

BRAZILIAN

INFORMATION

BULLETIN


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Brazil's Military - Industrial Complex



Under the tutelage of a strong military dictatorship, Brazil is beginning to build a military-industrial complex. Working together, foreign, local and government industries are modernizing the Brazilian Army, increasing its ability to suppress indigenous uprisings. At the same time, an intensive road building program across both the Amazon and Rio de La Plata regions will give Brazil 23 access roads to its 9 South American neighbors. As soon as the roads are completed Brazil will be able to strike out militarily against any unfriendly nation in South America with the largest and best equipped army of the Southern Hemisphere.¹ Brazil thus will be in a position to take over some of the policing operations for the United States in this part of the world. For less money than Washington currently spends and for no risk of North American lives, Brazil will be able to shoulder some of the dirty business of "Hemispheric Security", whether it be suppression of left-leaning

governments in Uruguay, Bolivia or Guyana or, as it did in Santo Domingo in 1965, providing troops to share in occupations of Latin American countries.

Cooperation between the foreign and local industries with the military dictatorship in Brazil has been well planned and financed and is already showing some results. The union of military sword and industrial forge began in 1964 when the Sao Paulo Industrial Federation (FIESP) created the Permanent Group for Industrial Mobilization (GPMI) which, according to its organizers, "will coordinate in a systematic, methodical and permanent way the largest number of factories in order to produce in the shortest period of time industrially possible, the articles the country will need immediately after mobilization is declared."² Among the projects carried out by the GPMI in its efforts to create a smoothly functioning military-industrial complex are tours of major plants such as the visit in August 1971 by 80 top ranking Navy officers to Motores Perkins, Mercedes Benz do Brasil, Philco Radio Television, Siemens do Brasil, Badella Boveri, General Electric and Metal Leve (owned by German interests). The GPMI also takes credit for the "permanent contact" both on a technical and economical level — maintained today between the armed forces and the leading steel mills, automobile factories and numerous other industries.³

In the automotive sector, as a result of heavy foreign investment, Brazil has become virtually self-sufficient in wheeled motor vehicles, but is still dependent on the

United States for some equipment. In 1968, for example, the Brazilian automotive industry delivered 850 wheeled lorries to the Army. It even maintains and refurbishes foreign-purchased vehicles, such as the old Sherman tanks.⁴ While the new diesel motors for these tanks are made in Brazil, some of the sophisticated electronic and hydraulic gear are not. Thus in the next few months Brazil will receive its first shipment of U.S. made M-41 tanks, the most modern in use in Vietnam. In all 300 M-41 tanks will be shipped to Brazil during the next two years, at a cost of \$18,000 each.⁵ Brazil, has, however, developed its own light armored car — the VBB-1 — at the Motor Mechanization Regional Park of the 2nd Military Region in Sao Paulo. This six rubber-wheeled vehicle, now manufactured by Nova Tracao, carries a crew of four, has a range of 750 miles without refueling, and is armed with 30 and 50 caliber machine guns and a 37 mm revolving cannon.⁶

The real military-industrial "success story" in Brazil is Jose Luis Whitaker's Engenheiros Especializados (ENGESA). In 1964 Whitaker developed a system of independent traction, capable of giving each wheel its own autonomy. This system, which he called QT, was, at the time, sought by General Motors and Ford. Rather than sell his patent, Whitaker worked out "a formula close to financing from the army," to produce the independent traction system on special vehicles requisitioned by the various branches of the Brazilian military.⁷ Since each branch put in a different request, today there are at least five different vehicles with the independent traction system: the Boomerang and the Bulhoes heavy military trucks; a scout vehicle; the Brocoto riot control vehicle which is equipped for spraying both water and machine gun bullets; and the recently finished Urutu, an amphibious model, which comes in two forms: one for transporting troops (fourteen men plus driver), and the other "made to combat guerrillas and disturbance in the streets [and which] is equipped with a 90 mm cannon or 7.2 mm MAG machine gun."⁸

The guns carried on these vehicles are local products, some built under royalties from foreign manufacturers, but others developed by Brazilians. Colt-Browning, for example, is adapting the 50 caliber machine gun for air-to-surface roles in Brazil. Also, the Belgian FN FAL rifle is being produced under license in Brazil at a rapidly expanding plant in Itajuba, on the Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais state borders. This same plant will soon begin to produce a machine gun under the Italian Beretta patent.⁹ The government is doing its own research at the Instituto de Pesquisas da Marinha (Navy Research Institute) and is producing Odeti hand grenades. In Southern Brazil, at the 5th Air Transport Division, a Lt. Roderico Lemos is reportedly developing a machine gun similar to the one U.S. troops use in Vietnam.¹⁰

The biggest military-industrial project in Brazil is neither guns nor vehicles, but jets, produced by the government-sponsored and controlled (51%) aircraft manufacturer, EMBRAER. Much publicity in Brazil has been given to EMBRAER's locally-developed planes, such as the 10 passenger Bandeirante or the proposed 35 passenger Amazonas or the assembling of the imported Gazelle helicopter. Meanwhile, it is clear from cost and production figures that the real function of EMBRAER is to assemble foreign produced military aircraft, mainly jets. The first jet to be assembled in Brazil is the Italian Aermacchi subsonic two seater, called the Xavante in



Brazil. The Xavante engine is a Rolls-Royce Viper 20 and most of the fuselage is also imported. The Brazilian air force has ordered 112 of these jets and has been receiving two of them every month since November 1971. Even though the plane is used in Europe as a light trainer, in Brazil it will be equipped with up to 5,000 pounds of bombs, machine guns and rockets.¹¹ The Xavante is the first Brazilian plane to be exported: in 1971 Bolivia contracted to buy 18 Xavantes.¹²

Brazil does not intend to continue simply assembling foreign-produced planes, but has "established a rule for importing based on the promise of exporters to cede the rights to manufacture of any imported product after a period of four years."¹³ It is interesting to speculate if this means that the 16 Mirage III jets or the 15 A-4 Skyhawks now being bought from France and the United States will fall under this rule. The British recently obtained the contract to build 6 Vosper MK 10 frigates only if they agreed to have two of them built in Brazil.¹⁴ The Brazilian Navy claims this is the "most important acquisition made to date," perhaps because "the total cost is in the order of \$240 million dollars, almost 10 times the cost of 16 Mirages being bought from France." The cost of the ships is only part of this bill, the rest is "materials, equipment and services given by Vosper Thornycroft, effectively transferring its technology to Brazil."¹⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Arms and Security in Latin America: Recent Developments" (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. 1971)
2. "SP Ajudara a Criar Racao para as Armas" *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, August 18, 1971.
3. *Ibid*
4. "As Novas Armas do Exercito" *Veja* (Editora Abril, Sao Paulo), August 30, 1972, pp. 15-17.
5. *Ibid*
6. *Ibid*
7. *Ibid*
8. "Blindados sao para Exterior, *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, August 20, 1971.
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10. "Nova arma e Testada no Sul", *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, August 17, 1971.
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12. *New York Times*, December 8, 1971.
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14. "Marinha Renova para Garantir Soberania", *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, August 19, 1971.
15. *Ibid*

Aid for the Generals

The massive flow of "development" aid into Brazil in recent years is not simply a phenomenon appropriate to her size. It is rather a measure of the unqualified support given the military government by the United States and by the U.S.-dominated international aid agencies. At a time when the constitutionally-elected government of Chile finds all the normal aid channels blocked, the Brazilian generals are enjoying an unimpeded flow of loans and credits to support their "development" plans.

The case of Brazil provides a clear case of how foreign aid serves a political function. Early in the Alliance for Progress, Brazil, and especially the economically depressed and politically volatile Northeast, was recognized to be of vital strategic importance, and so a large Agency for International Development (AID) mission was established in Rio, and another in Recife, the principal city of the Northeast.¹ Then in 1963, the United States grew dissatisfied with the leftward movement of the Goulart government, and, along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), cut off all aid to Brazil. Despite the many financial justifications given at the time, this move was political in nature, helping to force the crisis in Brazil which culminated in the military coup of April, 1964.

The United States wasted no time in demonstrating its support for the new military regime in dollars and cents, and within *two months* after the coup, signed and delivered a \$50 million program loan. Another \$150 million loan was signed in December of 1964, and the World Bank and the IMF resumed their lending activities in Brazil.

The accompanying chart gives the totals for aid to the Brazilian military regime, listed by the source agency. To this date, the United States has pumped in over \$2 billion in bilateral aid, and the international agencies have added another \$1.5 billion. In addition, the IMF, which functions as the gendarme of international finance, has extended eight consecutive standby agreements (the first in 1965, and the last, for \$50 million, in March of 1972). By doing so, all of these agencies have given at least tacit approval for the repressive measures of the government.

