SPAIN: COMMUNISM AND REPRESSION

RADICAL AMERICA

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LIBERTAD

THE PROFESSIONAL-MANAGERIAL CLASS
THE MAKING OF HARLAN COUNTY, U.S.A.

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Introduction

The 'seventies have seen the revival of a working-class orientation in the United States Left. Such an orientation obliges radicals to look at the class structure of modern American society carefully and undogmatically, as it is experienced. One major experience that must be accounted for in any useful theory of class is the phenomenon of "middle class" radicalism and the existence of a "middle class" of professionals and managers.

Various groups on the Left have either classified professionals and managers as part of the petty bourgeoisie or else have described them as part of the working class. But neither of these views is satisfactory. The term "petty bourgeoisie" is used as a catch-all for non-proletarian, non-bourgeois people by the new communist marxist-leninist organizations, particularly the Revolutionary Communist Party and the October League. Yet, the "petty bourgeoisie" properly describes the class of small owners, who have no chance of competing with the big bourgeoisie and are therefore doomed to dwindle in number relative to the population. Professionals and managers, on the contrary, are a growing segment of society.
The view that society consists solely of a huge working class and a tiny ruling class, however, defines "working class" so inclusively as to make the term strategically useless. This view has been characteristic of the class analysis of the New American Movement. The strength of this analysis is that it tries to come to terms with the theoretical and practical understanding that the nature of professional work has been drastically changed in this century. The experience of Left groups in recent years, however, should be ample confirmation of the immense cultural gap that separates the blue- and white-collar working class from the professional and managerial strata out of which a great many college-educated Left activists have come. The need for a working class socialist movement cannot be met by simply defining the present Left as a working class movement.

In the first section of a two-part article, Barbara and John Ehrenreich postulate the existence of a new class which includes technical, professional and managerial workers in advanced capitalist society, a class antagonistic in certain ways to both capital and the working class. While we do not feel that the only alternative to a two class theory is one which proclaims this particular "new class", we think the Ehrenreich's analysis is important because it forces us to think more precisely about where the Left is coming from and what the class contradictions are in America today.

The second section of this article, to be published in our next issue, applies the theory of the professional-managerial class to the experience of the Left in the 'sixties and 'seventies.

Another important issue for the American Left is the political struggle in Spain. U.S. imperialism anxiously awaits the outcome of struggles throughout southern Europe, hoping for respectable parliamentary governments but more than ready to settle for fascist dictatorships to support American power in that area. The American Left, hoping for an increase in the power of Spain's working class, must consider the question of how militants can advance the struggle in a fascist and reaction-prone context. In this issue Jose Delgado-Guitart, a Spaniard just returned from his first visit home since Franco's death, provides a concrete sense of the political excitement and accelerating rate of change in people which characterize contemporary Spain. Temma Kaplan discusses the relationship between this burgeoning mass movement and the PCE, the Spanish Communist Party.

In Spain the Communists lead (i.e., vastly outnumber the rest of) the Left. Are they in fact interested in leading the mass movement to power? Or do they, as the groups to their left claim, mislead workers into a futile accommodation with capitalism that provides PCE leadership with some hope of minor influence within a parliamentary system? Kaplan argues that the PCE in fact follows the mass movement, in its broadening of the struggle to include feminist, regionalist and community issues, in its militance, but at the same time in its basically defensive posture. She further argues that, given the strength of the "Fascist International" in Spain and the mood of the people, it makes sense for Spanish militants to work within the party for basic civil rights and elementary social justice.

We publish this article partly as a contribution to the debate over "Euro-communism," the new policies of Communist Parties in Spain, France and Italy. In a recent issue (vol. 10, no. 6), we presented an article
critical of the Italian CP for its willingness to subordinate workers power to the demands of parliamentary respectability. While we believe these same misgivings apply to the Spanish CP, we see that a distinction can be drawn. While the Italian CP functions in some ways as a trade union bureaucracy, relied upon by management to maintain industrial discipline between contract negotiations, the situation in Spain is quite different. Spanish workers are disciplined in Fascist company unions, and the Spanish CP, still clandestine, derives all its strength from its popular base and none from official tolerance.

We have printed a number of photographs taken by Jose Delgado-Guitart to accompany his report on the current situation in Spain. The photos of the wall murals discussed in the report emphasize the importance of art and culture in defining political consciousness and in expressing resistance to oppression. Similarly, the important new film Harlan County, U.S.A. shows how much the strength of the women and men of Kentucky's mining communities is expressed in their songs and their culture. Barbara Kopple, the director of Harlan County, explains in an interview what it was like to use another art form, the film, to portray the strengths of that culture.

Our Associate Editor, Jorge Corralejo, has written about the meaning of the November defeat of Proposition 14 in California for the United Farm Workers. We hope that publication of this, as well as last issue's piece on the Sadowski campaign, will encourage our readers to send us short articles about working class political activity and the experience of movement groups. We are especially interested in strategic discussion about the meaning and value of different types of organizing, in the workplace or community. We hope to publish more of these kinds of articles in issues to come, in the interest of speaking to the day-to-day concerns of activists.

The Radical America editors
The Professional-Managerial Class

Barbara and John Ehrenreich

To generations of radicals, the working class has been the bear-
er of socialism, the agent of both progressive social reform and
revolution. But in the United States in the last two decades, the
left has been concentrated most heavily among people who feel
themselves to be "middle class," while the working class has ap-
peared relatively quiescent. This "middle-class" left, unlike its
equivalent in early twentieth-century Europe or in the Third World
today, is not a minority within a mass working class (or peasant)
movement: it is, to a very large extent, the left itself. It has its
own history of mass struggle, not as an ally or appendage of the
industrial working class, but as a mass constituency in and of it-
self. At the same time, most of the U.S. left continues to believe
(correctly, we think) that without a mass working-class left, only
the most marginal of social reforms is possible.

None of these historical anomalies about the U.S. left is ex-
plained by the theories to which most of the left now adheres.
Orthodox Marxism describes capitalist society as being polarized

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Horwitz and especially John Welch for stimulating discussions of some of the
ideas in this paper and for extensive comments on earlier drafts. They, of
course, bear no responsibility for the paper as it stands. We also want to thank
James Weinstein, who, while disagreeing with the entire thrust of the paper,
made extensive and useful comments on the earlier drafts.
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; it has nothing to say about a “middle class,” or, of course, about middle-class radicalism. Thus, the left today may sense the impasse created by the narrowness of its class composition, but it lacks even the terms with which to describe the situation, much less a strategy for overcoming it.

Theoretical confusion about class is endemic among all parts of the left. Some leftists (mainly associated with the “new communist movement”) describe students, professionals, and other educated workers as “petty bourgeois,” though more as a put-down than as a defensible analysis. Other contemporary leftists describe all salary and wage workers who do not own the means of production as “working class.” The working class so conceived is a nearly universal class, embracing all but the actual capitalists and the classical petty bourgeoisie (i.e., small tradesmen, independent farmers, etc.). But this group, too, finds its definition practically untenable. In practice, and conversationally, these leftists use the terms “working class” and “middle class” with their colloquial connotations, knowing that the distinction is still somehow a useful one. Yet this distinction cannot be pursued in theory: the prevailing theoretical framework insists that all wage earners are working class and that the notion that some workers are “middle class” is a capitalist-inspired delusion.

When analysis stops, the problem does not necessarily go away. Rather, it is at that point that the door opens to all kinds of irrational and subjectivist approaches. In the years since the New Left in the U.S. matured from a radical to a socialist outlook, the left has dashed itself repeatedly against the contradictions between its “middle-class” origins and its working-class allegiance. Some pursue the search for a “pure” proletarian line to an ever more rarefied sectarianism. Others seem to find comfort in the ambiguities of contemporary class analysis, fearing that any attempt to draw more careful distinctions will leave them in an undesirable category (“petty bourgeois,” etc.). At this point the very emotion surrounding the subject of class provides a further impediment to analysis. Yet if the left is to grow, it must begin to come to an objective understanding of its own class origins and to comprehend objectively the barriers that have isolated it from the working class.

