

Hunger Strike by Political Prisoners

Those who oppose the dictatorship in Brazil today have no rights at all, especially when arrested, and are subjected to all kinds of arbitrary actions: they are kept incommunicado for months without knowing the reason why they were arrested; it is impossible for families to get news about relatives who have been arrested; and according to a recent statement by the southern region of the National Council of Brazilian Bishops, the prisoners were subjected to "physical, psychological and moral tortures leading to mutilation, the breakdown of health and even death."¹ Even the lawyers who defend political prisoners "are subjected to pressure and humiliating interrogations."²

The recent hunger strike by political prisoners in Sao Paulo's Tiradentes Prison has attracted worldwide attention to the conditions faced by growing numbers of political prisoners in Brazil. The Tiradentes Prison had previously been closed by government authorities because of unhygienic conditions. But as the repression carried out by the regime swelled the number of prisoners in the late sixties, the prison was again put into use without any improve-

ment in the physical conditions.³ The Washington Post reports that the Tiradentes prisoners are

jammed into cells designed to hold one fourth their number, denied adequate medical care and physical exercise, and subjected to the threat of being taken from their cells and tortured by political police, according to copies of letters supposedly written by prisoners and smuggled out.⁴

The smuggling of letters has led the military authorities to declare that there was a "terrorist cell" at Tiradentes Prison.⁵ In order to destroy this "terrorist cell" on May 11 the authorities transferred five political prisoners from Tiradentes Prison to Sao Paulo's Carandiru State Prison. Protesting this move and fearing that the transfers were meant to isolate prisoners who would then be quietly killed, on May 12, 36 political prisoners, including three Dominican priests and the five transferred prisoners, began a hunger strike. The authorities responded the same day by transferring 13 more prisoners to Carandiru.⁶

The prisoners' fear of being isolated and killed is based on past practice of the Brazilian authorities. The official explanation in the past has usually been that the prisoner was killed while trying to escape -- the deaths of former Labor Party Deputy Rubens Paiva⁷ and of Eduardo (Bacuri) Leite⁸ are two examples. A Brazilian priest recently sent this BULLETIN a letter estimating that over 160 political prisoners have been killed in this way.

Between the 15th and the 17th of May, 19 additional prisoners were sent to the Casa de Detencao in Sao Paulo and a 17 year old political prisoner participating in the strike was transferred to Operacao Bandeirantes and jailed in the same torture chamber where in April 1971 he saw his father die as a consequence of tortures. On May 17, the sixth day of the strike, Werner Rodrigues, head of the Department of Prisons of the state of Sao Paulo, promised the strikers that the prisoners would be reunited and the strike was called off.

Since by the 5th of June his promise had not been implemented, the prisoners sent letters to the Carandiru State Prison and to the Archbishop of Sao Paulo, Evaristo Arns, stating that they were going to resume their hunger strike if the prisoners were





Drawing by Paco, in
MARCHA (Montevideo)

not reunited by the 10th of June. The government's response came on June 7 when the three Dominican priests and three more prisoners were transferred to the far off Presidente Wenceslau State Prison near the Matto Grosso border.⁹

As a consequence, on June 8 the 36 political prisoners resumed the hunger strike and named Archbishop Arnas as the only person whom they would accept as a mediator. The military authorities refused to let the Archbishop talk with the prisoners.¹⁰ On June 9, as a further reprisal, the authorities sent two prisoners to Operacao Bandeirantes where they were barbarously tortured for five days.¹¹

On June 21 the Catholic Church's newspaper, *O Sao Paulo*, published an appeal signed by 37 student organizations, 46 students, intellectuals, professors and artists and 36 priests from Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The text read:

We appeal to the responsible authorities to attend the political prisoners' demands -- Human conditions of life and sheltering of them in the same prison -- which are guaranteed to them by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by the Federal Constitution.¹²

This appeal was remarkable in that it was the first time since the promulgation of Institutional Act Number 5 in December, 1968¹³ that such a broad group of institutions and people other than the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops, dared to publicly take a stand against the decisions of the dictatorship.

On June 24, the Supreme Military Court turned down a request for returning the three Dominican priests to Tiradentes prison.¹⁴ The hunger strike apparently ended sometime between the 13th and 15th of July without the demands of the prisoners being met.¹⁵

The strike, however, was not a failure. It called attention, both in Brazil and around the world, to what is going on inside Brazilian prisons, as can be seen in the variety of sources cited for this article. The international concern aroused by the hunger strike is illustrated by appeals such as the one published by *O Sao Paulo* and an appeal made by Amnesty International¹⁶ and by the Cardinal head of the Catholic Church of Holland to the Brazilian Minister of Justice.¹⁷ Readers of this Bulletin can help keep alive the protest of these prisoners by writing to the Brazilian ambassador in Washington