Where has all this money gone? As previous articles in this *Bulletin* have indicated, some of the U.S. funds have been used for extensive military and police programs in Brazil. The focus of this article, however, is the less controversial, but equally as important, economic aid programs. About half of these AID funds (\$550 million) have been in the form of program loans.² These loans extend general support to the government by providing foreign exchange (i.e., dollars) with which to import U.S. commodities. They are not tied to any specific project or goal beyond bolstering the government and its foreign reserve position.

The rest of the AID money has gone to project loans, which provide capital for specific development projects. In the case of Brazil, the majority of these funds have been used for infrastructure development — the building of electric power and transportation facilities. In contrast to the massive program of the mid-60's, the current AID program is relatively small — \$79.3 million in fiscal 1971 (less than the AID program in Colombia), and only \$9.4

million in fiscal 1972. The early transfusions, designed simply to put the regime on its feet financially, have served their purpose, and the generally ineffectual project loans continue, though on a lesser scale.

Yet while the AID effort has been toned down, funds from other agencies have increased rapidly. In 1972, for example, Brazil surpassed Japan as the biggest borrower from the U.S. Export-Import Bank (over \$2.6 billion)³ and became the largest World Bank debtor as well. World Bank loans to Brazil in fiscal year 1972 reached a total of \$437 million, accounting for more than 45% of the \$956 million total it lent to all of Latin America. In addition, Brazil has increased its borrowing from private banks, as evidenced by the \$200 million loan obtained from a consortium of Japanese banks.⁴

TOTAL AID TO BRAZIL SINCE THE MILITARY COUP OF 1964 (in millions of dollars)

U.S. Agency for International Development ..	\$ 1,246.6*
PL 480 (U.S. Food for Peace Program)	478.1*
U.S. Military Assistance Program	186.1*
World Bank	1,168.3*
International Finance Corporation (a World Bank affiliate)	89.4*
Inter-American Development Bank	776.4
<hr/>	
U.S. Export-Import Bank ("long term loans")	271.2
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (insurance of U.S. investments)	636.2

SOURCE: U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945 to June 30, 1971* (Washington, D.C.; 1972).

NOTE: Date from fiscal 1964 to fiscal 1971; Asterisk* indicates fiscal 1972 data taken from annual report of the agency and added to the total as of 1971.

The sector receiving the largest amount of credit has been electric power. The U.S.-dominated Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has provided a total of about \$240 million since 1962, including the second largest loan in its history — \$70 million in 1970 for the Ilha Solteira power plant. The World Bank has provided about \$750 million for power facilities, and the Eximbank has financed imports of U.S. equipment for power plants, including \$138 million for a nuclear facility near Rio. Industrial development, of course, requires the existence of an adequate power supply, yet the location of aid-supported facilities bears a discernible relationship to the needs of U.S. corporations. The Alcominas aluminum operation (50% owned by Alcoa and 23.5% by Hanna Mining), for example, depends for its power on the Rio Grande hydroelectric system built with loans from the World Bank, and could not operate without it. The geographic

coincidence of aid-sponsored infrastructure projects and U.S. corporate activities is likely to become increasingly visible as U.S. investments continue to pour into Brazil.

Sometimes, in fact, U.S. companies are able to get direct capital injections from the aid agencies. The Alcominas operation, for example, received a \$22 million World Bank loan in fiscal 1968. Also, the Aguas Claras iron mine, 49% owned by Hanna, received \$96 million from the World Bank in fiscal 1972 — \$50 million to develop the deposit and \$46 million for the construction of a railroad link to Sepetiba Bay near Rio.

Many other U.S. corporations have found aid-financed projects quite attractive. The industrial park at Aratu, Bahia, has been one of the focal points of development efforts in the Northeast, and the IDB has loaned \$8 million for the construction of a port there. The park's tenants include American Cyanamid, Celanese, Allis-Chalmers, and Alcan, which needs the port to receive ore shipments for its smelter in the park.⁵

Much aid money has also gone into the construction of roads. IDB has lent \$142 million, and the World Bank (since 1968 alone) \$266 million. These funds are being used to improve road transportation within Brazil, as well as between Brazil and neighboring countries. Besides providing commercial contact with other Latin American nations, these roads are very important to Brazil militarily. The road links being built (with \$47 million from IDB) between southern Brazil and Uruguay lend even more reality to the threat of a Brazilian invasion should Uruguay move leftward.

Another Brazilian case clarifies the degree to which U.S. aid functions as a subsidy for U.S. exports. In 1971 Brazil sought to finance part of its large steel expansion program through the World Bank. Potential U.S. suppliers, however, fearful of losing out in the international competitive bidding required by the World Bank, insisted that the financing be done through the Eximbank, which would insure that the contracts go to U.S. suppliers. The Brazilian government preferred the World Bank, because its competitive bidding would undoubtedly keep costs lower, and because it would provide more money for support facilities. The Eximbank, on the other hand, insisted that its previous loans to the steel industry made it the logical financier. A struggle ensued, centering not around Brazil's development needs, but around who was to get the supply contracts. A compromise involving the World Bank, IDB, Eximbank, and the export-funding agencies of the other supply countries was finally reached, but not without first baring for all to see the real self-interest of U.S. aid.⁶

Another program has directly favored, not U.S. exporters, but the subsidiaries of U.S. corporations which want to export from Brazil to the rest of Latin America. The IDB's capital goods export promotion program, designed to stimulate exports of capital goods among Latin American nations, and thus foster economic integration, has extended nearly half of its credits to Brazil — \$18.5 million in revolving credits and three special credits totalling \$7.4 million. Although no specific information is available as to which companies have utilized the revolving credits, two of the three special lines were for U.S. subsidiaries. One financed the export of paper mill equipment by Companhia Federal de Fundicao, owned by Ohio-based Black-Clawson, and the other, telephone equipment by Standard Electrica do Brazil to Standard Electrica de Argentina — both IT&T subsidiaries. American penetration of the Brazilian capital goods industry makes it all the more likely that U.S. companies have been and will be the main beneficiaries of the program.


Given the amount of aid that Brazil has received from the United States and the international agencies, it might seem surprising that Brazil has developed a little foreign aid program of its own. Brazil has now extended credits of nearly \$80 million to various Latin American nations, and prospects are for more in the future.⁷ In light of the way in which aid serves to subsidize exports from the donor country, it's almost natural that Brazil should be "aiding" the less-developed Latin American nations. Most of the money lent to Bolivia (with \$22.5 million, the largest recipient), for example, will be used to purchase Brazilian capital goods and machinery. In foreign aid, then, as in so many other areas, Brazil is assuming the role of the sub-imperial power in Latin America.

In the process of receiving such tremendous amounts of aid, Brazil has of course accumulated a colossal foreign debt. Brazil's public external debt (borrowed or guaranteed by the government or one of its agencies) at the end of 1970 was nearly \$4 billion, and is increasing rapidly. No one knows how much the private external debt amounts to, but it is undoubtedly substantial.⁸

This debt not only places a heavy burden on Brazil's current foreign exchange earnings, but more importantly, can serve in the future as a giant club in the hands of U.S. creditors, particularly if the present regime is replaced by a more progressive government. One need only look at Chile today for an example of how a government can be strapped by the debt of previous governments, and how foreign creditors can use this debt to pressure, and even subvert, a progressive government.

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2. *U.S. Policies and Programs in Brazil*, Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May, 1971. All other information on the various aid agencies, unless otherwise cited, comes from their annual reports.
3. *The New York Times*, January 28, 1972.
4. *The Wall Street Journal*, December 20, 1972.
5. *The New York Times*, February 18, 1968, and the *Peruvian Times* (Lima), April 21, 1972.
6. *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 18, 1971.
7. *Los Angeles Times*, October 16, 1972.
8. The \$4 billion figure comes from the World Bank 1972 Annual Report. In the December 4, 1972 issue of *Opinao* (Rio de Janeiro), the total foreign debt (both public and private) was given as \$10.0 billion in 1972, up from (\$6.6 billion in 1971 (based on figures from the Central Bank of Brazil).



Press Muzzled

This is a translated copy of a telegram sent by Rui Mesquita, publisher of O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, one of the most influential daily papers in Latin America, to the Brazilian Minister of Justice, Alfredo Bussaid.

Two newspapers in Porto Alegre, capital of Rio Grande do Sul state, that published the text of Mesquita's telegram had their editions confiscated by the Federal Police (see *Washington Post*, October 3, 1972).

September 19, 1972

Mr. Minister:

From the Federal Police we have received the following warning:

By order of the Honorable Minister of Justice it is absolutely forbidden to publish news, commentaries, interviews or comments of any kind in relation to: political liberalization, democratization or related subjects; amnesty for those stripped of their political rights or changes in their trials; criticisms, commentaries or editorials unfavorable to the economic-financial situation; and/or the problem of (the presidential) succession and its implications. The above orders are now in effect for any and all persons, including those who had been Cabinet Ministers and/or occupied high positions in any public office. The Honorable Minister of Justice also prohibits the Interview with Roberto Campos.