I. Classes in Monopoly Capitalist Society

The classical Marxian analysis of capitalist society centers on two classes and two alone—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The other numerically large class of mature capitalist society—the petty bourgeoisie—lies outside of this central polarity, and is in a sense anachronistic: a class left over from an earlier social order, which undergoes a continual process of “proletarianization”
(i.e., its members are progressively forced down into the proletariat)." Meanwhile, the working class not only expands to embrace the vast majority of the working population, but also becomes more and more homogeneous and unified.

As early as the turn of the century it was becoming evident that the class structures of the advanced capitalist countries were not evolving along quite so straight a path. The middle classes were simply not withering away; new, educated and salaried middle-class strata had appeared and were growing rapidly. Most Marxists, however, either ignored the new strata or insisted that they, like the old middle class of independent artisans and entrepreneurs, would become proletarianized. It was left to radical social theorists outside the Marxian mainstream (such as Emil Lederer and Jacob Marschak in Germany and C. Wright Mills in the United States) to analyze the "new middle classes". In these analyses, the salaried white-collar workers were not seen as a single class, but rather as a disparate group, ranging from clerical workers to engineers and college professors, connected to each other (and to the old middle classes) by little more than a common desire not to fall into the proletariat.

By early in the sixties, the explosive growth and continued social distinctiveness of the stratum of educated wage earners had become impossible for Marxists to ignore. But Marxian theorists were not yet ready to give up the attempt at forcing engineers, teachers, government workers and accountants into the proletarian mold. Pierre Belleville, Andre Gorz, and Serge Mallet were the first Marxists to chronicle and analyze the emergence of what they called, in opposition to Mills, et al., the "new working class." The new working class, wrote Gorz in 1964, like the old working class, was defined by its antagonistic relation to capital.

Technicians, engineers, students, researchers discover that they are wage earners like the others, paid for a piece of work which is "good" only to the degree it is profitable in the short run. They discover that long-range research, creative work on original problems, and the love of workmanship are incompatible with the criteria of capitalist profitability....

Despite their immediate consciousness as "middle class," the growing body of educated workers are, according to this analysis, a stratum of the working class. (2)

A decade later, after the rise and decline of a New Left based heavily among students and educated workers, it had become ap-

* "Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses...this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other — bourgeoisie and proletariat." (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO)
parent that the gulf between the "old" and "new" working classes was deeper than the earlier analyses had suggested, Nicos Poulantzas suggested making a distinction between labor necessary for production of commodities and labor necessary for the reproduction of capitalist social relationships. Thus, according to Poulantzas, workers in the state and other "ideological apparatuses"—schools, government agencies, welfare agencies, mass media, etc.—must be considered as being in a different class from production workers. (3)

In the early '70's Andre Gorz, too, broke with his own earlier analysis, arguing that it was not only workers in the ideological apparatuses who served reproductive roles, but also the engineers, scientists, managers, etc. in productive enterprises. The capitalist division of labor has been determined by the need to control the workers and the work process in the context of class antagonism, and not only by technological imperatives. (4) Thus, proposed Gorz, even at the point of production, a distinction must be made between productive and reproductive labor.

We shall not succeed in locating technical and scientific labor within the class structure of advanced capitalist society unless we start by analyzing what functions technical and scientific labor perform in the process of capital accumulation and in the process of reproducing social relations. The question as to whether technicians, engineers, research workers and the like belong to the middle class or to the working class must be made to depend upon the following questions: (1) (a) Is their function required by the process of material production as such or (b) by capital's concern for ruling and controlling the productive process and the work process from above? (2) (a) Is their function required by concern for the greatest possible efficiency in production technology? or (b) does the concern for efficient production technology come second only to the concern for "social technology," i.e., for keeping the labor force disciplined, hierarchically regimented and divided? (3) (a) Is the present definition of technical skill and knowledge primarily required by the technical division of labor and thereby based upon scientific and ideologically neutral data? or (b) is the definition of technical skill and knowledge primarily social and ideological, as an outgrowth of the social division of labor? (5)

Both Gorz and Poulantzas conclude that there is an "unbridgeable objective class distinction," as Gorz puts it, between professional, technical and managerial workers and production workers. The problem, then, is where to place these mental workers in the class structure of capitalist society. But Gorz, so far as we know, has not extended his analysis of the class position of "tech-
nical workers" any further. Poulantzas refuses to break with Marx's two-class model, taking refuge in the dogmatic assertion that to "maintain that capitalism itself produces a new class in the course of its development" is "unthinkable for Marxist theory" (emphasis ours). He ends by lumping the educated workers along with all other non-productive workers - wage earners (educated or not) in banks, commerce, service industries, government, etc. - in a stratum of the petty bourgeoisie which he calls the "new petty bourgeoisie." (6)

We will argue that the "middle class" category of workers which has concerned Marxist analysts for the last two decades - the technical workers, managerial workers, "culture" producers, etc. - must be understood as comprising a distinct class in monopoly capitalist society. The Professional-Managerial Class ("PMC")*, as we will define it, cannot be considered a stratum of a broader "class" of "workers" because it exists in an objectively antagonistic relationship to another class of wage earners (whom we shall simply call the "working class"). Nor can it be considered to be a "residual" class like the petty bourgeoisie; it is a formation specific to the monopoly stage of capitalism. It is only in the light of this analysis, we believe, that it is possible to understand the role of technical, professional and managerial workers in advanced capitalist society and in the radical movements.

Let us begin by clarifying what we mean by a "class." With E. P. Thompson, we see class as having meaning only as a relationship:

...The notion of class entails the notion of historical relationship. Like any other relationship, it is a fluency which evades analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomize its structure. The finest meshed sociological analysis cannot give us a pure specimen of class, any more than it can give us one of deference or love. The relationship must always be embodied in real people and in a real context. Moreover, we cannot have two distinct classes, each with an independent being, and then bring them into relationships with each other. We cannot have love without lovers, nor deference without squires and labourers. (7)

It follows that any class which is not residual - i.e., merely "leftover" from another era, like the European aristocracy in the nineteenth century - can be properly defined only in the context of

*"PMC" is, perhaps, an awkward term. But the more obvious "new middle class" has been used with a variety of definitions (e.g., by C. Wright Mills and Richard Hofstadter, who include sales and clerical workers in it), which could only lead to confusion. Moreover, "new middle class" obscures the fact that the class we are identifying is not part of some broader middle class, which includes both "old" and "new" strata, but rather is a distinct class, separate from the old middle class.
the totality of class relationships and (2) the historical development of these relationships. Thus, if we were going to fully and properly define a Professional-Managerial Class, we would not be able to restrict ourselves to a picture of this group as a sociological entity; we would have to deal, at all stages, with the complementary and mutually interacting developments in the bourgeoisie and the working class. The story of the rise and development of the PMC is simultaneously the story of the rise of the modern bourgeoisie and the modern proletariat as they have taken form in monopoly capitalist society. Here, of course, we can give only a fragment of this story. We will focus on the PMC itself, skimming lightly over the complementary developments in other classes.

From our point of view, a class (as opposed to a stratum or other social grouping) is defined by two major characteristics:

1. At all times in its historical development, a class is characterized by a common relation to the economic foundations of society—the means of production and the socially organized patterns of distribution and consumption. By a common "relation" we do not mean a purely juridical relationship; e.g., legal ownership or non-ownership of the means of production, (8) Class is defined by actual relations between groups of people, not formal relations between people and objects. The former may or may not coincide, at any given moment in history, with the legal relationships evolved over previous years. The relations which define class arise from the place occupied by groups in the broad social division of labor, and from the basic patterns of control over access to the means of production and of appropriation of the social surplus.