and to the Brazilian Minister of Justice denouncing the treatment of prisoners in Brazil, and by writing to congressmen expressing opposition to any further U.S. military aid to Brazil.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Prisoners Tortured, Brazilian Bishops Say," *The Miami Herald*, 6/13/72.
2. "Deputado Envia Apelo a Buzaid," *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 6/3/72.
3. "Encarceramento de Presos Politicos," *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 4/18/72.
4. "Brazil Political Prisoners are Mistreated, Letters Say," *The Washington Post*, 4/14/72.
5. "Three Priests' Plea Denied in Brazil," *The Miami Herald*, 6/25/72; "Procurador Confirma as Razoes da Greve," *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 7/22/72.
6. "Sociedade Pede Por Prisoneiros em Sao Paulo," *Jornal do Brasil*, 7/14/72.
7. "La Dictadura Brasileira Asesino a Rubens Paiva," *Frente Brasileiro de Informaciones--Suplemento Especial #1*, June 1971; "Mysterious Disappearance of Paiva," *Brazilian Information Bulletin #2*, March, 1971; "Maria Paiva's Desperate Plea for Justice," *BIB #3*, May 1971; "Case of Missing Engineer Stirs Political Controversy in Brazil," *The New York Times*, 8/13/71 (reprinted in *BIB #5*, August-September 1971).
8. "Murder of Eduardo (Bacuri) Leite," *BIB #1*, February, 1971.
9. Jack Anderson, "The Washington Merry-go-Round," *The Washington Post*, 7/3/72.
10. *Ibid.*
11. "Trois Dominicains Incarceres a Sao Paulo Adressent une Lettre a Paul VI," *Le Monde*, 7/14/72. See also letter reprinted below.
12. "Um Pedido: Melhores Condicoes Aos Presos," *Jornal da Tarde*, 7/1/72.
13. For a description of Institutional Act Number 5, see *Terror in Brazil*, distributed by the Latin America Bureau, U.S. Catholic Conference, Washington, D.C.
14. "Three Priests' Plea Denied in Brazil," *The Miami Herald*, 6/25/72.
15. "Brazil Prisoners Apparently Fail," *The New York Times*, 7/16/72; "Procurador Confirma as Razoes da Greve," *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 7/22/72.
16. "Sociedade Pede por Prisoneiros em Sao Paulo," *Jornal do Brasil*, 7/14/72.
17. "Igreja da Holanda Pede Pelos Presos," *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 7/22/72.

Lawyer's Petition for Hunger Striker

The following is excerpted from a letter written in Rio on June 14, 1972 by the defense attorney for one of the hunger strikers mentioned in the above article.

"Exalted Sir Attorney General of Military Justice:

" I, Eny Raymundo Moreira, defense attorney for Paulo de Tarso Vannuchi, inform and request of your excellency the following:

" Paulo de Tarso Vannuchi has been jailed under the deposition of the Appeals Judge of the Second Military Court of the Second C.J.M.* since February 18, 1972, to respond to a process before that court.

"Frequently, by order of the Appeals Judge, the prisoner has been removed from the prison where he is to be tried and taken to the DOI (ex OBAN)** of the State of Sao Paulo, where he has been submitted to the shame of being tortured.

" Every time he is taken away, the defense, by means of a writ of habeas corpus,*** protests this action to the Appeals court to force the return of the prisoner to Tiradentes Prison.

" It has been about one month since Paulo de Tarso was transferred to the Detention House. There the prisoners have organized a hunger strike and in response, the authorities have transferred these prisoners to different prisons throughout the State of Sao Paulo

" On the 9th, last Friday, by order of the Appeals Judge, Paulo de Tarso was taken to the DOI where there was an attempt to force him to eat.

" Yesterday, the 13th, during a hearing of inquiry of witnesses, the prisoner was presented in the courtroom in a lamentable state because he was violently tortured by police who specialize in torture. He was presented with a hematoma of the left eye, signs of strangulation on the neck, hematoma of the left genitals and left leg and other scars.

" In fulfilling her difficult mission, the defense attorney called in the Appeals Judge to interview Paulo de Tarso in the presence of the Attorney

General. She told the judge that he had refused to eat the food they forced on him, for which, besides all the tortures already applied, they forced open his anal orifice to introduce milk.

" In this way, I, the petitioner, have given you an opportunity to hear the worse humiliations of a human being in the basement of the political police.

" The only providence admitted by the Appeals Judge was the immediate removal of Paulo de Tarso to the House of Detention, promising that he will no longer be taken from there to the DOI....

" The petitioner ...requests your Excellency to ...:

1. Order an immediate competent medical examination of the prisoner to determine the criminal wounds all over his body caused by the barbarous acts of those dangerous and crazy men.

2. Give this political prisoner the treatment that as a human being he deserves.

" The destiny and the fate of Paulo de Tarso Vannuchi is waiting on your Excellency, a dignified person, competent and humane, to start an inquiry to find those responsible for one more crime perpetrated by the political police.


I ask your deference,

Rio de Janeiro, June 14, 1972
(signed) Eny Raymundo Moreira,
Order of Brazilian Lawyers inscription
number 16912, Rio de Janeiro.

* Circumscricao Juridica Militar

** OBAN, short for Operacao Bandeirantes, was a pilot project to coordinate military and police counter-insurgency activities. OBAN is now called DOI, Department of Internal Operations.

*** In the case of political prisoners such as Paulo de Tarso Vannuchi, the writ of habeas corpus means little, since Institutional Act # 5 (passed in 1968) suspended the guarantee of habeas corpus in the cases of political crimes committed against the national security, economic and social order and the popular economy.



Bishops & 2 International Groups Denounce Torture

Amnesty Group Accuses Brazil Of Torturing Political Prisoners

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Sept. 6.—The organization Amnesty International, in a report alleging torture of Brazilian political prisoners, has named more than 1,000 Brazilians it says were ill-treated, and asserted it had names of 472 Brazilians responsible for their sufferings.

The report, issued here yesterday, said that the names of the torturers would be made available only to a limited number of international organizations and to the Brazilian Government.

Amnesty International is an independent organization, which has consultative status of the United Nations and the Council of Europe, an 18-nation group that seems to promote European unity. It works for the release of people imprisoned solely because of their beliefs. Several of its officials are well-known activists.

Main Torture Centers

The report charges severe beatings, electric shocks administered to the sexual organs and other parts of the body of men and women prisoners, simulated executions and other methods of psychological torture.

Other documents mentioned in the report tell of a woman raped in front of her husband by one of his torturers and of children tortured in front of their parents and vice-versa.

The report said that torture by the police and military went on in virtually all Brazilian prisons. The main torture centers, it says, are São Paulo's Operacao Bandeirantes and Rio de Janeiro's Cenimar prisons.