Mr. Minister, when I learned of these orders that were issued by you, I was overcome with shame and profound humiliation. I was ashamed, Mr. Minister, for Brazil, now degraded to the position of a banana republic or a Uganda by a government that has just lost its self-respect. It seems incredible that those who hold the positions that they find themselves in today and now decree the ostracism of their own compatriots of the revolution, don't spend five minutes to think about the judgment that History will hand down. You, Mr. Minister, will one day no longer be a minister. All those who are today in power will some day leave and then, Mr. Minister, as happened in Germany with Hitler, in Italy with Mussolini, in Russia with Stalin, Brazil will someday know the true history of this period when the Revolution of '64 abandoned the goals set down by its great leader, General Castelo Branco, to embark on a path of military despotism which is no longer used, even in the Latin American republics. Filled with shame to see my country denigrated by this situation, I am, in humiliation,

Rui Mesquita, Publisher of the
Jornal da Tarde and *O Estado*
de Sao Paulo.

Children are Born to be Happy

The following is a document presented by the Committee of Brazilian Women Exiled in Chile at a conference in Lima, Peru during the week of September 1-7, 1972 celebrating the solidarity of the people of Peru with the Brazilian people. This week of solidarity was declared as a protest against the official celebration of 150 years of Brazilian independence. The conference was sponsored by the following organizations: the Peruvian Movement for Peace, the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers, the Peruvian Committee Against Torture in Brazil, the National Journalists Association, and many others.

For us, Brazilian women exiled in Chile, the words of the title resound like an ardent message of hope in the future.

In Brazil 1972, the happiness of our children is impeded by the power of the fascist military regime that oppresses our country and our people.

The facts clearly express this bitter truth.

Shamelessly the Brazilian dictatorship proclaims in the press and at international conferences the Brazilian economic miracle with a GNP growth of 11%. But it hides from the world the fact that out of every 1,000 children born in Brazil, 100 die before reaching the age of one; that in 1968, in the region of Amarazi, near the city of Recife, all the children born between the months of July and December, died, without the occurrence in the region of either an epidemic or a catastrophe. Nothing is said about the death in 1969 of 1,936,000 children under the age of 5,

which represents the death of a child per minute. Of these, 400,000 children were under age one. Why did they die? They died victims of diarrhea, vitamin deficiency, lack of medical assistance, or due to the poor hygienic conditions.

In 1968, Brazil produced only 14.5 million liters of milk to feed 35 million children under the age of 12. 40% of that quantity was transformed into powdered milk, and another 40% was used in the production of cheese and other byproducts which, for economic reasons, are inaccessible to the majority of the population. A news item from the state of Ceara attracted attention: "A child died of hunger yesterday in the Plaza of Sao Pedro, a few meters away from the major food market in Fortaleza. The child was only three years old."

What kind of education do our children receive?

Almost 50% of all Brazilians over seven are illiterate, that is, almost 30 million people. Only 450 out of every

1,000 children between the ages of 7 and 14 attend grade school. Of these, 8 will attend the university. At the university 7% of the students come from the social strata that represents 70% of the population. At the present time 5 million school age children are deprived of elementary education due to lack of schools.

Why do these things happen in such a large and rich country like Brazil?

Why doesn't the "economic miracle" so advertised by the dictatorship take into consideration the happiness of the children?

The Brazilian fascists allow themselves to speak of "miracles" at the cost of the exploitation of the parents of our children, whose salaries are reduced by brutal salary withholdings and taxes which grow heavier with each passing day. As it reduces the purchasing power of each family's salary the government allocates fantastic sums of its budget for military expenses to the detriment of such basic needs as health, education and housing.

From 1964 to 1967, military expenses increased by 17%. In 1968, they represent 16% of the federal budget, which is double the amount of the budget allotted to education, triple that for health, and 17 times greater than that for housing. In addition, according to *Exchange Bulletin* data, 5% of the population receives 50% of the National Income generated in the country.

This ill-omened economic and financial policy can only be maintained by force. Thus, Brazil is being transformed into a huge concentration camp where the escalation of government terror is always the first victim, and this is not mere rhetoric. Hundreds of children are orphaned. Their parents, brave revolutionaries or simply progressive citizens, died under brutal torture in civil and military prisons that fill our country with shame. Others are being cared for by friends or strangers because their parents are hiding. Thousands of women are prevented from fulfilling their proud role of motherhood. The most sensitive parts of their bodies were rendered useless by electric shocks. They had their uterus perforated by bottle necks and other sharp objects. They suffered psychological traumas, internal hemorrhages, and other deformations that made them forever sterile. Some of them miscarried in prison or died pregnant, victims of childbirth, torture, desperation and lack of medical assistance. Some of the mothers had the breasts with which they were nursing their children burned with cigarettes.

And the children themselves have not escaped tortures. On March 28, 1968 Edson Luis Soto, a student, was assassinated by the police of Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro). He was 16 years old. On January 20, 1971 Representative Rubens Paiva (who was later assassinated) was imprisoned along with his wife and 14 year old daughter. Hilda Gomes da Silva, mother of three children, was tortured and along with her was tortured her 4 month old son. Teresa Cristina, daughter of the lawyer Antonio Expedito, was interrogated by Captain Pivato and other military men — she was 10 years old. Carlos Avelino Filho was tortured in front of his father to make the latter confess: the boy was 16 years old. Mrs. Fanny Akselrud was tortured so she would reveal the whereabouts of her "dangerous" son, the 10 year old Irineu. The revolutionary Jonas died from torture in September of 1969. Together with him was tortured, with electric shocks, his 4 month old daughter.

The priest Alberto Siligo confirmed in a public denunciation: "A woman, the mother of a family, was tortured until she had a miscarriage. Both mother and child died."



We are not dealing with words. What is related here are acts that have been denounced, narrated, written, documented, and reproduced in clandestine newspapers that circulated in Brazil and in the headlines of the international press.

These are sufficient reasons why we, the Brazilian women exiled in Chile, cannot stop loudly proclaiming the fervent desire to assure the happiness of our children. The first condition necessary for this to be possible is the demand to end an intolerable situation that brings unrest, tears, struggle, and pain to hundreds of Brazilian homes. Our great wish is to unite our forces with the women of our country and with women the world over, to defeat the oppressors of the Brazilian people.

But we know that aggression and fascism will only be defeated through constant battle, daily and self-sacrificing of the large working and popular masses of Brazil. This was demonstrated by the Revolutionary experience of other people on our continent. Only in a regime of full democratic liberty will our children be able to enjoy the happiness to which they have a right.

The Brazilian women exiled in Chile, make a final appeal to all mothers to express their solidarity and to protest the tortures and crimes denounced herein.

Santiago, June 1, 1972
Committee of Women Exiled in Chile

Lima Resolution

At this same conference in Lima, a resolution-petition was presented and signed by 17 Peruvian organizations. This petition, which has been sent to various international organizations, appears below.

The organization and individuals signing this document,
CONSIDERING:

1. That the Brazilian people live under a discriminatory and cruel dictatorship that not only suspended all individual liberties but is also daily assaulting the most basic human rights consecrated by the United Nations Charter.

2. That the most revealing acts of the repressive character of the dictatorship are the following:

a) 160 members of the opposition to the regime were brutally assassinated by the police and the army in the past few years, the majority of them being young people under 25;

b) The proven existence of 12,000 political prisoners in Brazilian jails.

c) There are 5,000 Brazilian political exiles in Latin America alone.

d) Hundreds of cases of tortures have been proven by medical examination.

e) The Brazilian police have perfected the physical/chemical/psychological methods of torture and they indiscriminately torture all people who fall into the hands of the repression — men, women, children and the aged, whether or not they are guilty.

f) 2,000 young people were expelled from the universities and are prohibited from entering any other institution of higher education in the country.

g) 600 of the best professors and researchers were expelled from the universities.

h) The repression exercises a strong censorship on all communications media, which have been practically transformed into official organs of the government.

i) The censorship imposed on artistic activities greatly limits the creativity of the Brazilian people; more than 100 theatrical works are officially banned; some 30 films are currently prohibited; more than 70 popular songs are prohibited from being sung; dozens of artists are impeded from performing.

3. That the Brazilian dictatorship is staging a propaganda campaign to gain international acceptance of its development model and is trying to convince the Brazilian people to accept the illusion of a consumer society established for the benefit of a selected minority.

4. That the myth of the "Brazilian Miracle" can easily be destroyed through the simple verification of the facts: 80% of the basic sectors of the economy and 50% of the industrial investment of the country is controlled by foreigners.

5. That the 11% growth of the GNP claimed by the dictatorship is nothing but the increasing profits of foreign capital.

6. That the hunger among people has increased, since the agricultural production (excluding coffee) increases 2%, while the population grows at an annual rate of 3%.

7. That 50% of the Brazilian population is illiterate; 30% of the *causa mortis* is hunger; only one-third of the active population is employed. According to a statement

made by the president of the World Bank, in 1970, while the poorest 40% of the population received 3% of the national income, the richest 5% received 38%.

8. That the natural resources are being exploited by foreign capital which has also taken over one-fifth of the land in the Amazon.