2. However, the relation to the economic foundations of society is not sufficient to specify a class as a real social entity. At any moment in its historical development after its earliest, formative period, a class is characterized by a coherent social and cultural existence: members of a class share a common life style, educational background, kinship networks, consumption patterns, work habits, beliefs. These cultural and social patterns cannot be derived in any simple fashion from the concurrently existing relationship to the means of production of the members of the class.

For one thing, culture has a memory: social patterns formed in earlier periods, when a different relation to the means of production (or even another mode of production) prevailed, may long survive their "owners" separation from the earlier relationships. (For example, the culture of an industrial working class newly recruited from a semi-feudal peasantry is quite different from that of habitually urbanized workers.) In addition, the social existence of a group of people is determined not only by its experience at the point of production, but by its experience in private life (mediated especially by kinship relations, which, in turn, are at most only distantly related to evolving relations of production). The relationship between class as abstract economic relationship and class as real social existence has been all-but-unexplored; for our
purposes we shall have to limit ourselves to insisting that a class has both characteristics.

Having stated these two general characteristics, we should strongly emphasize that class is an analytic abstraction, a way of putting some order into an otherwise bewildering array of individual and group characteristics and interrelationships. It describes a phenomenon existing most clearly at the level of society as a whole. When, however, the notion of class is called on to explain or predict infallibly the actions, ideas and relationships of every individual, it ceases to be very useful.

Our description of the historical experience of the PMC will be abbreviated and episodic, leaving out many key developments in the history of the class (most importantly, any elaboration on the expansion of the state in the twentieth century) and restricting ourselves to the United States. We will begin with a schematic definition of the PMC, then describe the emergence of its distinctive class outlook and its consolidation as a class in the early part of the twentieth century, and finally return to the situation of the contemporary left.

II. A Definition

We define the Professional-Managerial Class as consisting of salaried mental workers who do not own the means of production and whose major function in the social division of labor may be described broadly as the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class relations.*

Their role in the process of reproduction may be more or less explicit, as with workers who are directly concerned with social control or with the production and propagation of ideology (e.g., teachers, social workers, psychologists, entertainers, writers of

*We do not, of course, mean by "culture" merely "high" culture or the arts in general. By the culture of a social group we mean its total repertory of solutions and responses to everyday problems and situations. This is a transmittable repertory, and the means of transmission may be anything from myths and songs to scientific formulae and machinery.
advertising copy and TV scripts, etc.), or it may be hidden within the process of production, as is the case with the middle-level administrators and managers, engineers, and other technical workers whose functions, as Gorz, Steve Marglin, Harry Braverman and others have argued, are essentially determined by the need to preserve capitalist relations of production. Thus we assert that these occupational groups—cultural workers, managers, engineers and scientists, etc.—share a common function in the broad social division of labor and a common relation to the economic foundations of society.*

The PMC, by our definition, includes people with a wide range of occupations, skills, income levels, power and prestige. The boundaries separating it from the ruling class above and the working class below are fuzzy. In describing the class standing of people near the divide separating the PMC from other classes (e.g., registered nurses, welfare case workers, engineers in routine production or inspection jobs at the lower end, middle levels of corporate and state bureaucratic managers at the upper end), we must emphasize two aspects of our definition of class: First (in Paul Sweezy's words), "it would be a mistake to think of a class as perfectly homogeneous internally and sharply marked off from other classes. Actually there is variety within the class; and one class sometimes shades off very gradually and almost imperceptibly into another." Second, occupation is not the sole determinant of class (nor even the sole determinant of the relation to the means of production).

Consider the case of the registered nurse: She may have been recruited from a working class, PMC or petty-bourgeois family. Her education may be two years in a working-class community college or four years in a private, upper-middle-class college. On the job, she may be a worker, doing the most menial varieties of bedside nursing, supervising no one, using only a small fraction of the skills and knowledge she learned at school. Or she may be part of management, supervising dozens, even hundreds of other RN's, practical nurses and nurses' aides. Moreover, over 98 percent of RN's are women; their class standing is, in significant measure, linked to that of their husband. Some nurses do, in fact, marry doctors; far more marry lower-level professionals, while many others marry blue-collar and lower-level white-collar workers. So there is simply no way to classify registered nurses as a group. What seems to be a single occupational category is in fact socially and functionally heterogeneous.

* Throughout this essay, "manager," unless otherwise qualified, means lower- and middle-level managers. In advanced capitalism, the capitalists are the corporations, not the individual entrepreneurs of an earlier period. The people who as a group own a substantial portion of their stock, and as individuals have direct and dominant power over their functioning, can only be considered as part of the ruling class. The top officials of large non-corporate enterprises (i.e., government, large foundations, etc.) are also part of the ruling class.
Much the same kind of analysis could be made of most of the other groupings near the boundaries of the PMC. The situation of the groups near the PMC-working-class border, we should note, is especially likely to be ambiguous: It is here that the process of "de-skilling"—of rationalizing previously professional tasks into a number of completely routinized functions requiring little training—occurs. Moreover, a disproportionate number of people in these groups are women, for whom purely occupational criteria for class are especially inadequate.

Despite the lack of precise delineation of the boundaries of the PMC, by combining occupational data and statistics on property distribution we can make a very crude estimate of the class composition of U.S. society: By this estimate, about 65 to 70 per cent of the U.S. population is working class. (We accept Braverman's conception of the working class: craftsmen, operatives, laborers, sales workers, clerical workers, service workers, non-college-educated technical workers.) Eight to ten per cent is in the "old middle class" (i.e., self-employed professionals, small tradespeople, independent farmers, etc.). Twenty to twenty-five per cent is PMC; and one to two per cent is ruling class. That is, the PMC includes something like fifty million people.

The very definition of the PMC—as a class concerned with the reproduction of capitalist culture and class relationships—proclaims treating it as a separable sociological entity. It is in a sense a derivative class; its existence presupposes: (1) that the social surplus has developed to a point sufficient to sustain the PMC in addition to the bourgeoisie, for the PMC is essentially nonproductive; and (2) that the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has developed to the point that a class specializing in the reproduction of capitalist class relationships becomes a necessity to the capitalist class. That is, the maintenance of order can no longer be left to episodic police violence.

Historically, these conditions were met in the U.S. by the early twentieth century. The last half of the nineteenth century saw: (1) the development of an enormous social surplus, concentrated in monopolistic corporations and individual capitalists; and (2) intermittent, violent warfare between the industrial working class and the capitalist class. The possibility of outright insurrection was taken very seriously by both bourgeois and radical observers.

At the same time, however, the new concentration and centralization of capital opened up the possibilities of long-term planning, the refinement of "management" (essentially as a substitute for force), and the capitalist rationalization of both productive and consumptive processes. In the decades immediately following the turn of the century, these possibilities began to be realized:

1. At the point of production, the concentration of capital allowed for the wholesale purchase of science and its transformation into a direct instrument of capital. Science, and its practical offshoot engineering, were set to work producing not only "progress" in the
form of new products, but new productive technologies which undercuted the power of skilled labor, Labor was directly replaced by machines, or else it was "scientifically" managed in an effort to strip from the workers their knowledge and control of the productive process and reduce their labor, as much as possible, to mere motion. (10) As we have argued elsewhere, these developments drastically altered the terms and conditions of class struggle at the workplace: diminishing the workers' collective mastery over the work process and undercutting the collective experience of socialized production. (11)

2. The huge social surplus, concentrated in private foundations and in the public sector, began to be a force for regulation and management of civil society. The Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations, each worth tens of millions of dollars, appeared on the scene in the first decade of the twentieth century; local governments increased their revenues and expenditures five-fold between 1902 and 1922. (17) Public education was vastly expanded; charity was institutionalized; public-health measures gained sponsorship and the authority of law; etc. These developments were of course progressive (in both the specific historical as well as the judgmental sense of the word). But they also represented a politically motivated penetration of working-class community life: Schools imparted industrial discipline and "American" values; charity agencies and domestic scientists imposed their ideas of "right living"; public-health officials literally policed immigrant ghettos, etc. (13)