Sean MacBride, chairman of Amnesty International, and a former External Affairs Minister of Ireland, in his preface called on the Brazilian Government to "respond to the very serious charges" raised in the report and permit an independent inquiry panel to enter Brazil. Amnesty International has been refused such permission.

The report, which coincided with the 150th anniversary of Brazil's independence, speaks of groups of off-duty policemen—"the notorious death squads"—saying they capture people they consider criminals and kill them. It is strongly critical of the judicial procedure for political trials and says there are thousands of political prisoners who have been awaiting trials for almost three years.

The report gave what it said were detailed depositions of 11 former political prisoners. Their cases were chosen, it said, because they were outside of Brazil and safe from reprisals. Amnesty said: "Where it was not possible for the Amnesty representative to interview those involved, an effort was nonetheless made to select documents which appeared reliable and which were corroborated by supportive material."

Many of the depositions identified not only people forced to watch the torture but the torturers as well. The inquiry was carried out in April and May, 1972, and covers three years beginning in 1968. The report maintained that there was abundant evidence that torture continued to be used by Brazilian police and other security agencies not only for interrogation but also for intimidation.

Brazil Bishops Hit Renewed Prison Torture

BY LEONARD GREENWOOD
Times Staff Writer

RIO DE JANEIRO—A powerful group of Roman Catholic Church leaders has accused Brazil of torturing political prisoners physically, mentally and morally so that some of them are mutilated, broken in health or even die. The church leaders recalled that they had urged the government to stop torture two years ago. But they added that the church now has evidence of a sufficient number of recent cases to know that "substantially the situation has not changed since that time."

In a declaration of unprecedented bluntness, the bishops flatly rejected government claims that individual freedoms have been suspended so that

the country can progress in peace and security.

"It is exactly the absence of these freedoms and especially habeas corpus that has created this climate of insecurity," the bishops said. The declaration went on to list some of the problems.

Feeling of Threat

There are, it said, "the insecurity of people who feel themselves threatened with prisoner maltreatment on mere suspicion or even by mistake. The insecurity of entire families who find it impossible for months to obtain information about missing members who have been arrested. The insecurity of the whole society which today is incapable of confiding in those which have the responsibility for the protection of the people."

"The restoration of a climate of confidence in justice," the declaration went on, "would certainly ease the fears of Brazil's families and of all its people."

The declaration was issued two days after the end of a special meeting of the southern section of the Brazilian Council of Bishops.

LOS ANGELES TIMES, JUNE 12, 1972

Unit Cites Brazil For Torture

By Dan Griffin

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has said that it is convinced that there have been "serious cases of torture, abuse and maltreatment" of prisoners in Brazil, although it adds that it can't prove it.

The findings, seen as a sharp slap at Brazil, are contained in a strong resolution approved by the commission but not published. The Washington Post was able to obtain a copy.

The commission, whose headquarters are in Washington, held that there is a "persuasive presumption" of torture and abuse of prisoners, but said that difficulties have hindered the carrying out of the examination of

torture charges and prevented the commission from gathering "absolutely conclusive proof of the truth or untruth" of the allegations.

Although the resolution does not specifically mention it, one of the "difficulties" is the Brazilian government's refusal to let the commission send an observer to Brazil to investigate the charges.

The commission is made up of seven individuals elected by the Council of the Organization of American States, the parent body, to investigate the protection of human rights throughout the hemisphere.

In effect, the commission is calling on Brazil to either substantiate or abandon its claim that torture of prisoners is simply a result of individual "excesses" rather than a standard policy of Brazilian security agencies.

The commission asks the Brazilian government to "carry out a thorough investigation... in charge of independent judges, not subject to military or police influence, with all the guarantees

of due process" and to "inform the commission of the results of the investigation."

Brazil is also asked to punish any individuals found responsible for violations of human rights of prisoners.

The commission's resolution, which deals with cases dating as far back as 1970, is the latest in a series of steps that have consumed nearly two years.

In October of 1970, the commission sent the Brazilian government information it had received charging specific cases of torture of political prisoners, and requested further information.

At the same time, it requested Brazil's permission to send an observer to check out the charges.

Nearly three months later, in a letter signed by Brazilian Foreign Minister Mario Gibson Barbosa, Brazil refused to allow a commission observer to enter. It did, however, comment on the cases individually.

Since then, the commission has continued to gather information about these cases and

others in which torture is charged. The Latin American agencies of the National Council of Churches and of the U.S. Catholic Conference have been among those furnishing the commission with detailed information on alleged cases of torture.

In the new resolution, the commission said that it would like to be able to examine the results of Brazil's investigation of the charges "at its next regular session," which is scheduled for October.

If the commission is not satisfied with the Brazilian response, it can report the case to the OAS at its next meeting, next spring.

Brazilian officials here declined to comment on the resolution or to indicate whether their government plans to carry out the investigation.

It is unlikely, in fact, to do so, because the Brazilian position has consistently been that the matter is an internal affair involving an issue of national sovereignty.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 7, 1972

THE WASHINGTON POST, JUNE 4, 1972

New Forms of Torture: The Inferno & The Freezer

The following document on new forms of torture is excerpted and translated from a longer report on political conditions within Brazil which was recently received by this BULLETIN from contacts inside the country.

Torture has not come to an end, instead it has increased in intensity and at the end of 1971 reached new heights of sophistication. The methods described below are practiced in Rio de Janeiro, state of Guanabara, in the 1st BPE (1st Battalion of Military Police under the command of Col. Homem de Carvalho), where CODI (Center of Internal Security Operations) functions. In other states the pau de arara (parrot's perch), electric shock treatments, beatings and palm beatings continue. In the state of Guanabara this type of physical violence is no longer practiced by CODI, though in the other security bureaus such as CISA, DOPS, CENIMAR etc., traditional torture methods continue to be used.