9. That the police, the army and other forces of repression are financed and advised by North American imperialism.

10. That against the people's will the Constitution was replaced by Institutional Acts of fascist character; that all political parties were declared illegal and abolished; that the main labor unions are under the intervention of government agents, and that strikes and any other demonstrations by the working class are prohibited by the National Security Law.

11. That justice is a farce in the hands of the puppets manipulated by the military high command and that the most recent example of that is the refusal of the Supreme Court to consider the case against the "Death Squad".

12. That being unable and unwilling to improve the standard of living of the marginalized masses, to incorporate them into production and consumption, the Brazilian Dictatorship decided to stage an offensive to conquer foreign markets.

13. That this offensive, of imperialist character, represents a menace to the sister countries of Latin America.

14. That on the 7th of September of this year the 150th anniversary of Brazilian Independence is commemorated, and that from the 1st to 7th of September will take place in Lima, simultaneously with other countries in the world, the "Week of International Solidarity with the Brazilian People."

BE IT RESOLVED:

1. To solicit the Revolutionary Government in Peru, in the person of the President, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, to intercede before the Brazilian Government so that the International Red Cross Commission can visit the prisons and investigate the denunciations made about tortures.

2. To solicit the international organizations and progressive governments of the world that they join efforts of the Brazilian patriots for the attainment of freedom for the political prisoners, the respect of the judicial rules and of human rights, advocating the return of the democratic liberties and the end of the imperialist policy.

3. To make public their protest and repudiation of the repressive and expansionist character of the Brazilian Military Dictatorship.

4. To declare their complete solidarity with and active support for the struggle of the Brazilian people for their liberation.

Lima, September 1-7, 1972.

Week of International

Solidarity with the Brazilian People

Development Against the Indians

The Brazilian government does not care about Indians. In order to care about Indians, the Government itself would have to be Indian."

—Leader of the Tapirape Tribe
Mato Grosso, Brazil, February 1972

Late in 1967, the Brazilian Government issued a report which caused international concern and shock: it disclosed that its own Indian Protection Service (SPI) had been directly and indirectly involved in the widespread destruction of the native Brazilian Indians with whose welfare it had been entrusted. 134 functionaries, including officers at high government levels, were charged with over 1000 crimes, ranging from murder, torture ("from tearing out Indians' fingernails to allowing them to die without assistance") and theft of Indian land. The Attorney-General at the time "estimated that property worth \$62 million had been stolen from the Indians in the past 10 years." He charged that the crimes committed by the Indian Protection Service included not only the embezzlement of funds but also "sexual perversions, murders, and all other crimes listed in the penal code."¹

A scandal of this proportion reflected badly on the newly established Brazilian military regime. How was it possible that the tight censorship would allow such damaging information to freely circulate? There are many reasons. First, Indian affairs have never been considered within the purview of political issues in Brazil. They therefore escaped the heavy censorship that had already fallen on all news and opinion concerning political,

economic, or ideological questions. By the time the Indian question had exploded into an international scandal, it was being too widely discussed in the foreign press (much of which is readily available within Brazil) for domestic discussion to be easily suppressed. Also, the regime probably did not feel itself directly implicated or involved in the issue of treatment of the Indians: the Indian Protection Service was not its creation; the military government had only been in power a short time, and (most importantly) the problems, goals and ideological issues with which it was preoccupied seemed only remotely related to the Indians.

After dissolving the old Indian Protection Service, the regime found itself in the position of having to create a successor to it and, in the process, to formulate an Indian policy. It was a critical moment for the remaining tribal peoples. The vast development schemes for Amazonia and the Western frontier regions were just being launched. Regional development authorities, the Superintendencia pelo Desenvolvimento da Amazonia (SUDAM) and the Superintendencia pelo Desenvolvimento do Centro-Oeste (SUDECO) had been formed to channel domestic and foreign investment capital into these areas through generous tax incentives and other inducements. The Trans-Amazonica Highway System was on the verge of beginning construction.

The needs of the native peoples in this situation were clear and pressing. First and foremost was the necessity for the demarcation and legal establishment of adequate reservations to protect tribal lands from encroachment and expropriation by the deluge of immigrants and developers about to be precipitated into Amazonia. Secondly, greatly improved health assistance and police protection would be required to counteract the predictable effects of contact with settler and construction gangs. Thirdly, some technical assistance and training would be required to enable the tribal peoples to adjust to, and participate in, to the extent they desired, the new economic system about to be created in the area. Also, the development of the region would clearly raise in acute form the issue of cultural autonomy and self-determination of the indigenous peoples — their right to choose their own course without economic, social or cultural coercion or forced draft assimilation.

In the first couple of years of its existence, the military government's newly created National Foundation for Assistance to the Indian (FUNAI) and its advisory council, the Conselho Nacional do Indio, gave verbal recognition to these needs and made some tentative moves in the direction of satisfying them. A training program was set up for prospective *encarregados* (agents in charge of Indian posts) a much needed step toward upgrading the personnel of the old service. A call was sent out to the regional FUNAI officers for the surveying and filing of legal petitions for tribal reservations. Since no financial resources were provided and the time allowed for the surveying was short, it proved difficult to take advantage of this "opportunity" on anything like the necessary scale. However, over a hundred petitions for reservations were duly filed.

It soon became apparent that the government had no intention of actually creating the reservations (only two or




three were in fact set up before mid-1971). Instead, by 1970 it was clear that the regime had settled upon a "hard line" on the Indian question. An important advocate of this line was Costa Cavalcanti, the Minister of Interior, within whose ministry FUNAI is located. A series of new appointments in 1970 and 1971 confirmed the shift in emphasis. The civilian head of FUNAI was replaced by General Oscar Bandeira de Melo, a military man of strongly conservative opinions on Indians and who possessed no other perceptible qualifications for the job. The Conselho do Índio was packed with military men, development economists, and lawyers: anthropologists and others with first-hand experience of native societies and their problems were, and remain, virtually excluded.

The implications of the new hardline policy became apparent as the Trans-Amazon Highway System started cutting through the wilderness, where the Indians lived. The original map of the BR-80 stretch of the highway system was shown as passing to the north of the famous Xingu Indian Reserve by a considerable margin. The plan, however, was secretly altered, and construction of the road bed through the park rushed so fast that those in charge of the park (the Villas Boas brothers) and the public at large only learned of the altered plan when the road construction crews had arrived at the Xingu River, already half-way across the park (see map). The reason for the change was never explained, beyond vague and obviously inadequate references to its necessity for engineering reasons, nor was any explanation offered for why the change in the announced plan had been kept secret. The entire operation was obviously directed by cabinet-level officials such as Cavalcanti and Camargo Junior, the head of SUDECO, the development authority responsible for the area in which the park is located.

One motive for the conspiracy was patently clear. The Villas-Boas brothers represented the antithesis of the policy being adopted by the military men on the Conselho Nacional do Índio and FUNAI toward the tribal communities. The park they had struggled to create was based on the principle of guaranteeing the Indians' right to their own cultures and way of life, while giving them time to adjust on their own terms to the onset of Brazilian society. It had already come under heavy criticism, by Bandiera and other regime spokesmen, as a threat to national security, a utopian experiment in cultural isolationism, and a contradiction of the principles of "integration" and "assimilation" upon which the national Indian policy should be founded. So the military regime had ideological reasons for wanting to destroy or, at least, weaken the Park.

Ideological motives were not the only ones involved in the conspiracy against the park. The most vociferous opposition to the Xingu National Park had always come from the big ranchers and land speculators of Mato Grosso, Goiás and points south, who were outraged at the removal of so much rich potential pasture land from the market. One of the biggest land-owners and ranchers in all Mato Grosso is Carmargo Junior, who is also the director of SUDECO, the regional development authority within whose domain the Xingu Park is located. One of the strongest friends and proponents of landed interests in the interior, and a man of considerable wealth and landed interest himself, is Cavalcanti, the Minister of the Interior, bureaucratic chief and bitter foe of the Villas-Boas brothers.



Carmargo Junior and Cavalcanti were excellently placed to influence the course of BR-80 through northern Mato Grosso. When it became known that the course of the road had been altered so as to amputate the northern fifth of the Xingu Park, the rumor got about that the separated section had already been secretly divided and sold to three private parties: Carmargo Junior, Cavalcanti and an American corporation whose identity remains unknown. This story has been repeated by Brazilian government personnel in a position to know the facts. It cannot be verified by a deed of sale or registry of property or tax receipt, for obvious reasons. It is nonetheless worth noting that Cavalcanti took the stories seriously enough to deny them in a public speech.² Cavalcanti nevertheless failed to explain why, assuming, as he claimed, the severed northern section of the park "still belonged to the Indians" and had not been allocated to private owners, it was necessary to remove the area from the jurisdiction of the park—an act carried out under his authority.