3. Beginning in the 1900's and increasing throughout the twentieth century, monopoly capitalism came to depend on the development of a national consumer-goods market. Items which had been made in the home or in the neighborhood were replaced by the uniform products of giant corporations. "Services" which had been an indigenous part of working-class culture were edged out by commodities conceived and designed outside of the class. For example, midwifery, which played an important role in the culture of European immigrant groups and rural (black and white) Americans, was outlawed and/or officially discredited in the early 1900's, to be replaced by professionally dominated care. (14) Traditional forms of recreation, from participant sports to social drinking, suffered a similar fate in the face of the new commoditized (and privatized) forms of entertainment offered by the corporation (e.g., records, radio, spectator sports, movies, etc.) The penetration of working-class life by commodities required and continues to require a massive job of education—from schools, advertisers, social workers, domestic scientists, "experts" in child rearing, etc. As the dependence of American capital on the domestic consumer-goods market increased, the management of consumption came to be as important as the management of production. (15)

To summarize the effects of these developments on working-class life: The accumulation and concentration of capital which
occurred in the last decades of the nineteenth century allowed for an extensive reorganization of working-class life—both in the community and in the workplace. This reorganization was aimed at both social control and the development of a mass consumer market. The net effect of this drive to reorganize and reshape working-class life was the social atomization of the working class: the fragmentation of work (and workers) in the productive process, a withdrawal of aspirations from the workplace into private goals, the disruption of indigenous networks of support and mutual aid, the destruction of autonomous working-class culture and its replacement by “mass culture” defined by the privatized consumption of commodities (health care, recreation, etc.).*

It is simultaneously with these developments in working-class life (more precisely, in the relation between the working class and the capitalist class) that the professional and managerial workers emerge as a new class in society. The three key developments listed above—the reorganization of the productive process, the emergence of mass institutions of social control, the commodity penetration of working-class life—do not simply “develop”; they require the effort of more or less conscious agents. The expropriation of productive skills requires the intervention of scientific management experts; there must be engineers to inherit the productive lore, managers to supervise the increasingly degraded work process, etc. Similarly, the destruction of autonomous working-class culture requires (and calls forth) the emergence of new culture-producers—from physicians to journalists, teachers, admen and so on. These new operatives, the vanguard of the emerging PMC, are not simply an old intelligentsia expanding to meet the needs of a “complex” society. Their emergence in force near the turn of the century is parallel and complementary to the transformation of the working class which marks the emergence of monopoly capital.

Thus the relationship between the PMC and the working class is objectively antagonistic. The functions and interests of the two classes are not merely different; they are mutually contradictory. True, both groups are forced to sell their labor power to the capitalist class: both are necessary to the productive process under capitalism; and they share an antagonistic relation to the capitalist class. (We will return to this point in more detail later.) But these commonalities should not distract us from the fact that the professional-managerial workers exist, as a mass grouping in monopoly capitalist society, only by virtue of the expropriation of the skills and culture once indigenous to the working class. Historically, the

*For more thorough discussion of this phase in the history of the U.S. working class, see Stanley Aronowitz, FALSE PROMISES (McGraw-Hill, 1973); Stuart Ewen, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS (McGraw-Hill, 1976); and Harry Braverman, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL (Monthly Review, 1975). The political implications of these phenomena for working-class struggles are very great, though beyond the scope of this essay.
process of overt and sometimes violent expropriation was concentrated in the early twentieth century, with the forced Taylorization of major industries, the "Americanization" drive in working-class communities, etc. The fact that this process does not have to be repeated in every generation—any more than the capitalist class must continually re-enact the process of primitive accumulation—creates the impression that PMC—working-class relations represent a purely "natural" division of labor imposed by the social complexity and technological sophistication of modern society. But the objective antagonism persists and represents a contradiction which is continually nourished by the historical alternative of a society in which mental and manual work are re-united to create whole people. It is because of this objective antagonism that we are let to define the professional and managerial workers as a class distinct from the working class.

We should add, at this point, that the antagonism between the PMC and the working class does not exist only in the abstract realm of "objective" relations, of course. Real-life contacts between the two classes express directly, if sometimes benignly, the relation of control which is at the heart of the PMC—working-class relation: teacher and student (or parent), manager and worker, social worker and client, etc. The subjective dimension of these contacts is a complex mixture of hostility and deference on the part of working-class people, contempt and paternalism on the part of the PMC.

The interdependent yet antagonistic relationship between the working class and the PMC also leads us to insist that the PMC is a class totally distinct from the petty bourgeoisie (the "old middle class" of artisans, shopkeepers, self-employed professionals and independent farmers). The classical petty bourgeoisie lies outside the polarity of labor and capital. It is made up of people who are neither employed by capital nor themselves employers of labor to any significant extent. The PMC, by contrast, is employed by capital and it manages, controls, has authority over labor (though it does not directly employ it). The classical petty bourgeoisie is irrelevant to the process of capital accumulation and to the process of reproducing capitalist social relations. The PMC, by contrast, is essential to both.

III. The Rise of the PMC

In order to define more sharply the relation between the PMC and the other classes, we turn now to a closer examination of the initial emergence of the PMC, its ideology and its institutions. The PMC emerged with dramatic suddenness in the years between 1890 and 1920, a period roughly overlapping what historians call
the Progressive Era. (Table 1 summarizes the expansion of selected professional and managerial occupations at this time.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1.</th>
<th>(in thousands, except for total population in millions)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers* (manufacturing)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social, recreation &amp; religious workers (other than clergy)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College faculty</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants and auditors</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials, administrators, inspectors</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editors and reporters</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*includes managers and manufacturers for 1870, managers only all other years.


We have already sketched the conditions which prepared the way for the expansion of these occupations: a growing and increasingly centralized social surplus, and intensified struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. But it would be wrong to think of the emerging PMC as being no more than passive recruits for the occupational roles required by monopoly capital. The people entering the class-in-formation were drawn from an older middle class. They were the sons and daughters of businessmen, independent professionals, prosperous farmers, etc.—groups which feared their own extinction in the titanic struggle between capital and labor. The generation entering managerial and professional

* cf. Richard Hofstadter, THE AGE OF REFORM (Knopf, 1955), pp. 215-216: *From 1870 to 1910, while the whole population of the United States increased two and one third times, the old middle class—business entrepreneurs and independent professional men—grew somewhat more than two times; the working class, including farm labor, grew a little more than three times; the number of farmers and farm tenants doubled. But the middle class (technicians, salaried professionals, clerical workers, salespeople, public-service workers) grew almost eight times, rising from 756,000 to 5,609,000 people.... The new middle class had risen from 33% of the entire middle class in 1870 to 63% in 1910.* Also cf. Robert H. Wiebe, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER (Hill and Wang, 1967), pp. 111 ff.
roles between 1890 and 1920 consciously grasped the roles which they had to play. They understood that their own self-interest was bound up in reforming capitalism, and they articulated their understanding far more persistently and clearly than did the capitalist class itself. The role of the emerging PMC, as they saw it, was to mediate the basic class conflict of capitalist society and create a "rational," reproducible social order. (16) As Edward A. Ross, a prominent professor and Progressive ideologue, wrote in 1907, after surveying the conflict and corruption of turn-of-the-century capitalism:

Social defense is coming to be a matter for the expert. The rearing of dikes against faithlessness and fraud calls for intelligent social engineering. If in this strait the public does not speedily become far shrewder...there is nothing for it but to turn over the defense of society to professionals. (17)

Many people, of all classes, subscribed to parts of this outlook and stood to benefit one way or another from the Progressive reforms which were associated with it. For our purposes, the striking things about Progressive ideology and reforms are (1) their direct and material contribution to the creation and expansion of professional and managerial occupational slots; (2) their intimate relation to the emergence and articulation of the PMC's characteristic ideologies; and (3) their association with the creation of characteristic PMC class institutions (such as professional organizations).