CODI has adopted a new torture technique. Perhaps this method of torture is an old one, but its forms are renewed by the implementation of advanced technology such as the use of computers and stereophonic sound and by the "higher callings" of the torturers (electronic engineers, electricians, doctors, psychologists, psychoanalysts, nurses and computer technicians). The aim of all torture activity is the penetration of the emotional and psychological structures of the individual through his physical (sensory) parts, and by this means obtaining desired information. The violence done to the physical parts of the "patient" over a period of days has as its goal his conversion into an animal, in which state his instinctive reaction toward self-

preservation, his hunger and thirst, predominate over the complex and sophisticated reactions of a human being inspired by the ideal of human freedom.

As soon as an individual is captured, he is subjected to interrogation accompanied by slight physical torture. The interrogation lasts from 5 to 20 hours, depending on the resistance offered by the person being tortured, the judgement of the doctor, and the advice of the psychologist. On the other hand, at the first sign of fatigue on the part of the interrogator, be it perspiration, irritation, etc., he is replaced. (As a rule, each interrogator works for less than an hour).

The interrogation room (called the "inferno") is brightly lit and hot. The interrogators use earphones. Microphones are placed around the room. Earphones and microphones are connected to the control room. The chiefs and advisors of the interrogation remain in the control room. The control room is dark and is connected to the "inferno" by means of a glass partition, a one-way mirror allowing monitoring of proceedings from the control room.

The psychologists and doctors, (among others, the captain Dr. Continho, who is from CENIMAR but is on loan to CODI), the political specialists (Lt. Garcez, ex-commander of PIC, the Criminal Investigation Squad, which is the Internal Police unit of the PE, as well as the Frigate Capt. Jacob Sinval Gadelha, also from CENIMAR on loan to CODI), and analysts who specialize in the political organizations and type of work carried out by the prisoner---this personnel is all located in the control room and works out of it.




A Central de Operações carioca, superior à da Scotland Yard, obtém fotos rapidamente

"CODI in Rio, superior to Scotland Yard, retrieves photos rapidly."

JORNAL DO BRASIL

August 11, 1972

Among the aforementioned analysts are: the Brig. Carlos Afonso Dellamora (the recently fired head of CISA), an expert on the workers movement; Maj. Zembsky, a specialist in matters relating to MR-8 and the student movement; Maj. Gomes Carneiro, a specialist in the PCBR and COLINA; Francisco Pinotti, who has tortured and murdered from the time Getulio Vargas was in power with his "Estado Novo", is today chief of torture and a specialist in the workers movement and the PCB; "Jacananda", the captain of the Firemen's Corps, an expert on the ALN; and finally, Capt. Gumerindo, an expert on the VPR. These are some of the individuals who in one way or another are working in some form of torture activity. Still others are specialized in church movements; all function as a team.



They are part of the torture ensemble which functions in the context of the control room that is at the executive end of all electric and electronic equipment. The interrogation is directed by telephone by the analysts, psychologists and directors who decide when it should be interrupted and when an interrogator should be substituted.

Each response is fed into the computer, which indicates any discrepancy with previous answers or with facts known to CODI about the organization under investigation. Two minutes after any such slip is recorded, the interrogator is told about it over the telephone. The computer notes the discrepancy, explains the reasons which can explain it and furnishes the relevant data on which its opinion is based.

The length of the interrogation will depend on the reactions of the prisoner, always subject to the advice of the psychologists and doctors in attendance. When there is a break in the questioning, the person under interrogation is removed to the fourth room in the interrogation building: the "little music box", also referred to as the "freezer". It is impossible to stand or lie down in the room, given its dimensions: one can only sit. It is totally dark and the walls give off shocks so leaning on them is totally out of the question. The room is cold, in contrast to the interrogation "inferno"; it is very draughty and electronic music is piped in at different volume levels, very high or low. One of these sounds is that of structural collapse, giving the impression that the ceiling is about to cave in. The

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

ALN Acao Libertadora Nacional (Action for National Liberation). Started in late 1967 as the Sao Paulo Communist grouping, led by Carlos Mari-ghela.

CENIMAR Centro de Informacoes da Marinha (Navy Intel- ligence Agency). Known as one of the worst torturers in Brazil.

CISA Centro de Informacoes de Seguranca da Aero- nautica (Air Force Center for Security Infor- mation). CISA is located at Galeao, Rio's international airport.

CODI Centro de Operacoes de Defesa Interna (Center of Internal Security Operations). A recently created umbrella organization that coordina- tes all counterinsurgency operations in Brazil (such as CENIMAR, OBAN etc.) CODI is located in the 1st Battalion of the Policia do Exercito, on Barao de Mesquita street in the Tijuca section of Rio. CODI has a clandestine prison in the Tijuca forest above Rio.

COLINA Comando de Libertacao Nacional (National Liberation Command). An armed organization formed in 1967 in the state of Minas Gerais and in Rio de Janeiro.

DOPS Departamento de Ordem Politica e Social (Department of Public and Social Order). DOPS is the investigative division of the Federal

and State Police. Its headquarters is on the third floor of the Police Building on Rela- cao street in Rio. DOPS also uses the 3rd floor of the main building of the Santos Dumont airport in downtown Rio for torturing prisoners.

OBAN Operacao Bandeirantes. Soon after the 1964 military coup OBAN was created to coordinate military and police counterinsurgency activi- ties. It operated mostly in the state of Sao Paulo. Today, most of its functions have been taken over by CODI, a move to create a national organization.

PCB Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party). Founded in 1922, for many years underground.

PCBR Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionario (Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party). Broke away from the PCB on the question of methods of work.