From other incidents it is clear that FUNAI is on the side of the land speculators and "developers" when their interests clash with the Indians' interests. The most flagrant of these examples is the case of the Nambikwara-speaking groups of the Guaporé valley in western Mato Grosso. The Guaporé valley consists mainly of lush pasture land. It was largely unsettled by Brazilians, and inhabited by nine mutually hostile Indian groups speaking mutually unintelligible but remotely related languages of the Nambikwara linguistic stock. When the SUDAM regional development authority was set up, several large Brazilian companies rushed to take advantage of the tax incentives

for investing in the Guaporé district of the development region.³ There was one hitch: the regulations establishing the development projects must be certified "free of Indians" by FUNAI in order to qualify for support from the authority.

When the request for clearance of the proposed land purchases were forwarded to FUNAI from SUDAM a direct conflict between the interests of developers and Indians was precipitated. The regional office of FUNAI responsible for the Guaporé valley, anticipating the developers' move, had requested the establishment of three new reservations for the eight Nambikwara groups of the area that at that time lacked reserves. These were to be in addition to the reservation that had already been established for a ninth group. The three areas proposed were as close as possible to the traditional village sites of the groups concerned, unfortunately, they were also within the areas that the companies had proposed to acquire. The contradiction was clear: the lands were not free of Indians, and the one solution proposed by the regional office of FUNAI as viable for the preservation of the Indians would not make the land free for "development."

The solution proposed by the National FUNAI office was to truck all the eight groups still lacking reservations to the reservation already established for the ninth group and dump them there. It was urged upon the central office of FUNAI by its own local functionaries that this reservation, which consists almost entirely of arid scrub land, was barely sufficient to support the one tribe then established on it, and that to relocate eight other groups (which were, incidentally, mutually hostile to one another) on the same territory was to invite starvation, epidemic disease, inter-tribal conflict, and the flight of many individuals and groups from the reservation, possibly followed by hostilities toward the Brazilians occupying their traditional lands or those sent to bring them back. All of these warnings were to no avail. FUNAI operatives were ordered by Sr. Queiroz Campos and his successor, Bandeira de Melo, to carry out the relocation of the eight groups. The predicated consequences have not been long in arriving.

THE STATUTE OF THE INDIAN

The Statute of the Indian, proposed in 1970 and temporarily shelved due to pressures brought on by publicity, is again being considered for passage into law. It would permit the legal removal of Indians from their territories by the Brazilian government if this is seen to be in the best interest of "national development or national security." The Statute states that until he has become "civilized" or assimilated into the national community, the Indian remains a ward of the government without inherent rights. Two provisions, which would prove extremely detrimental would allow that Indian people have the use but not ownership of traditional territories; also, mineral wealth and forest resources on these lands are to be excluded from Indian control. The "Indigenous Income" obtained from the leasing of Indian lands to lumber, mining, and other firms, and the direct profits from the sale of mineral, forest, and other products on Indian land go not to the Indian themselves but to the government agencies administering Indian affairs.

Antonio Cotrim Soares, one of Brazil's top Indian specialists, who recently resigned from FUNAI saying he was "tired of being a gravedigger for Indians," gave *Veja* magazine the following report on the fate of the Nambikwaras:

When they reached the reserved site they were immediately struck by an epidemic of malaria and influenza, a result of the unhealthy conditions in the area. They realized they did not have the means for survival, and, utterly abandoned, they sought to return to their former villages. Almost 30% of the tribe died during this return. It was a tragic march, with Indians dropping by the roadside.⁴

Cotrim also reported that during the first eight months of relocation one tribe of Nambikwaras had lost almost all its children under 15 because of neglect.⁵

As is clear from these and many similar cases, the indigenous tribes are relatively minor and peripheral concerns of the military government in contrast to its overriding preoccupation: the transformation of Brazil into a fully developed capitalistic society. Insofar as the indigenous people enter into this scenario at all, they do so in the role of obstacles to the achievement of this goal. This is the meaning of General Bandeira's eloquent metaphor for them, "ethnic cysts" which Brazil "will not tolerate within its borders." The military regime's slogan of "national security," provides the pretext for eliminating anyone who, for one reason or another, becomes a threat to the surest and quickest path to economic development.

The greatest threat of internal disorder in Brazil comes from the impoverished, landless population of the Northeast. The Amazonia development scheme was conceived partly as a way of resettling the huge "surplus" population of the Northeast and thus defusing its revolutionary potential, while avoiding the politically painful and embarrassing process of carrying out long-overdue reforms in the archaic social and economic structure of that region. When the military regime talks about opening the Amazon to achieve "national integration" it is really talking about eliminating Indians and opening the Amazon to exploitation by large domestic and international investors. Their "integration" plans have nothing to do with protecting the Indians and preserving their culture, nor do they have anything to do with really meeting the problems of an archaic agrarian structure.

The development of Amazonia is currently in its most labor-intensive phase. Large numbers of workers are being brought in to build the roads and to clear the forest for the pasture lands and fields of the new ranches and farms. Other immigrants are being given small allotments of farm land with stakes of seeds and supplies to tide them over until their first crop. But only a fraction of the workers now engaged in road-building and land clearing will become successful homesteaders. The rest will need to find jobs. The ominous question therefore presents itself: after the roads are built and the pastures are cleared (probably by the end of 1975), what are the armies of unskilled construction workers going to do? The economic enterprises now being developed or planned in Amazonia (chiefly cattle and mining) are heavily capital-intensive. It does not take many cowboys to run even a huge cattle ranch.

The danger, in short, is that after the initial labor-intensive phase, the development of Amazonia may create a large reserve army of unemployed that cannot be

absorbed by the capital-intensive enterprises now being established in the region. The only recourse for these jobless and landless people will be to revert to the status of squatters, clearing small subsistence farms on "unoccupied" land, or to engage in one of the extractive occupations (gathering wild vegetable products, hunting, prospecting) that traditionally formed the basis of Amazonian economy. That is to say, their only recourse will be to enter directly into competition with the Indians for the region's diminishing supply of subsistence resources. In the resulting struggle, the Indians will be at a heavy disadvantage, if only because of the sheer weight of numbers on the other side.

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1. Norman Lewis, *London Times*, February 23, 1969, p. 41.
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3. The companies involved are: Galera, Padronal, Guapé (an acronym for Alto Guaporé), Sape, Nomura Agropecuaria, Zilo Lorenzetti, Madeirama S.A., Edmundo Rodrigues, and Mario



Geraldi. So far as known none of these companies have foreign capital. Nomura Agro-Pecuria S.A. Comercio e Industria has received capital from investors under the tax reduction program of the government. See *Guia de Incentivos Fiscais*, Editora Abril, Sao Paulo, March 1972, p. 47.

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BERTRAND RUSSELL TRIBUNAL

The previous issue of this BULLETIN announced the preparation for the Bertrand Russell Tribunal hearings on repression in Brazil. Before these hearings actually take place, a good deal of organizational work is going to have to be done everywhere.

The creation of a broad international network of supportive committees will be necessary. The Tribunal suggests that these committees undertake the following tasks:

1. to inform people of the present situation in Brazil and mobilize people for the Tribunal,
2. to obtain the support of influential, political, religious, academic, labor, cultural, etc. groups and individuals for the Tribunal,
3. to provide the Tribunal with any kind of useful information concerning Brazil, particularly on repression,
4. to raise as much money as possible to cover the expenses of the Tribunal (which are already high and will increase.)

In Europe the Tribunal has significant support in several countries. In France the CFDT, a large labor organization, has promised financial support, and additional cooperation and support is being sought from the CGT, another labor organization as well as from Catholic and Protestant groups. Committees are being formed in Yugoslavia, Holland, Germany and Canada. Twelve support committees are being set up in Italy, while the head organizing committee of the Tribunal in Rome is publishing a brochure (available on request) describing the Tribunal—its history, objectives and the results of its hearings on Vietnam. The head office also plans to publish a bulletin to keep people informed about developments in the Tribunal's work and to coordinate support and mobilization.

We urge readers to form or join local support committees, and keep this BULLETIN and the Tribunal headquarters informed about your work.

Correspondence to the Tribunal should be addressed to:

Lelio Basso
via della Dogana Vecchia 5
Rome, ITALY 00186

Armed Resistance in Amazonia

The outbreak of armed conflict in the Brazilian countryside comes as no surprise to those who have observed the conditions of misery and oppression in which the peasants have been living for centuries and which have been aggravated by the policies of the current military dictatorship.

In April, 1972 armed resistance against the dictatorship broke out along the Araguaia river, which marks the eastern border of the state of Goiás and the western border of the states of Mato Grosso and Pará. For months Brazilian newspapers were ordered not to print stories about military activities in the Amazon region.¹ But by September, with 5,000 Army, Navy, and Air Force troops concentrated in the area of resistance,² the generals felt some explanation was necessary and thus allowed *O Estado de São Paulo* to publish an account.³

Among the conditions described by the newspaper were the presence of many intelligence officers, including CENIMAR (Naval intelligence) officials, who interrogate prisoners in military camps. Prisoners are kept in a large hole dug in the ground and covered with a net of barbed wire. Three soldiers keep constant guard above them. Indicative of the tight censorship maintained over all military actions, the newspaper reported that "even the letters which the soldiers send to their families are censored and have to be mailed in open envelopes."