(1) The Growth of the PMC: Every effort to mediate class conflict and "rationalize" capitalism served to create new institutionalized roles for reformers—i.e., to expand the PMC. Settlement houses, domestic-science training courses, adult-education classes in literacy, English, patriotism, etc. provided jobs for social workers (who formed the National Conference of Social Workers in 1911) and home economists (who formed the American Home Economics Association in 1909), etc. Child-labor laws, compulsory-school-attendance laws, factory health and safety inspections, etc. created jobs for truant officers, teachers and inspectors of various kinds. Similarly, municipal reform meant the establishment of committees of city planners, architects, engineers, statisticians, sociologists, to plan and administer the health, recreation, welfare, housing and other functions of the metropolis. At the federal level, conservationist demands (pushed by the emerging engineering profession, among others) led to the creation of Federal agencies employing engineers to watch over and plan resource use. The Pure Food and Drug Act, the establishment of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Federal Trade Commission, etc. all, in addition to their direct impact in regulating business, gathering infor-
mation, etc., offered thousands of jobs. Public policy in general became dependent on input from specialists, experts, professors. "It is a great thing," exulted political-economy professor Richard T. Ely, another major Progressive-era ideologue, on reading the report of the U.S. Industrial Commission established by Congress in 1898, "that there are in this country a body of economic experts, and that the state of public opinion is such as to demand their employment." (18)

The rationalizing drive of the emerging PMC struck deep into the business enterprise itself. The early years of the century saw the transformation of the internal functioning of the corporation at the hands of a rapidly growing corps of managers — "scientific managers," lawyers, financial experts, engineers, personnel experts, etc. As early as 1886, Henry R. Townes had admonished the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (the source of much early management thought) that "The matter of shop management is of equal importance with that of engineering." By the early 1900's, Townes, Taylor, Gantt, the Gilbreths and other engineers were churning out papers on how to rationalize all aspects of the business enterprise. College-level schools and departments of business administration rapidly appeared to teach the new creed. (The American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business was founded in 1916.) The managers held conferences, formed associations (e.g., the Society to Promote the Science of Management in 1912, and the American Management Association, out of several already existing societies, in 1923), and published professional journals (e.g., ENGINEERING MAGAZINE in 1891, FACTORY in 1908, the BULLETIN OF THE TAYLOR SOCIETY in 1916).

The introduction of modern methods of management was a reform which was understood by contemporary observers to be part of the overall Progressive cause. In fact, scientific management first became known to the public as a tool for the Progressive attack on corporate greed: in the "Eastern Rates" case of 1911, the Interstate Commerce Commission turned down an increase in railroad rates after scientific-management expert H. Emerson testified that proper management would cut a million dollars a day off the cost of rail shipments. Scientific management as taught in the new business schools, exulted reformer and writer Walter Lippmann, would produce a new professional breed of managers who would help lift American business out of the "cesspool of commercialism." To the managers themselves,

...scientific management became something of a "movement." In an age of growing achievement in the physical sciences, it offered the hope of resolving industrial problems also through the use of objective principles. For young and imaginative engineers it provided an ethos and a mission in life. The movement soon became replete with popularizers, traditionalists and dissidents. After the ini-
tial periods of resistance, it conquered the citadels of old-fashioned industrial management in the United States, and had a tremendous effect on industrial practice. It had a major influence on the growing reform and economy movements in public administration. (19)

(2) The Development of a Class Outlook: From the beginning the nascent PMC possessed a class outlook which was distinct from, and often antagonistic to, that of the capitalist class. It is true that, with hindsight, one is struck by the ultimate concordance of interests between the two classes. Even at that time, NEW REPUBLIC editor Herbert Crole noted that Progressivism was "designed to serve as a counterpoise to the threat of working-class revolution." (20) And a wealthy philanthropist friend of Jane Addams noted appreciatively that Adams "was really an interpreter between working men and the people who lived in luxury on the other side of the city, and she also gave the people of her neighborhood quite a different idea about the men and women who were ordinarily called 'capitalists.'" (21) "Class harmony" was the stated goal of many outstanding PMC spokespeople, and to many in the capitalist class as well, it was clear that "professionals" could be more effective in the long run than Pinkertons. But the PMC was not merely a class of lackeys: The capitalists fought vigorously to block or modify those PMC-supported reforms which they saw as threatening their interests. As for the PMC, the very ideals of "objectivity," "rationality," etc. which justified their role to the capitalists inevitably led them into con-

lict with the capitalists.

For one thing, the roles the PMC was entering and carving out for itself—as technical innovators, social mediators, culture producers, etc.—required a high degree of autonomy, if only for the sake of legitimization. Claims to "objectivity" cannot be made from an objective position of servility. The conflict over occupational autonomy was particularly visible in the universities. The enormous expansion of higher education in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century had been underwritten by men like Johns Hopkins, Leland Stanford, and above all John D, Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie. Battles over academic freedom often brought faculty into direct confrontation with capitalist trustees, with the professors asserting their autonomy as "experts."

But the conflict between the PMC and the capitalist class went deeper than the issue of occupational autonomy. Early PMC leaders envisioned a technocratic transformation of society in which all aspects of life would be "rationalized" according to expert knowledge. For example, Frederick Winslow Taylor, the leader of the movement for scientific management, saw scientific management as much more than a set of techniques to streamline pr
The same principles can be applied with equal force to all social activities: to the management of our tradesmen, large and small; of our churches, our philanthropic institutions, our universities, and our governmental departments.... What other reforms could do as much toward promoting prosperity, toward the diminution of poverty and the alleviation of suffering? (22)

Or, as E. D. Meier, the president of the American Society of Mining Engineers, put it in 1911, "The golden rule will be put into practice through the slide rule of the engineer." (23)

Of course, "efficiency," "order" and rationality are not in themselves capitalist goals. Even scientific management met with initial resistance from many in the business community, who saw it as a potential threat to their own autonomy from outside surveillance. (Scientific management, as already mentioned, was originally popularized as a tool for the public to use to judge the fairness of corporate prices.) Engineers, perhaps because of their workaday intimacy with capitalist concerns, often saw the recalcitrance of capital most clearly. To give a trivial, but telling, example: in 1902 and again in 1906, efforts of reform-minded engineers to get the American Society of Mechanical Engineers to support the campaign for conversion to the metric system were defeated by capitalist opposition. (Most capital equipment was already calibrated in English units.) "The businessman is the master, the engineer is his good slave," complained a writer in ENGINEERING NEWS in 1904. (24)

Out of these continual skirmishes—over academic freedom, Progressive reforms, consumer issues, etc.—many in the PMC were led to more systematic anti-capitalist outlooks. One widely publicized variety of PMC anti-capitalism was that represented by Thorstein Veblen's "technocratic" critique. Veblen portrayed the contemporary capitalists as a parasitical class no less decadent than the European aristocracy. The captains of industry, he argued,

have always turned the technologists and their knowledge to account...only so far as would serve their own commercial profit, not to the extent of their ability; or to the limit set by the material circumstances; or by the needs of the community... To do their work as it should be done these men of the industrial general staff i.e., engineers and managers must have a free hand, unhampered by commercial considerations and reservations.... It is an open secret that with a reasonably free hand the production experts would today readily increase the ordinary output of industry by several fold—variously estimated at some 300 per cent to 1200 per cent of the current out-
Progress demanded that the capitalists be swept away to make room — not for the working class — but for the rising class of experts. But Veblen’s vision of a technocracy — a government by the experts — smacked too overtly of PMC self-interest to gain a wide following, even within the class. In fact Edward Ross, who in 1907 had himself called for extensive “social engineering,” was moved to write, somewhat defensively, in 1920:

There is of course no such thing as ‘government by experts’. The malicious phrase is but a sneer flung by the scheming self-seekers who find in the relentless veracity of modestly-paid trained investigators a barrier across their path, (26)

The strongest expression of PMC anti-capitalist ideology was to be found in explicitly socialist politics — which in the early-twentieth-century United States meant the Socialist Party. “In the United States probably more than anywhere else, socialism is recruiting heavily from the better classes of society,” boasted Party leader Morris Hillquit in 1907. Although the party had a large working-class membership and people we would identify as members of the PMC were clearly a minority in the party as a whole, most of the top leadership and a vastly disproportionate part of the membership were engaged in PMC (and old middle class) occupations (or had been so engaged before assuming full-time party duties), (27)*

In fact, socialism, as articulated by the pre–World War I Socialist Party, was frequently not far from the PMC’s technocratic vision. Socialism meant government ownership of the means of production (which would still be administered by experts) and expansion of government social services (which would still be supplied by professionals — or “intellectual proletarians,” as Hillquit called them).