PE Policia do Exercito (Army Police). In this article, reference is to the PE of the 1st Infantry Division, located in Vila Militar on Avenida Duque de Caxias, Rio de Janeiro. The PE are among the worst torturers in Brazil.

VPR Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria (Revolu- tionary People's Vanguard). A militant group that began armed actions with ex- soldiers and sailors in 1968.

room begins to shake in conjunction with certain sounds.

The function of this room is to prevent the prisoner from thinking of sleep and to disrupt his emotional stability. When ears are covered to shut out the sound the volume is increased. One-way mirrors look in on the room. Now and then the lights are turned on and they are so blinding that sometimes vision is impaired. At times the music is interrupted and the interrogation continues with the speakers on at peak volume. The torturer tries to demoralize the prisoner.

Interrogation in the "inferno" is interlaced with sessions in the "freezer"; all notion of time is lost. Gas poisoning is simulated inside the "freezer"; a pellet is dropped and makes a characteristic sound as it evaporates, and the torturer advises the prisoner not to breathe, saying that the pellet was dropped by mistake; the prisoner is removed from the "freezer". On the other occasions the presence of a snake is simulated, etc.

The doctor tests the "patient" before each session and orders that he be served

water or weak soup, just enough to keep the prisoner alive. The prisoner tends to become animalized. The days pass and the prisoner loses track of day and night. All the torturers eat sandwiches in the presence of the prisoner. The prisoner reaches the point of madness. All those imprisoned by CODI after July 1971 were tortured in this way.

State Elections Cancelled

"The (Brazilian) government has now postponed state elections which had been fixed for 1974 in the Constitution promulgated by the armed forces in 1969. And President Medici declared only a few days ago that Brazil will maintain its curbs on the basic freedoms and special powers to purge politicians and to hold suspected subversives indefinitely without trial"

From a New York Times editorial, August 10, 1972

Dictatorship vs. a Minor

The following information is from a communique issued June 3, 1972 by the MR-8 (the October 8th Revolutionary Movement). By disseminating this information the MR-8 hopes to save the life of Cesar Queiros Benjamin.

*** ***

On August 30, 1971 Cesar Queiros Benjamin, a member of the MR-8, was arrested in the State of Bahia. After holding him incommunicado the Army finally admitted they held him when his family presented undeniable evidence of his detention.

Throughout his detention the Army has considered him a "special case". Because he is young (17), and had an important position in the revolutionary movement and because he yielded no information during the tortures he was submitted to, the military authorities consider him a "dangerous element of moral stimulation". Thus he has been held in solitary confinement since his arrest.

The Army is faced with a particular problem in the Benjamin case -- at the time of his arrest he was under Brazilian law, a minor and thus cannot be tried. The authorities have tried all kinds of schemes to avoid his release: a psychological test to prove his mental age was in fact 35 so "he was responsible for his acts"; 32 trials are being organized by the military courts to keep him in jail indefinitely.



Cesar Queiros Benjamin

Another alternative is simple murder. There is evidence that high ranking officers have already studied a plan to fabricate an escape attempt in which he would be killed -- a method which has already been used to cover up the murder under torture of former Labor Party deputy Rubens Paiva and the assassination of the revolutionary leader Eduardo Leite.*

* For more on Paiva and Leite see Brazilian Information Bulletin #'s 1, 2, and 3.

Bankruptcy of the Economic Miracle

The last few months saw an increasing level of criticism directed at the glaring injustices in Brazil's so-called "economic miracle." Reprinted below are excerpts from three critiques made by 1) the top Latin America reporter for the Wall Street Journal, 2) World Bank president Robert McNamara, and 3) two former Brazilian government economists.

"While Brazil's real economic growth has averaged 9.8% in the last four years, the boom has had practically no impact at all on well over half the country's 95 million citizens. In fact, millions are actually poorer now than they were five years ago.

"The reason apparently, is that while factories spring up everywhere in this nation they have no use for the millions of unskilled workers; indeed, they tend to throw older workers out of their jobs. Moreover, to combat inflation, the government has held down wage increases so that in most cases a worker's earnings buy less every year. ...

"The problem is most crucial in Northeastern Brazil, a hot, drought-ridden area that is nearly four times the size of California. Nearly one third of all Brazilians live here, but they share only 15% of the nation's output. ... In the last 10 years, the American government has spent almost \$400 million to help develop the region. ...

"Real incomes of employed and partially employed workers for the lower two thirds of the labor force have not increased in the past five years and probably have decreased", says a U.S. State Department report on the region. ("Real incomes" are earnings adjusted to exclude the effect of inflation on purchasing power).



"Factories lured to the area by government tax incentives and other factors now employ about 900,000 workers. But nearly two thirds of these workers earn less than the \$30 a month that the government figures it costs to subsist in the cities. And on the farms, fully 80% of all families earn less than \$50 a year.

".... In addition to these woes, disease is rampant. According to the 1970 census, the rate of infant mortality was a staggering 165.3 per 1,000 live births in Recife, triple the 52.9 in Rio de Janeiro and about 8 times the U.S. rate ... Fully 20% of the children in the region's coastal belt suffer from malnutrition so severe that it has damaged their brains for life, says Dr. Nelson Chaves, a nutritional expert working in the area."

Everett G. Martin in *The Wall Street Journal*, April 21, 1972.

"In 1970, 60% of the nation's workers earned less than \$40 a month. The wealthiest 1% of the country receive 30% of the nation's income."

Everett G. Martin in *The Wall Street Journal*, April 14, 1972.

In his speech last April to the meeting of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD III) in Santiago, Chile, Robert McNamara, president of the World Bank, singled out Mexico and Brazil as countries where income is unevenly distributed. He reported that in 1960 the poorest 40% of the Brazilian population earned 10% of the national income. In 1970 that share dropped to 8%. At the same time, he said, the richest 5% of the population received 29% of the income in 1960 and 38% in 1970.