The *Brazilian Information Bulletin* recently received a copy of a letter from the "Command of the Partisan Forces of the Araguaia" addressed to an unnamed Brazilian congressman. This document sheds important light on the activities in the Araguaia region and we reprint it in its entirety.

1. *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 1, 1973

2. *The New York Times*, September 26, 1972

3. *O Estado de São Paulo*, September 24, 1972

LETTER TO A FEDERAL REPRESENTATIVE

Mister Representative,

We write to you from somewhere in the Amazon jungle, where we are fighting arms in hand. Our purpose is to clarify the situation created in this region, and to explain the reasons for our resistance against the violence of the government. Paradoxical as it may sound, the opportunity to write to you arose when we met one of the soldiers that are here to kill us. He expressed readiness to send this letter to Brasília, if he had the opportunity to do so. He said he had sympathy for our struggle and was ready to help us, a fact that reveals the existence among the soldiers of a feeling of revulsion at serving as hangmen of the people. If he keeps his word, we ask you, mister Representative, to send copies of this letter to other democratic Congressmen, to newspapers and other information media. We have no illusions about it being published. The official censorship fears the truth. Nor do we believe that it will be read or commented on in the Congress. Anyhow, the Congress is a mere facade, for the Legislative Power no longer exists. The echo of the people's sufferings, their aspirations and struggles, have no repercussions in the parliament.

For about three months we have been deep in the forest of southern Pará, following the attack by troops of the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Military Police of Pará. We don't want to give a detailed account in this letter of the military operations in this area. We want only to give an idea of what is happening here. Numerous troops have been mobilised in order to crush us. Airplanes and helicopters, in great numbers, are taking part in the offensive. Motor boats and amphibious vehicles cross the rivers and channels in the forest. In many parts, napalm bombs have been used. Armed confrontations between us and government soldiers have occurred, resulting in deaths and injuries. Some of our men have been arrested, but we took prisoners from the attacking troops. In spite of the inequality of forces, we caused them some reverses. The troops of the government did not succeed in liquidating us or dampening our morale. However great our vicissitudes

may be, we are determined to continue the struggle. Experience shows that a weak man, when fighting for a just cause, becomes strong.

The aggression began in early April, in the county of São João de Araguaia. Army troops disembarked in a trading post, in the place known as Faveira, on the banks of Araguaia River, and, under the pretext of hunting subversive elements, arrested many people. After that, they attacked inhabitants of the environs of the village of São Domingos, where they also arrested many people and wounded a young woman. Extending their actions, the military men carried out a savage war operation. The inhabitants of a great part of the county had their homes invaded and their plantations destroyed by the military men. They were submitted to all kinds of harassments. Many of them were arrested and brutally beaten. Later on, the operation was extended to the county of Conceição de Araguaia, particularly in the area of Santa Izabel Falls and the village of São Geraldo. There, too, the military men committed incredible atrocities.

In face of this situation, resistance was inevitable. The most resolute people in the area took their arms and tried to counterract the brutality of the troops. Little by little, the number of fighters, men and women, increased, and the fighting force was organised. Besides people of the region, there are some people in our ranks who came from big towns and cities, in order to escape political persecution. They are workers, students and graduates. All of them have lived in the region for quite a long time. They worked and lived in the same way as the other people. They have built their homes, tilled their land, and endured the hardships of living in the countryside. They identified themselves with the inhabitants of the region, in their struggle to solve their problems, and were highly thought of by the local population. Knowing that they could be persecuted again, they adopted the necessary measures to defend themselves.


The troops of the dictatorship spread the rumour that we are terrorists and outlaws, trying in this way to legitimate their banditry. But here, everyone knows that we are people who lived by our work and helped our neighbors as best we could. They know that we are resolute patriots and democrats. And among us there are peasants, revolting against the subhuman living conditions they have endured. And this revolt is fully justified.

The people of this region endure a very hard life. They have no aid of any kind. They till the land in the most primitive way, and the fruit of their toil is sold at the lowest prices. On the other hand, everything they buy costs the earth. Famine is a permanent evil. And diseases, like malaria, leishmaniasis, parasites, and pulmonary infections, are a plague for almost every inhabitant. Arbitrary actions of the police are frequent. Every soldier arrogates to himself the right to beat and humiliate the peasants and to extort their wretched possessions. Those who live in towns and villages, like Marabá, São João, Araguaatins, Xambioá, Conceição, São Domingos, Apinajés, Palestina, Santa Cruz, São Geraldo, are unable to earn their living. Young people emigrate. There is work only during part of the year, during the harvest of Brazil nuts or in wood-cutting, a work that can be considered semi-slavery. After nine months of hard work in the forests, harvesting nuts, or cutting wood, the workers earn almost nothing. In recent years, the practice of "grilagem" (1) has been developing intensively along the Araguaia river, with open or disguised support from the authorities. Former inhabitants are being expelled from the lands they were cultivating, with no place to go, or are being thrust into the deep of the forest, like the Indians. In turn, the newcomers, in ever increasing number, arriving from different points of the country to escape from misery and exploitation, find no place to build homes and earn their living in agriculture. Great companies, attracted by financial inducements of the government, take possession of tens and hundreds of thousands of hectares of land. Many of these companies are property of influential foreign capitalists. As a result of such plunder, the "posseiros" (2) fight to defend their plot of land, and face the police and the mercenaries in the service of the powerful.

All this population, poor and abandoned, industrious and patient, wants and deserves a better life. Most of these people are illiterate and do not understand the reasons for their sufferings, but they feel the injustice and they revolt against the fate reserved for them. They have a fearful future before them. While everything is denied to them, the "grileiros" have all the protection of the government, and international trusts obtain concessions to exploit the region's riches. Until now, these suffering people have not found the way to formulate their requests and demand their rights.

Today, those who have taken arms in hand and who appeal to the proved method of partisan war, are taking the first step in this direction. The struggle we are engaging is not only to resist the arbitrary acts of the government, but, at the same time, to defend the rights of the people, for a new life for the people of the countryside. Sooner or later, the inhabitants of rural areas, of hamlets, villages and towns of the countryside will rise in revolt, conscious that only in this way can they change the sad and gloomy situation in this neglected part of the country. We also cherish the hope that patriots and democrats in big urban centres, will participate, in one way or another, in the noble combat we are waging for the common cause.

We understand that the struggle we have begun here has a more than local character. It is part of the great struggle against dictatorship in which the majority of the nation is interested. It was not only us whom the generals attacked. For some time, they have declared war against the Brazilian people, submitting them to an intolerable regime. We know what a great number of people of different social backgrounds go through the jails and are condemned for political "crimes." Torture and murder of patriots have



become routine in police inquiries. People live under the arbitrary Institutional Act No. 5, which abrogated the exercise of the most common civil rights. Our country is today a vast military camp, where there is no law or regard for human beings.

The generals in power talk about development and financial successes, and pose as patriots. But, Brazil is experiencing a deep social crisis, and none of the basic problems, which call for urgent solutions, has been solved. It is an undeniable fact that millions of Brazilians do not find work and do not receive education. The rate of criminality in young people has grown as never before. Diseases that had been eliminated or were under control, are now spreading again. But, the worst of all is famine. Hundreds of thousands of children die of malnutrition. Development, which occasions such a fanfare, favours only the imperialist enterprises, the banks and big trusts, whose profits are growing from year to year. Brazil is running increasingly into debt with foreign countries, and is becoming more and more dependent on the United States. How can we consider as patriots those who are governing the country to the advantage of international trusts, while the majority of the nation is becoming poorer with each passing day? What right have those who are delivering up the Amazon riches to the exploitation of foreign groups, to call themselves the guardians of national sovereignty? In spite of all the government propaganda about progress, in fact the nation has suffered a regression in its cultural life, political development and standard of living.

For that reason, the great national aspiration of our days is the overthrow of the dictatorship, which is the origin of so much damage and suffering for Brazil, as well as the installation of a government and a regime that can assure wide democratic freedoms and facilitate the solution of the serious problems affecting the country.

Our thinking in the struggle we are waging is oriented in this direction too. The Brazilian people, who proclaimed their independence 150 years ago, and who are still fighting for true national emancipation, are not immature, as the military men say. They are a proud people, conscious of their responsibilities as citizens. They refuse to live under the tutelage of generals whose vision of the country's problems does not go beyond the horizons of the barracks or the dark winding corridors of intelligence service. In 1909, Rui Barbosa proclaimed with accuracy: "It is the

nation that governs. The Army, as all other organs of the country, obeys." This fundamental principle has now been overturned. The Armed Forces are now governing, and the nation has no voice in public matters. Nevertheless, the true masters of this land are its hundred million inhabitants. To them, and not to the generals, belongs the task of making or abolishing the laws. Those who claim to replace them in the exercise of sovereignty, no matter what reason they invoke, are tyrants that must be swept out of power by the people.