Socialism in this version formed a continuum with non-socialist Progressivism. Party leader William Ghent even complained that Teddy Roosevelt’s 1912 Progressive Party platform (a platform designed to attract the middle-class reform vote without fundamentally upsetting capitalist priorities) “begins its program with the brazen theft of half the working program of the Socialist Par-

* To give a few prominent examples, Victor Berger was a school teacher; Morris Hillquit was a lawyer and journalist; Robert Hunter, A. M. Simons and William Ghent were editors and journalists; and even Eugene Victor Debs spent only four years as a railroad worker, the rest of his pre-socialist life being spent as billing clerk for the largest wholesale grocer in the Midwest, as elected town clerk of Terre Haute, and as editor of a labor-union paper.
ty." On the right wing of the Party, even such traditional socialist notions as class struggle were considered too radical and were replaced by Progressive ideals of class conciliation. Class hatred, wrote writer, social worker and Party National Executive member John Spargo, was a "monstrous thing...to be abhorred by all right-thinking men and women." (28)

3. The Consolidation of the Professional-Managerial Class: In the period up to mid-century, professional-managerial occupations expanded much more rapidly than the workforce as a whole.* The people filling these occupations (and their families) came more and more to constitute a socially coherent class. Collectively the PMC consolidated its cultural hegemony over the working class, as the army of counselors, psychologists, teachers, etc. swelled from the twenties on. But the early PMC's radical dream of a technocratic society was not, of course, to be realized. To the extent that the PMC established itself as a major class in twentieth-century American society, it did so on terms set by the capitalist class.**

Individually, many PMC members scaled the highest pinnacles of power, either to bask there temporarily as consultants and advisors, or to remain as permanent members of the ruling class. Acceptance came gradually. Self-made capitalists like Andrew Carnegie initially had little use for "experts" and "college men" in their enterprises. But by the teens, "experts" — college professors, researchers, PMC civic reformers — had become indispensable and routine members of the boards of trustees of key capitalist-sponsored institutions (replacing the token clergyman of an earlier era). In 1918, when President Wilson went off to the Peace Conference in Paris, he publicly acknowledged the importance of the PMC by taking along with him a "grand conclave of expert advisors from several fields of knowledge which was known to contemporaries as The Inquiry," (29) Within industry, as the size and complexity of corporations increased, PMC occupations such as engineering, law and financial management became recruiting grounds for top management; i.e., into the ruling class itself.

*A complete account of the development of the PMC would have to dwell on (1) the tremendous expansion of the state apparatus during World War I, the New Deal, and World War II (and the accompanying triumph of what has been called — over-simplistically, we think — corporate liberal ideology); (2) the expansion of the corporate bureaucratic apparatus and its extension from control of production to control of distribution and manipulation of demand; (3) the post-World War II expansion of the universities and the mass media; etc.

**It is necessary to emphasize this point. The PMC (or the managerial portion of it) has not become a new ruling class (as Berle and Means, Burnham, Galbraith and others have suggested). Top managers are part of the ruling class (see above, p. 12, footnote and Paul Sweezy, *The Illusion of the Managerial Revolution* in THE PRESENT AS HISTORY, pp. 39-66; C. Wright Mills, THE POWER ELITE (Chapters 6 and 7, pp. 118-170), but most managers and administrators, along with virtually all non-managerial salaried professionals, are part of the PMC, a subordinate and dependent class. This does not mean, however, that the PMC is powerless vis-a-vis the ruling class.
For the great majority of the members of the PMC, however, the only guarantee of security — never mind autonomous power — lay in collective action. The characteristic form of self-organization of the PMC was the profession. The defining characteristics of professions should be seen as representing simultaneously both the aspirations of the PMC and the claims which are necessary to justify those aspirations to the other classes of capitalist society. These characteristics are, in brief: (a) the existence of a specialized body of knowledge, accessible only by lengthy training; (b) the existence of ethical standards which include a commitment to public service; and (c) a measure of autonomy from outside interference in the practice of the profession (e.g., only members of the profession can judge the value of a fellow professional’s work). The claims to specialized knowledge and ethical standards serve to justify the bid for autonomy, which is most commonly directed at the (capitalist) employing class. Furthermore, the possession (or claim to possession) of specialized knowledge ensures that the PMC can control its own reproduction as a class: “Lengthy” training has barred working-class entrance to the professions and given a decided advantage to the children of the PMC itself. The claim to high ethical standards represents the PMC’s persistent reassurance that its class interests are identical to the interests of society at large. Finally, all three characteristics of professions are aimed at ensuring that the relationship between the individual professional and his or her “client” (student, patient) is one of benign domination.

Between the 1880’s and 1920, medicine, law, social work, engineering and teaching emerged in their modern form, complete with professional organizations and journals and legally enforced criteria for admissions (i.e., accrediting of training institutions and/or licensing of individual practitioners). At the same time, the learned professions were sorting themselves out and taking organizational form: “natural philosophy” subdivided into the modern natural sciences; psychology detached itself from philosophy; sociology, history and political science began to go their separate ways; etc.

The device of professionalism was not universally or uniformly successful. Some occupations, like nursing, are “professions” more out of courtesy than social reality. Other, more clearly PMC occupations, such as engineering, can hardly claim to have a “professional” degree of autonomy. Between 1900 and 1920, many of the U.S. engineering societies were torn by struggles between “professional-minded” engineers, who saw themselves as professionals first and employees second, and business-oriented engineers, whose first loyalty was to their employing industry. The business-oriented faction triumphed, for the most part, even going
so far as to permit untrained businessmen to join the engineers' "professional" societies. (30) *

From the perspective of the entire class, professionalism had an inherent disadvantage as a strategy for class advancement. Specialization was the PMC member's chief selling point, the quality which justified his or her claim to a unique niche in society, but it acted as a centrifugal force on the class as a whole. Consider that in 1900 a scholar such as William James could flit from teaching physiology to psychology and finally to philosophy without unduly discomfiting the Harvard administration. And in 1919, Veblen (in ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM) could still lump together engineers and all sorts of managers and administrators under the common rubric "engineer." But by mid-century the class was so minutely splintered that even terms such as "scientist" or "engineer" no longer signified groups with common workplace concerns or even a common language.