The Miami Herald, August 27, 1972

Articles in *O Estado de Sao Paulo* by two Brazilian economists who worked for the government, Joao Carolos Duarte and Rodolfo Hoffmann, report that the poorest half of the wage earners are just where they were 10 years ago, while the top 10%'s earnings have increased by 61%.

Lewis Diuguid in *The Washington Post*, August 30, 1972.



Peasants of northeast Brazil
Times drawing by Pete Bentoveja

New U.S. Investments in Brazil

From the point of view of the foreign investor, Brazil is like cat heaven at a time when much if not all the rest of Latin America is becoming a dirty word. By the end of 1971, foreign investment in Brazil had rocketed to about \$5 billion, an estimated 40% -- or \$2 billion -- of which is from the U.S.

U.S. investment in Brazil increased by some \$200 million, the largest dollar increase in Latin America. Indicative of the reception for U.S. private capital in Brazil is the size of the Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce here in Sao Paulo, the Detroit of Latin America. It has 1,650 members.

Don Bohning, in the Miami Herald, August 27, 1972

As the above quote indicates, U.S. investors are leading the rush to Brazil.¹ While neighboring countries in Latin America are taking steps to increase their control of their economies and natural resources, Brazil is throwing itself open to foreign investors, offering them, among other attractions, liberal tax incentives, guarantees against devaluation and expropriation and a labor force whose wages are strictly controlled and which is not allowed to strike.²


The statistics on U.S. investment are impressive and give the idea that these companies are bringing a cornucopia of fiscal, technological and employment benefits to the country. However, on closer examination, serious flaws in this argument begin to appear.³ Examine, for example, the list below of U.S. investments in Brazil which were announced within the last six months.

First, many of these investments produce primarily for the wealthy and the privileged, rather than for the bulk of the population -- products such as automobiles (Ford's Maverick will sell for the equivalent of almost \$5,000)⁴ and color television sets. A side effect of the automobile boom in Brazil is that car loans are becoming one of the largest users of bank loan capital, thus drying up credit for other more socially useful projects.

Secondly, U.S. companies are geared to high technology, capital intensive (low labor use) production since their manufacturing techniques were developed in the United States where labor costs are the highest in the world. Christopher Roper, writing on Brazil in the Manchester Guardian recently described some of the problems introduced by this kind of investment:

... no attention has been given to whether the industries being set up here are capital or labour intensive. In fact, the problem is not just that modern low-cost plants do not employ many workers, they actually put thousands out of work in companies which cannot compete.⁵

Furthermore, U.S. investors do not go to Brazil because they want to raise worker wages and re-establish the right to strike. Ford is investing \$150 million in a new engine plant precisely because wages for auto workers in Brazil are \$100 a month⁶, well



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under half those in Germany and Japan and less than one sixth those in the United States. The New York Times described the attractions Brazil's "ample and cheap" labor pool has for foreign investors:

Industry is new to Brazil and most workers come from wretchedly poor backgrounds ... And their expectations are still quite low. Besides, labor unions exist mostly on paper and strikes are against the law in Brazil.⁷

Thirdly, some U.S. investors see Brazil as a place where they can escape the anti-pollution requirements being applied in the United States. For example, one U.S. correspondent in Brazil reported that "resistance of U.S. cities to foundry smoke undoubtedly was also a factor" in the Ford investment decision.⁸

Fourthly, new investments by U.S. companies do not always bring in new capital. In fact, as seen in the auto loan example above, many tap existing capital sources in Brazil. In the Anderson Clayton investment listed below, the company announced that the capital for the expansion of its agribusiness operations in the country was going to be raised on the local capital market.

Finally, a number of the investments listed below are actually not investments in new productive facilities, rather they are purchases of existing plants -- further examples of the accelerating denationalization of Brazilian industry.

These are just a few examples of the flaws in the arguments favoring foreign investment in Brazil. They do not even begin to touch on the broader questions of what kinds of political and economic pressures U.S. corporate and banking giants, aligned with U.S. and international lending agencies, are bringing to bear on the country and what consequences this will have for the future of the Brazilian people. And they say nothing of the responsibility U.S. investors share in the creation and support of today's dictatorial regime in Brazil.

REFERENCES

1. For previous BULLETIN articles about foreign investment in Brazil see #1, pp. 4-5; #4, pp. 6-8; #5, p. 3; #6, pp. 9, 10, 12-14; #7, p. 10.
2. For a description of some of the generous tax holidays and other investment incentives see: Brazil: New Business Power in Latin America (Business Int'l. Corp., 757 Third Ave, NY, NY 10017), 1971, 92 pp., \$60; and Guia de Incentivos Fiscais (Editora Abril, Avda. Otaviano Alves de Lima 800, 5º andar, Sao Paulo), a supplement to VEJA # 185.
3. For a more complete discussion of the effects of foreign investment see Yanqui Dollar: The Contribution of U.S. Private Foreign Investment to Underdevelopment in Latin America, (NACLA, Box 226, Berkeley, Calif. 94701) 1972, 64 pp., \$1.
4. San Francisco Chronicle, 10/3/72
5. Christopher Roper, "Brazilian Blemishes" Manchester Guardian/Le Monde weekly edition, 5/13/72.
6. The New York Times, 7/30/72
7. Ibid.
8. San Francisco Chronicle, 10/3/72

An official of the Ministry of Communications charged ITT subsidiary Standard Electrica of Brazil failed to complete the installation of a direct long-distance dialing system within the contracted time limit. In addition, the official declared, the work done was unsatisfactory. The official said that the system was put into operation six months ago -- a delay of more than two years -- and that only 300 of the system's 400 trunk lines worked. An ITT spokesman did not deny the charges.

