that my mother, as she had done for me, had been taking clothes for Rubens to the second floor of the Ministry of War. Initially, they were accepted; some days later, however, they were refused with the allegation that Rubens was not to be found in any military unit under the command of the First Army. This allegation coincided with information filed officially with the Superior Military Tribunal in the writs of habeas corpus petitions in Rubens' and my behalf, by our attorney, Dr. Lino Machado Jr. Much to our surprise and regret, the reply stated that neither Rubens nor I myself had ever been under arrest at any units of the First Army.

I was informed of a news release - which torments me day and night - that had been distributed to the newspapers and appeared on television on January 22, insinuating that my husband had been the target of a kidnapping operation carried out by groups of terrorists. The incredibility of this interpretation of what happened to us is astonishing; it has all the marks of contemptuous ridicule. Reports have appeared with the name of Rubens Paiva, still others which omit his name and simply allude to an important political prisoner, a former Congressman from Sao Paulo, whose political rights were revoked in 1964.



I cannot, and will not, believe that my country would allow a human being to disappear in this way for such a length of time.

Rubens is a man of goodwill, an exemplary father of his family, a competent engineer, a just and honored citizen, an able and responsible businessman. Those who know him, confirm this. As a Congressman for Sao Paulo, his political rights were suspended in 1964. Since then, no military police inquiries or indictments have been initiated against him. Never has any accusation of any kind been made against him. What is he accused of now? His wife and children have the right to know. What have they done with Rubens? Where is he? Where have they taken him? Why don't they carry out laws now in force? I reaffirm for my husband the right to be arrested according to the rules of the penal security legislation. So that he can defend himself, so that he can be freed.

And now, what of the obligation of the country that solemnly avowed in its constitution, at the

dawn of the Republic, and in international circles, that it was a Christian and civilized nation which endorsed the principles of the Universal Human Rights Commission of the UN and OAS? How can it allow the terrible insecurity of abduction and kidnapping that has now become official?

I appeal to Your Honors, members of this eminent Council, institutionally founded for the defense of the rights of human beings. I appeal in order that they will permit Rubens to exercise his right to defend himself, which cannot be denied, and to identify the place where he can be found, the authority that has detained him, specifying the crime of which he is charged, and finally to preserve his physical and spiritual integrity, or rather, his life.

I am, Honorable Sirs, most respectfully yours,

Maria Eunice Paiva

## Frank Mankiewicz and Tom Braden

# Brazilian Blood on Our Hands

IN 1962, when Rubens Be-roydt Paiva was elected—at the age of 34—to the Brazilian Congress from his native Sao Paulo as a member of one of the moderate parties, he was thought to have a bright political future. Today, his family and friends believe he has been beaten to death by the Brazilian police. That brutal fact says a lot about Brazil, and perhaps more about U.S. policy in Latin America.

In the spring of 1964, Paiva was heading a legislative inquiry into a shadowy operation called IBAD, the Portuguese initials for Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action. IBAD, an organization formed by big business and extreme conservatives, was involved in supporting political campaigns with secret contributions and also financing friendly congressmen.

As Paiva's investigation began to get close to the bone—some Brazilians say as it was about to expose the role of large American business interests in IBAD—the government of President Goulart was over-

thrown by the Brazilian military, and Congress was dissolved. The generals were able to move as confidently as they did because the U.S. Embassy was convinced that Goulart was about to turn the country over to Communism, and had furnished the generals with assurance of diplomatic recognition in advance of the coup.

Paiva, along with other opposition congressmen, was deprived of his political rights, but not otherwise molested. Later that year, he became the editor of *Ultima Hora*, a major afternoon newspaper, and remained editor for four years.

AS EDITOR, Paiva was occasionally critical of the military regime, but far less so than many of his colleagues, some of whose papers were harassed by the government. Indeed, Paiva was criticized during this period by some oppositionists for having "sold out" and for insufficient militancy.

In December, 1968, a Congress, composed of members handpicked by the generals, refused in a surprising show of independence to lift the

legislative immunity of one of its members, Marcio Maureira Alves, and the generals responded by abolishing even this tame legislature. Alves fled the country, and Paiva—by now convinced that his journalistic role was useless—resigned his editorship and went back to the engineering business for which he had been trained.

It was as a quiet and non-political structural engineer that he was arrested last Jan. 20, along with his wife and his 16-year-old daughter. His daughter was released the next day, his wife twelve days later after being confined in First Army headquarters. Since that time, Paiva's wife has heard nothing from him or about his fate.

The Army denies that it has Paiva in custody, although it has returned his clothing and personal effects to his wife. But friends since released from prison have told her that he was seen two days after her release, "in bad condition" from apparent beatings and torture. The denial of re-

sponsibility by the Army, and the failure even to admit that Paiva is under arrest, has led his friends both here and in Rio de Janeiro to assume that he has been killed.

For Americans, this is a double tragedy, for few Brazilians doubt that a stern telephone call from the American ambassador or the military mission to the appropriate authority would have saved Paiva, or could save him now if he is alive. It is our strong support of Brazil at every level—our diplomacy, our military assistance, our "public safety" program which furnishes assistance to the very military police who have instituted torture as an acceptable investigating technique—which keeps in unchecked power the most repressive regime in the Western Hemisphere.

We busily denounce the leftist government of Chile—which is, after, elected by its people. But the shame of Latin America is the blood of Rubens Paiva, and that blood is not on Brazilian hands alone.

© 1971, Los Angeles Times

Source: The Washington Post, March 23, 1971.

## Film Interview with the 70

A one hour color film of interviews with seventeen of the 70 prisoners released in exchange for the Swiss Ambassador plus reconstructions of tortures they endured is now available for local showings. For details write: "Torture in Brazil", Dove Films, 722 North Seward Street, Hollywood, Ca. 90038.



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