The deepest rift, over-riding the petty occupational subspecializations, was the one which developed between the managers, administrators and engineers on one hand, and those in the liberal arts and service professions on the other. The material difference between the two groups was that those in the first category are directly tied to business and industry: their jobs are, not infrequently, way stations on the road into the ruling class itself. Those in the second category are more likely to enjoy the relative shelter of the university or other sorts of non-profit agencies and to be firmly fixed within the PMC. Along with this difference in apparent sources of subsidy went a difference in general political outlook: The managerial/technical community came to pride itself on its "hard-headedness" and even on its indifference to the social consequences of its labor (i.e., its helplessness). The second group, those in the more "liberal" pursuits, became the only repository of the traditional PMC antagonism to capital. Managers and en-

* The profession of medicine, at first thought, may seem to contradict our assertion that professionalism is the characteristic form of self-organization of the PMC, since most physicians, even today, are independent entrepreneurs (i.e., classical petty bourgeoisie). Professionalism does, of course, have pre-monopoly capitalist roots in the ancient "free professions" — medicine, law, theology. But in its modern form, medical professionalism in the U.S. was forged by a small handful of PMC doctors. The American Medical Association, in the crucial pre-World War I years when it gained hegemony over U.S. medicine, was dominated by academic physicians. And the public's belief in the expertise of doctors arose largely from the achievements and propaganda of (salaried) government public-health officials and medical-school professors. Cf. Rosemary Stevens, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Yale University Press, 1971). Salaried physicians have made up an ever-growing and increasingly dominant fraction of the medical profession; and even the physicians still in private practice are, in real terms, completely dependent on and increasingly subject to the PMC-dominated hospitals, medical schools, and government health agencies. Cf. Health PAC, THE AMERICAN HEALTH EMPIRE (Random House, 1971).
engineers on the one side, liberal academics on the other, came to view each other across a gulf of distrust and contempt.

But we should not overestimate the significance of this division. The PMC at mid-century still constituted a single, coherent class. The actual employment experience and social attitudes of managers and engineers and those in the liberal professions are hardly more divergent than those of such working-class groups as, say, clerical workers and steel workers. The image of non-managerial professionals as ivory-tower-bound, somewhat impractical intellectuals has little counterpart in reality. Seventy per cent of the country’s scientists and engineers are employed in business and industry; half the rest are in government. (Even leaving out the engineers, only one-fifth of the physicists and two-fifths of the life scientists are employed by universities.) Well under half of the professional and scientific workers in all fields (including the social sciences) are employed by educational and other non-profit institutions. In the business and governmental organizations which employ most professionals, the professional typically is employed in a managerial or semi-managerial role. As for the minority of professionals who are in academic and similar institutions, they are hardly aloof from what C. Wright Mills called the “managerial demiurge.” They greedily accept consulting positions with industry and government. And within their institutions, they take on a variety of managerial and administrative functions, administering grants, supervising research and teaching assistants, running departments and institutes. (31)

The image of the corporate middle manager as completely divorced from the academic world is equally overdrawn. Over eighty percent of corporate managers (at all levels) in large corporations have college training (or graduate training) — about half in the liberal arts, the rest divided equally between engineering and business. “Professional” (graduate) training in law, engineering, or business schools — which, correctly, tell their students that they are being trained in “applied social science” — more and more becomes a prerequisite for advance on the management ladder. (32)

Moreover, the various groups within the PMC are socially coherent. Paul Sweezy has argued that the basic test of whether two families belong to the same class or not is the freedom with which
they intermarry. The children of PMC members do overwhelmingly tend to marry within the class; marriage "down" to the working class or "up" to the ruling class is comparatively infrequent. In line with the frequency of intermarriage, the class exhibits a substantial degree of intergenerational stability: children of PMC families are more than twice as likely as children of working-class families to themselves enter PMC occupations. (33)

Moreover, the class is characterized by a common "culture" or lifestyle. The interior life of the class is shaped by the problem of class reproduction. Unlike ruling-class occupations, PMC occupations are never directly hereditary: The son of the Chairman of the Board may expect to become a successful businessman (or at least a wealthy one) more or less by growing up; the son of a research scientist knows he can only hope to achieve a similar position through continuous effort. Traditionally, much of this effort has come from the women of the class. Since, according to psychologists, a child's future achievement is determined by the nuances of its early upbringing, women of the class have been expected to stay home and "specialize" in childrearing. Both sexes, however, are expected to perform well in school and attend good colleges, for it is at college that young men acquire the credentials for full class membership and young women acquire, in addition to their own degrees, credentialed husbands.*

As a result of the anxiety about class reproduction, all of the ordinary experiences of life — growing up, giving birth, childrearing — are freighted with an external significance unknown in other classes. Private life thus becomes too arduous to be lived in private; the inner life of the PMC must be continuously shaped, updated and revised by — of course — ever mounting numbers of experts: experts in childrearing, family living, sexual fulfillment, self-realization, etc., etc. The very insecurity of the class, then, provides new ground for class expansion. By mid-century the PMC was successful enough to provide a new mass market for many of its own services — and unsuccessful enough to need them.**

* Betty Friedan's book THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (Norton, 1963) points out the inherent contradictions in this mode of class reproduction: Women of the class are educated along with men, then required to do the unpaid, menial labor of homemaking. Friedan herself feared that the degradation of PMC women was leading to the deterioration of the children and hence the entire class. Her book is a strongly class-conscious statement, concerned more with the future of her class than with the fate of women of all classes. Nonetheless she accurately pinpointed one major factor in the rise of the late-twentieth-century women's movement: the "over-education" — or under-employment — of PMC women.

** Many of the characteristics of the PMC as a social class are shared, of course, by portions of the classical petty bourgeoisie, such as doctors in private practice. The PMC is integrated socially with these upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie (upper strata, we emphasize; not with the overwhelmingly larger lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie — the millions of proprietors of tiny shops, self-employed craftsmen, etc.). But, as we have argued earlier, this is not sufficient grounds for calling the PMC itself "petty bourgeoisie" (see above, p. 20).
In the second part of this essay (to be published in RADICAL AMERICA, May-June 1977) we will discuss the growth of the PMC and its institutions (e.g., the university) in the sixties. We will use the theoretical framework we have developed here to analyze the emergence and history of a New Left, based in the PMC (including students, the PMC-in-training). Finally, we will discuss the subjective relationships existing today between the PMC and the working class, and we will try to draw from this some strategic implications for the left.

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BARBARA and JOHN EHRENREICH have written widely on health and other topics for various left publications.
Barbara Kopple, producer and director of HARLAN COUNTY, U.S.A. (left) and women strike supporters in county jail.
The Making of *Harlan County, U.S.A.*:
An Interview with Barbara Kopple

*Gail Pellet*

In 1973, miners at the Bookside mine in Harlan County, Kentucky went on strike after the mine owners refused to sign a contract with the newly formed local of the United Mine Workers (UMWA). Barbara Kopple, a filmmaker who had been documenting the Miners for Democracy movement, moved to Harlan to live with and film the miners and their families during the struggle. Their story is shown in her recently released film, *Harlan County, U.S.A.* The film is in color and runs 103 minutes. It is distributed by Cinema 5 Distribution Inc., 595 Madison Ave., New York, NY.

Gail Pellet interviewed Barbara Kopple in February, 1977 for *Radical America.*

G: How did you get involved in filming in Harlan County?

B: I was originally hired by the Miners for Democracy, a rank-and-file movement in the United Mine Workers (UMWA). But then I got so involved with people in the coal fields—the miners and their families—that I wanted to do a lot more than make a film about the Miners for Democracy movement.

To explain this movement, it's really necessary to go over some history of the UMWA. From the early '30s John L. Lewis ran the

*GAIL PELLET works in radio, video and film in New York.*

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union as a dictatorship. That dictatorship continued under Tony Boyle, who was appointed president by Lewis in 1963. From the '30s to 1968 there had never been an election.

Boyle's regime did little organizing. They negotiated sweetheart contracts. He controlled the locals by appointing officials who shared his politics. You know, coal mining is one of the most dangerous industries in this country. Yet Boyle made health and safety demands on the companies only when absolutely forced to. For example, in 1969 the Farmington mine blew up and 78 men were killed. The mine had been inspected 16 times before and had been shown to be dangerous, but the coal operators just asked for more extensions.