From The New York Times, April 12, 1972

Note: The information for the following list of U.S. investments in Brazil announced over the last six months was taken from REPORT FROM BANK OF AMERICA'S MAN ON THE SPOT IN BRAZIL (BA), BOLSA REVIEW (BR), and the following newspapers: JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (JC) LOS ANGELES TIMES (LAT), MIAMI HERALD (MH), SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (SFC), NEW YORK TIMES (NYT), and the WALL STREET JOURNAL (WSJ).

Recently Announced U.S. Investments

GENERAL MOTORS CORP. decided to give Brazil top priority for investments outside the U.S. It plans to invest \$103 million this year and another \$50 million a year. The GM Brazilian operations last year showed "more positive results" than those of the firm's three largest subsidiaries -- Opel of West Germany, Vauxhall of England and GM Holden of Australia. (LAT 5/11/72) GM also announced it plans to assemble its off highway Terex brand earthmoving equipment near Belo Horizonte starting early 1973 and will build an \$11.5 million plant to manufacture the units there by mid-1974. The plant will produce off highway earthmoving equipment for construction, mining, logging and industrial applications. (WSJ 9/29/72).

FORD MOTOR CO. will invest \$150 million in the next 2-3 years to build a plant for manufacturing Pinto engines. Half the 255,000 engines produced annually starting in 1974 will be installed in Mavericks for the Brazilian market and the rest will be for export to the US and Europe. Ford president Lee A. Iacocca, on a four day visit, made the announcement after meeting in Brasilia with President Medici. Ford has been operating in Brazil since 1919 and has \$185 million invested in 15 plants. Though the new plant will nearly double the company's investment in the country, it will boost the company's labor force there by less than 25%, adding 4,000 workers to its present 16,500 payroll. "Cheap labor is a main reason for putting the engine export capacity here, though resistance of U.S. cities to foundry smoke undoubtedly was also a factor." (SFC, 10/3/72). Ford has 19% of the Brazilian auto market -- the fastest growing in the world -- considerably behind VW's 55%. (LAT 3/6/72; JC 6/12/72; WSJ 4/14/72; SFC 10/3/72).

AMERICAN HOIST AND DERRICK CO. increased its holdings in Tema Terra Maquinaria S.A. of Campinas, a heavy equipment making subsidiary, from 33% to 100%. (WSJ 9/20/72)

WAGNER ELECTRIC CO. of Newark N.J. (85% owned by STUDEBAKER WORTHINGTON INC.) acquired (subject to approval by Wagner's board) a group of privately owned Brazilian companies for an undisclosed amount of cash. Included in the package are Peterco SA Iluminacao e Electricidade, 4 other companies and 80% of the stock of Projetores Cibie do Brasil SA. All three are in the Peters group of commonly controlled companies managed from Sao Paulo. These companies, which make lighting equipment, auto headlights and rear lights, had combined sales of about \$19 million last year. (WSJ 5/10/72)

ECHLIN MANUFACTURING CO. of Branford Conn., purchased Auto Pecas Henrique Schenk SA of Sao Paulo, maker of automotive electrical parts for an undisclosed amount of cash. Schenk's sales for its latest fiscal year exceeded \$2 million. The company employs 400. (LAT 5/19/72)

SIFCO INDUSTRIES INC. of Cleveland plans a \$5 million expansion of its majority-owned Sao Paulo affiliate. The project will take SIFCO do Brasil, one of the largest forging operations in South America, into the finish machining of diesel engine crankshafts. The engineering and technical assistance contracts for the expansion went to two divisions of the British firm Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd. (GKN). (JC 4/28/72)

The Brazilian government confirmed that its joint venture with U.S. STEEL CORP. in the Amazon jungle has tapped one of the biggest iron ore deposits in the world. The ore reportedly runs as high as 67% richness and the presumed reserves are a phenomenal 6.6 billion tons. The mining venture, 49% owned by U.S. Steel, is in the Carajas mountain range in the state of Para. In April U.S. Steel chairman Edwin H. Gott made a week-long trip through Brazil to survey the \$500 million project and meet with President Medici. On returning from the trip he was presented with the 1972 Man of the Year award by the Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce in New York. In his acceptance speech, besides talking of the mining project, he reported that Mapri, a U.S. Steel-controlled firm which is the major supplier of industrial fasteners for the Brazilian auto industry, "has enjoyed good rates of profit and growth". (JC 5/12/72; WSJ 3/24/72; NYT 4/15/72)

METRO will experiment with Portuguese-dubbed versions of some of their old westerns for the large Brazilian market. WALT DISNEY's Buena Vista Film Co. has done it and found the market lucrative, especially as the cartoon characters are matched to idiomatic Portuguese dialog and subtitles. (JC 6/26/72)

On March 31, 1972 Brazil became the second Latin American country (after Mexico, which began in 1967) to launch nationwide color TV broadcasts. RCA received an order for approximately \$4.6 million in studio and transmitting equipment to convert to color program operation. GENERAL TELEPHONE & ELECTRONIC's Brazilian subsidiary is now making color TV sets and tubes. The company said it started with a 25 inch table color set and it estimates the color-TV market at 50,000 - 80,000 sets this year. (JC 6/23/72; WSJ 4/5/72)

PHELPS DODGE and Philips (Netherlands) created a 50-50 company which will build a plant in Sao Paulo to produce conductors beginning mid-1973. (BR 3/72 p. 154)

DUPONT's wholly owned Brazilian subsidiary will build a \$6 million plant to produce Lycra spandex fiber at Paulina, 80 miles northwest of Sao Paulo. Approximately 125 persons will be employed at the plant. Lycra, a fiber with elastic properties, is used in textile products such as stretch outerwear, foundation garments, swimwear and hosiery. (JC 3/8/72)