We join all those in this vast and beloved Brazil, who raise the banner of freedom and fight for the overthrow of the despotic and anti-national government imposed by a military coup d'état. In the depths of the forest, hunted by the dictatorship and facing a thousand difficulties, we dream of democracy and independence for our fatherland. We have faith in the brilliant future of Brazil, free from

oppression, backwardness and ignorance. But we know that this future can be won only through the union and the struggle of all its sons and daughters.

Accept, dear compatriot, our democratic greetings.

From a corner of the Amazon forest, in the south of Pará,
June, 1972

The Command of the Partisan Forces of Araguaia

Notes:

- (1) Grilagem: Action carried out by the powerful man who allows peasants to clear areas of virgin land, then, profiting from the confusion or the venality of the land surveying administration, acquires the property titles, forged but in order, and expels the first occupants, defrauding them in this way of the fruit of their toil.
- (2) Posseiros: Landless peasants, who occupy unworked land, in order to cultivate it.

Wildcat Plays with Military Mice

Since it came to power in 1964, the Brazilian military regime has been trying to create a political model that consolidates its domination and at the same time gives the regime a democratic facade. The first step toward this goal was taken during the period between 1964-68 when the dictatorship deprived hundreds of popular leaders of their political rights, dissolved all political parties and replaced them with two new parties—ARENA (the government party) and MDB (the allowed opposition party)—and established a new electoral code. In order to prevent embarrassing surprises, i.e., the election of persons truly opposed to the regime, the code requires the candidates to have their candidacies approved by an electoral tribunal and also by the intelligence agencies created by the dictatorship. Besides these restrictions there is also Institutional Act No. 5, which gives the President broad dictatorial powers such as the right to suspend the political rights of any citizen, to decree a congressional recess and to cancel any elected terms of office, whether federal, state or municipal. To complete the farce the dictatorship abolished direct elections for president, for state governors and for mayors of the state capitals and dozens of cities along the Brazilian border with its sister Latin American republics.

It is within this context of political repression that the elections held on November 15 must be understood. Neither of the political parties is in any position to provide an alternative for the people. Both are just part of a charade created by the dictatorship in an attempt to sell itself as a "democratic" country to the international public, and to Brazilians themselves. These political parties are known in Brazil as "the party of the 'yes'" and "the party of the 'yes, sir'." To confirm this it is sufficient to observe the role played by the congress in the past five years. In 1967 the congress approved 97% of the projects introduced by the executive, and in 1971 the government achieved what could be called a "political miracle": 100% of its projects were approved by the Congress.¹

Knowing that elections are no longer a means of real political participation, two-thirds of those who have voted since 1966 (every literate person over 18 years of age is required to vote) have in some way demonstrated their protest of the elections.² In the elections held on November 15, this popular bitterness regarding the



government showed up once again.

In the city of Sao Sebastiao da Lagoa de Roca, in northeastern Paraíba state, a candidate for the government party did the impossible: he ran without opposition and lost. Voters cast more blank and nullified votes than they did for the sole candidate.³

In Sao Paulo, the largest Brazilian city, besides nullifying their votes, a significant number of people cast their ballots for "Sujismundo," the government-created cartoon star of a nationwide cleanliness campaign, and for a reputed international Mafia figure recently arrested in Brazil.⁴

In the rural northeast, votes were also cast for "onça" (Portuguese for "wildcat"), widely used in colloquial speech and jokes as a symbol of falsity and boldness.⁵

And in Salvador, the old colonial capital of Brazil, a wildcat named Peteleca which had escaped from the local zoo polled more than 5000 votes, beating the candidates from both the pro-government and the opposition party. Ironically, Peteleca met the same fate as hundreds of people who have opposed the dictatorship: eight days after it won the elections, it was captured and killed by the state police....⁶

REFERENCES

1. *Veja*, October 25, 1972.
2. *Campanha*, November 28, 1972.
3. *Los Angeles Times*, November 18, 1972.
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6. *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 25, 1972.

Peasant Leaders in Danger

On January 23, 1972 two peasant leaders, Manoel da Conceicao and Luis Campos, were captured in an ambush set up by hired gunmen of the *latifundiarios* (big landowners) of Pindare, in the northeastern state of Maranhao.

This is not the first time Manoel da Conceicao has been a victim of repression in the Northeast. In July 1968, when he was president of the Rural Workers of Vale do Pindare, a union supported by 100,000 peasants, police shot him five times in the legs in front of the union medical center. Due to lack of medical attention, during his subsequent four days in jail, gangrene set in and upon his release he had to have his leg amputated. Constant police harassment and threats following his release in 1968 finally forced him to live clandestinely, hidden and supported by the peasants of the region. He was living under these conditions when he and Campos fell into the hands of the hired gunmen a year ago.

Soon after their illegal abduction by the gunmen Conceicao and Campos were turned over to police authorities who took them to Sao Luis, the capital of Maranhao state. Their imprisonment provoked an international campaign of solidarity which was largely responsible for their still being alive today. They are still in prison and the campaign for their freedom continues.

Reprinted below are two letters: one from Luis Campos calling on the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops to intercede on behalf of the peasants and other political prisoners; and the other, a letter from Manoel da Conceicao, which was written to his friends in December 1972 and smuggled out of a prison in Rio de Janeiro.

We urge readers to respond to these appeals by writing to the Ambassador of Brazil (Brazilian Embassy, 3006 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.) protesting the treatment of these men and demanding their freedom, as well as the freedom of all political prisoners in Brazil.

CAMPOS LETTER

Sao Luis, September 29, 1972

Your Excellency, Mr. President of the
National Conference of Brazilian Bishops

Mr. President,

I write this to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency, and of other ecclesiastical authorities of our country and of the world, events which are becoming almost routine, normal, for the police authorities, a matter which wounds our human dignity — the torture.

On January 23, the leader of the Rural Workers of Vale do Pindare, Mr. Manoel da Conceicao dos Santos and I were beaten by four hired gunmen ("jaguncos") on orders from owners of the Usina de Beneficiario Arroz. Later we were turned over to a police precinct in the city of Pindare Mirim and were immediately removed to Sao Luis (capital of Maranhao state) and turned over to DOPS (Department of Political and Social Order). On February 26, the DOPS sent Mr. Manoel da Conceicao to Rio de Janeiro, and Federal Agents came to get him on a Brazilian Air Force plane. Since that date we have had no news of him.

On March 16, I was removed from the prison of the PMM barracks (Military Police of Maranhao) by the official of the day, Lt. Mateus, and a sergeant of the guard, Sgt. Silva, and was left in the presence of two Federal Agents.

From this moment on they began to interrogate and beat me. They beat me until I fell prostrate on the floor. I was beaten with blows on my head, ears (the so-called "telephone" torture), chest, stomach, penis, coccyx and on the region of the lower abdomen above the penis, to the point of causing a rupture. Today my left testicle is enlarged as a consequence of the powerful pinches of which I was victim. I ate with great difficulty and managed to drink some liquid.

These sessions of torture lasted from 6 pm until 10 pm. One of these two agents was called Hugo and I didn't come to know the name of the other.

On May 25 I was removed from the Police Station with

four other peasants.

We were placed in a station wagon and our eyes were blindfolded so we wouldn't know where we were going. As soon as we arrived at the place we were taken to a big room. They removed my clothes, tied my hands with a rope, then tied electric cords to my toe, my index finger and my ears; all this on the right side of my body. Then they started to apply the strongest electric shocks. The pain was unbearable. In addition to electric shocks, these men beat me hysterically and with great sadism, and, moreover, with their guns aimed at my head, threatened to push a billy club up my anus. Beside all they said that we were going to leave there in the form of a "presunto" (literally, a ham; a term used by the Death Squad for its victims). They laid me on the floor and left me aside for a few hours. Next they tortured the peasant, Mr. Joaquim Matias Neto, General Secretary of the Rural Workers Union of Pindare Mirim, to the point where he didn't resist any more, having become crazy. The other peasants suffered the same fate. All suffered the terrible electric tortures and were barbarously beaten.

The same sequence of tortures was repeated with me during several consecutive hours. Mr. Joaquim Matias Neto, though he was already mad, was nevertheless brutally tortured. According to him, he was given an injection, but he didn't know what kind of injection it was.

After spending more than 3 hours in that place we were returned to the Central Police. From that day on Mr. Joaquim was no longer the same man of healthy senses which he was before the tortures. After spending some days in the prison he was sent to the Colonia para Debeis Mentais (Colony for the Feeble Minded) in Sao Luis, for his state of health was completely undermined, and he was treated there several days. Without permission from the doctors, he was removed from the Colony to be interrogated again.