UNION CARBIDE CORP. plans to double its industrial gas production in Brazil with a \$10.5 million expansion of its affiliate White Martins' plant in Capuava, Sao Paulo. Union Carbide's Linde Division, a major producer of industrial gasses and equipment, will supply a large part of the equipment, which will be exported from plants in the U.S. White Martins is the largest producer of industrial gases in Brazil, with facilities located in all major industrial areas. (JC 8/2/72; WSJ 3/24/72)

RALSTON PURINA plans to construct a new manufacturing plant at Alta Mograna (LAT 7/30/72)

ANDERSON CLAYTON's Brazilian unit plans to raise about \$9 million in a Brazilian common stock offering. This Houston-based agribusiness giant plans to use the capital to expand its activities in Brazil, including installation of a new plant at Jaguare (Sao Paulo) to produce 200 tons of poultry and animal feed a day. (WSJ 3/9/72; BR 5/72 p. 274).

IBEC, the Rockefeller-controlled conglomerate which already has vast agribusiness and financial operations in Brazil, plans to open Sao Paulo's first wholesale supermarket which will introduce the self-service system. The company, in association with the Dutch MAKRO organization, plans to install 15 large supermarkets in Brazil over the next five years. IBEC is the largest supermarket distributor of foods in South America, with over 50 American-style supermarkets in Venezuela, Peru and Argentina. IBEC also announced it plans to enter the housing field in Brazil. It already has constructed over 14,000 middle and upper middle class houses in Puerto Rico, Peru and Chile. (BA 8/72; WSJ 5/8/72 and corporate annual reports)

CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL CORP. announced it would spend \$46.2 million to double pulp production and increase by 50% the paper making capacity of its 90% owned Brazilian subsidiary, Champion Papel & Celulose SA. The financing will come "principally" from internal cash flow. The Brazilian subsidiary had sales of \$25 million in 1971 but Champion's chairman Karl R. Bendtsen, refused to discuss earnings. (WSJ 8/21/72)

ALLERGAN PHARMACEUTICALS of Irvine California purchased the assets of Brazil's largest specialty producer of ophthalmic products for \$1.3 million (LAT 6/6/72).

XEROX is building a toner plant in Salvador. The production will be sold not only in Brazil but exported to other Latin American countries. (JC 4/14/72)

U.S. BANK NOTE CORP. and Brazilian interests formed a new company, Industrias Graficas U.S. Bank Note do Brasil, with an initial capital of \$2 million, to produce high quality paper for share and bond certificates, banknotes, stamps and checks. (BR 6/72 p. 334)

Brazil Cracks Down on Paper Defying Censorship

By JOSEPH NOVITSKI

Special to The New York Times

RIO DE JANEIRO, Aug. 30—The Brazilian Government has cracked down hard on the single major newspaper in the country that has been consistently defying vague and largely unspecified censorship rules.

Since last Thursday night, federal and state police, censors have been reading the paper, *O Estado de São Paulo*, as it has come off the presses, and authorizing distribution only after each edition has been cleared.

Discussion Forbidden

The reason cited by the police was that the newspaper had not been observing one of the few clearly established censorship rules: The press is forbidden to discuss the maneuvering already under way within the military Government to decide who will succeed President Emílio G. Médici, an army general whose term expires in 1974.

The prohibition was communicated orally to newspapers, magazines and television and radio stations by Government authorities last April.

Government sources affirm

privately that it was established to avoid undercutting President Médici's authority during the last two years of his term.

O Estado de São Paulo ignored the ban regularly, reporting that support was forming behind one or two army generals as possible successors but that the final decision lay firmly in General Médici's hands.

The newspaper's coverage of the presidential succession was typical of the kind of reporting that this year had won for it the reputation among informed Brazilians as one of the best available sources of information about what was going on in the country.

The technique used to make the paper conform with most others, which exercise self-censorship, also represents the Government's last resort in its efforts to control the flow of public information.

O Estado de São Paulo is a conservative but independent newspaper that publishes about 150,000 copies daily in São Paulo, Brazil's largest and richest city, and circulates nationwide.

It is a rich newspaper, but Brazilian editors say that few papers can hold out against the

threat of confiscation. Once printed, they say, a newspaper represents an investment that must be sold. If it cannot be sold the cost of salaries and paper, as well as advertising fees that must be reimbursed, represent a heavy economic loss.

The threat of economic loss caused by seizure of a printed paper is the Government's ultimate weapon. More subtle pressures are normally applied to shape information that is available to the public.

Careful Control

First, information from official sources is carefully controlled by the Government. Then, Brazilian newspapermen report, local police and army authorities have generally established close contact with editors to keep them aware of what would displease the Government.

For example, when Gen. Alejandro A. Lanusse, President of Argentina, spent a tense three-day official visit here earlier this year, newspapers were told through a variety of channels that the Government wanted the tenseness of relations between the two countries de-

emphasized. *O Estado de São Paulo* ignored the suggestion.

The Government can also put police censors into newsrooms, but the tactic is usually avoided. The price for removing censors, a news magazine discovered recently, was to establish self-censorship, according to members of the staff, who declined to have their magazine publicly identified.

Generally taboo subjects for independent reporting include the activities of minuscule urban-guerrilla groups, the constant tension between the Government and the Roman Catholic Church and reports of torture used in police interrogations of suspected terrorists.

The rules and their enforcement vary, however, from city to city. At times, for no immediately apparent reason, they have been enforced more strictly and at times less so. In recent months, all the generally taboo subjects have been reported on cautiously by leading newspapers, using official church statements or court testimony by suspected terrorists on trial who alleged that they had been tortured.

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