I was forced to sign a statement, the contents of which I was not permitted to know. I don't know what is written in it, but I believe that perhaps I have signed a "death penalty" sentence because they didn't allow me to read it. I signed it to save my life so I would be able to bring to the

knowledge of all dignified persons of Brazil and of the world these cowardly, inhuman, indignant, repugnant and deplorable acts perpetrated by these executioners of the Brazilian "Gestapo". Even blindfolded I could perceive that we were at the 24th Batalhao de Caca barracks and I could recognize the voice of 2d Sgt. Marques, an active participant in the "festival of tortures"; I say festival because they amused themselves tremendously at the expense of our suffering and pain. There was also a lieutenant there, but I couldn't find out his name.

The persons responsible for turning us over to the torturers are the following authorities: the Secretary of Public Security of Maranhao State, Col. Paulo Maranhao Aries; the Director of Public Security, Dr. Felipe Jacinto; and Dr. Jose Carlos Raposo, a DOPS delegate.

Of those imprisoned that were tortured, Joaquim Matias Neto and I are still in the PMM barracks. Besides us there are two more, a woman who is hospitalized and Mr. Antonio Pereira Campos who is in the PMM barracks.

There is also a revolutionary young man, Jose Severino Nascimento, who was arrested in August and was tortured until he had a nervous breakdown. It is said he was taken to Fortaleza, capital of Ceara state.

Here in Maranhao they are constantly imprisoning peasants who defend their rights, or try to better their living conditions, or demand land or a better price for their products. They are imprisoned and accused of subversion. They spend months in jail with their families abandoned in the countryside suffering all kinds of misery.

Besides that, hundreds of families abandon their homes because of police repression used against them.

It is necessary that Your Excellency and other ecclesiastical authorities of Brazil and of the world learn about these events perpetrated against defenseless persons and do something to end this police arbitrariness.

I am confident that the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops will not neglect this deplorable situation in which the peasants of Maranhao find themselves.

It is true that I am a prisoner, but I cannot and never will silence my voice, unless they take my life, as they constantly threaten to do.

Being sure that my appeal will be heard, I thank this respectable organization in advance for doing something for our democratic and human rights.

Sincerely,

Andre Luis Campos

LETTER FROM MANOEL DA CONCEICAO

I am threatened with death if I denounce the crime that was done to me. I spent four months facing heavy tortures in the 1st Army Barracks of Rio de Janeiro and later in the Navy Secret Service — CENIMAR. Six times I was taken to the hospital practically dead. The beatings were so bad that not a place was left on my body that wasn't black and blue, blood vessels broke under my skin, and all my hair fell out.


They tore out my fingernails. They perforated my penis and my testicles with a needle until they came to resemble a sieve. They tied a rope to my testicles and dragged me on the terrace, then hung me upside down. They chained my wrists and hung me on a bar, took off my artificial leg and tied up my penis so I wouldn't urinate. They left me without food and drink and on only one leg. They gave me so many electric shocks that my ear drums burst and I am impotent.

They nailed my penis to a table board and left me nailed 24 hours. They threw me into a pool, tied up like a pig; I almost drowned. They put me in a cell that was completely dark. I spent 28 days urinating and defecating in the same place where I lay down to sleep. They gave me only bread moistened with water. They put me inside a rubber box, turned on a horn so that during eight days I didn't eat or sleep and I almost went crazy. They injected my blood stream with "truth serum". I went out of my mind and became crazy, knowing nothing of my situation while I was being questioned.

They lay me down on the floor and threatened to tear out my guts through my rectum with a piece of metal that had three corners with three rows of saw teeth.

There are dozens of other things, but it is enough for now. After doing all this with me, they took advantage of a false I.D. card and denied that I am Manoel da Conceicao, for I didn't have any document to prove this. They figured that once I have been here twelve months and the people have forgotten about me the government could order them to put me in a helicopter and drop me into the high seas. This was a promise made every day. Their main objective is to isolate me from the people. My life once more is in the hands of the Brazilian people. And only the people have the right to judge my actions."

Note: For more on the case of Manoel da Conceicao and Luis Campos see *Bulletin* No. 7. Copies of a letter describing their January 1972 arrest are available from CARIB, PO Box 426, Hyattsville, MD 20782. For more on Conceicao's July 1968 arrest see *Terror in Brazil, A Dossier*, available from the U.S. Catholic Conference, 1312 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.



CAUGHT AT THE CONFERENCE

The Brazilian military government has launched a worldwide campaign to neutralize the image of cruelty and terror that the dictatorship has acquired in international public opinion. To achieve this goal it utilizes different means, such as advertising campaigns in the media, special trips abroad by dignitaries, cultural and artistic exhibitions, commissioned magazine articles, and most recently, the celebration of Brazil's 150th anniversary of its independence. In the United States this campaign has reached into the universities and colleges, particularly through conferences and seminars jointly organized by academic bodies and the Brazilian Embassy and corporations interested in Brazil, with the clear objective of making political propaganda for the dictatorship.

A recent example of such collaboration was the "international symposium in honor of the 150th Anniversary of the Independence (7 September 1822) of the United States of Brazil" sponsored by the History Department of Johns Hopkins University on October 18-19, 1972. We reprint below Prof. Herbert Klein's response to the invitation to participate in this symposium.

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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Fayerweather Hall

October 11, 1972

Professor A.J.R. Russell-Wood
Department of History
The Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland 21218


Dear Professor Russell-Wood:


I was deeply honored this past June when you invited me to attend the symposium on the Historical Dimensions of Modern Brazil. During the summer I prepared a paper for the conference based on my current research on the slave trade. As I initially understood it, this was to be an historical conference sponsored by the Department of History of Johns Hopkins University. Since the University sponsors annual conferences, I assumed that this was in that long-standing tradition. That is, that it was a professional and scholarly meeting. This impression was based on your statement in the letter of May 10 that the symposium would be held "under the auspices of the Department of History" and would "bring together a distinguished group of scholars of national and international reputation."

Only recently, however, I discovered that the conference is now also being sponsored by assorted non-academic institutions and foundations as well as private American companies. Equally, you mentioned two sessions on the "economic and social situation" of Brazil, and the obtaining of an "outstanding scholar" from Brazil itself. As for the current "situation," the panel on "Modern Brazil, the economic miracle" is being given without a single academic economist and the panel on "Brazil, the country of the Future" apparently will not be dealing with the current social situation. With documented cases of torture, the destruction of the democratic regime and the complete censorship of all thought and expression, the current situation surely cannot be reasonably represented by these two panels. I can only conclude, given the sponsorship and the non-scholarly nature of the participants in these panels, that the overall aim of the conference is to give support to the current regime. Equally indicative of this fact is that the only Brazilians in evidence are two non-academic members of the Brazilian diplomatic service.

Since I do not wish to support this regime in any capacity, nor do I wish to lend my name without my prior consent to unknown foundations, and private American companies operating in Brazil, I must withdraw from the symposium. I also wish to express my profound regret at the way an American Academic conference has been used by non-academic groups for a political end.

Sincerely yours,


Herbert S. Klein
Professor of History



People's Bank & Distrust Co.

Since 1964 it has been commonplace for civilians to denounce individuals and groups to the police for personal or political reasons. An atmosphere of suspicion and distrust thus permeates almost all casual relations that even touch on politics.

Now this climate of insecurity has been institutionalized. In Belo Horizonte, the capital of the State of Minas Gerais, a "Data Bank" has been formed. Using a team of 53 policemen headed by chief Prata Neto, the Bank will collect information from any source, disregarding reliability. According to the founder, Chief Neto: "Any person has credit in this bank. It's not necessary to identify yourself. It's enough to make a phone call and denounce strange behavior of friends, enemies or unknown persons, that seem to be illegal. Even if there is no proof to substantiate the denunciation, it will be considered and put in the records." Mr. Prata Neto added, "this is an attempt to expand our network of volunteer agents, protecting their anonymity. Our objective now is to make the population, in its totality, participate in the combating of bad elements."

Source: *Veja* (July 19, 1972)

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Antônio Delfim Netto



But nowhere has this wooing (of government bureaucrats, local banking sources and U.S. Embassy staffers by Singer executives) produced a relationship more lucrative than in Brazil, where Singer's sewing machine operation has become its most profitable subsidiary outside the U.S.

When Scotsman Alec Dunbar moved into the International Consumer Products Group in 1968, the Brazilian operation controlled more than 60 per cent of a market that still showed signs of tremendous growth, but was only breaking even. "We had an uninformed management down there," Dunbar says. "Our guys were hanging out at all the American clubs." But then, through a mutual acquaintance, Dunbar met Antonio Delfim Netto, a former economics professor who is now Brazil's Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs. In the next year and a half, Dunbar traveled to Brazil two or three times a month to help pave the way for a modernization program at his plant in Campinas—and almost always he called on Delfim Netto. The friendship paid off when local opposition blocked Singer's request for duty-free status on \$3 million of machinery and equipment it needed to import. After Delfim intervened, the proposal was quickly approved, saving the company \$860,000 in import and excise taxes.

Quoted from "Global Companies Too Big to Handle?" *Newsweek*, Nov. 20, 1972, p. 103.

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