Joseph "Jock" Yablonsky was the first guy brave enough to run against Boyle. That was in 1969, Then Yablonsky and his wife and daughter were murdered, and miners really got angry. They wanted leadership that could respond to the needs of the coal miners. So a rank-and-file movement developed — the Miners for Democracy — and three rank-and-file miners emerged as leaders: Arnold Miller, Mike Trbovich, and Harry Patrick. Miller had spent 26 years in the mines, and fought for the black-lung movement. Trbovich fought for autonomy at the local level. And Patrick fought for compensation for widows and disabled miners.

Part of their platform was to organize the unorganized. And so in 1973, at the Brookside mine in Harlan, Kentucky, miners voted to become part of the UMWA. This was a test case for the new reform movement. That's how Harlan began this time. But there's a history in Harlan. Harlan County came to be known as "Bloody Harlan". In the '30s the UMWA under John L. Lewis came in. During the strike people were thrown out of their homes by the companies. There were no strike benefits, so people literally starved. The company brought in gun thugs and scabs. One morning the miners went into the hills and opened up on them. Miners and strikebreakers were killed. They called it the battle of Evarts. John L. Lewis got very scared and pulled out, leaving the miners to their own destiny. A number of miners spent 14 to 19 years in prison. Later in the 1950s, during the period of mechanization, thousands of miners were unemployed. That's when the UMWA really lost its hold in the coal fields. In 1964 they tried again to organize in Harlan County, but Tony Boyle signed sweetheart contracts and it was just as bad as before.

The miners were getting $26 to work 8-, 10-, or 12-hour days in the mines. It takes an hour to get from the beginning of the mine to the face where the actual work is being done, and you wouldn't get paid for that hour. The safety conditions were terrible. Suppose you and I were working under a roof and I heard a crack, I could come out, but they might say to you: "OK, you have six kids. You need the work and the money. You keep working under that roof." Workers were being divided like that. And safety inspectors were people who had come out of the company, so the
company would take them to places they wanted them to see. Little or nothing was done about violations. There was no job security. If you wanted to strike about something or if you felt that something wasn't right, you'd be fired automatically. The miners had absolutely no rights.

G: But in the film we see Miller, after winning the UMWA presidency on a reform platform, compromise the right to strike.

B: Right. People had felt him to represent a strong, honest reform leadership that was really going to respond to their needs. But you see Miller change during the course of the film. The last section of the film includes the vote for a national coal contract. It was the first time in union history that the miners were able to ratify their own contract. You see on a rank-and-file level what a contract can mean. Is it enough to have five-day vacations? Is that really enough time to get the coal dust out of your lungs? But then Miller compromised the miners' right to strike. The last part of the film says who your enemies are; you've got to fight against the coal operators and the government. In 1975 a hundred and twenty thousand miners went on wildcat strike; and in the following year they struck again when coal operators violated grievance procedures. Sometimes people think that once you get a good leader, you don't have to fight anymore. Everything's going to be taken care of. Of course we know that's not so, and the miners know that's not so. So the fight is still continuing. And as the young miner says in the film, "It's got to be a fight that comes from below." That's what the film is about.

G: What in your own personal background led you to producing this kind of film?

B: I grew up on a flower and vegetable farm in Shrub Oak, New York. I grew up with my grandparents, my parents, and my brother. They were all left-liberals. I went to school in Boston and got involved in the anti-war movement. Then I got into film making, doing sound and editing. I worked primarily on social-change films such as WINTER SOLDIER, a lot of things for "Bill Moyers' Journal" on television. But I knew that I really wanted to do films that had content, that moved people forward. For five years I had been working until three or four in the morning seven days a week for other people, and I really wanted to do something that I cared about.

As I started to do HARLAN CO., U.S.A., I realized that nothing in the world was going to stop me from telling that story. I don't think of myself as a producer/director, just somebody who knows how to make films, which is a way I can contribute to communicating the political things I believe in. To experience and learn but also to bring that experience back and share it with other people. We wanted a film that workers everywhere would be able to look
at. What we were trying to do with the film was make it honest, from the rank-and-file people. Trying not to manipulate it. Letting them speak. That's why there's no narration in the film. We didn't want narration with rhetoric or some heavy imposed thing that didn't naturally come out of where the people were.

I filmed in the coal fields for three years. Making the film was a day-to-day process. The only thing I was concerned with was being able to continue for another day. It was a life-and-death struggle down there, and we just wanted to continue working. If you stick with people long enough, you can see clearly in which directions they are moving. That's why I think staying in a place over a long period of time is really necessary when you're trying to do some kind of in-depth study of what's happening. Three years isn't long enough, but we were able to get a glimpse of the changes taking place.

This kind of film can only happen with a small group of tightly-knit people who know how to work and move quickly in different situations. The crew had to be politically motivated so we could have discussions after every few days of filming and taping, analyze what we were getting, and figure out where we were going from there. Like what it meant to watch grown men crawling in 23 to 29 inches of space in the mines, or that if a man works 15 years in a mine you can presume he has black lung.

G: What kind of relationships did the film crew have with miners, their families, the sheriff and company representatives?

B: Well, when we first arrived at Brookside it was about four in the morning. It was foggy and misty. And there they were. State troopers with clubs; women with sticks. We figured we couldn't just get out of the car and say "Hello, we're New York film makers and here we are," so we got an organizer we knew to introduce us to the picketers. At first they didn't trust us, they didn't tell us their real names. The women said they were Martha Washington, Florence Nightingale, and Betsy Ross.

A week later we got in a very bad car accident. They have incredible mountains there with no lights and no guidelines, and we were pushed off of Pine Mountain by some strike breakers. We rolled right over the mountain. The car landed on the hood, so we all crawled out of the windows, took our equipment, and walked all battered and bruised to the picket line because we promised the people that we would be there. After that they realized we really cared about them, that we were dedicated. So we lived with the miners in their homes for 13 months.

During the last couple of weeks of the strike they used to shoot up the miners' homes at night. We took mattresses to put them around the small homes, and we'd be sleeping on the floor with a kid here and a dog there. The men had porch duty at night taking
turns sitting with shotguns. There wasn’t any indoor plumbing, so at night we had a buddy system. One night my friend and I were going to the bathroom. He had an M-1 and I had a .357 Magnum. We could hear the gunfire down below. And suddenly there was a rustling in the bushes and we both pulled out our guns and a dog ran out of the bushes. That was the kind of terror we were living with. There was no one there to help us except the coal miners and their families. We owe our lives to them; they protected us and supported us.

I guess we kept down a lot of the violence by being on the picket line. Even if we didn’t have any film we would go out there and pretend to be filming. The gun thugs at that point really didn’t know who we were or where we were from. We’d also stop the scab caravan every now and then and try to ask them questions. Anytime Hart Perry, the cameraman, would ask a question, they would walk away. Whenever I asked a question they would talk to me in a very patronizing way. I didn’t mind; I was just glad that they were saying something. They also told us that if they ever caught us alone at night they would kill us. The state troopers would warn us continuously that we better get out because three years ago another film crew was shot up down there. The cameraman was killed. Nobody was prosecuted for it. One morning, about 4 or 5 am, the gun thugs opened up on us with semi-automatic carbines. I was the first beaten up, and then Hart Perry. All of us realized at that time, even if we had been naive before, that we could be killed at any moment.

G: How did you manage to get into jails and courthouses to film?

B: When the miners and women were put into jail we just followed them in. We stayed in there until we were kicked out.

In the courtroom scene we were really lucky. I used to use a wireless mike, and whenever I thought I wasn’t going to be able to film, I would mike somebody ahead of time who was going to participate. In the courtroom scene a lot of miners and women were confronting the judge—who was a coal operator—for putting them in jail for being on the picket line. The woman I had put the wireless mike on happened to be the one to speak. She’s the one who said “The laws aren’t made for working people.” For filming in that situation, we opened the doors of the courtroom in the back, “pushed” the film two f-stops, and shot.

G: In the film you follow the very important role that women played during the strike, but you don’t really get a sense of their lives. Can you explain that?

B: All their lives women had heard about unionism. From their grandfathers, their fathers, their husbands, their sons. They watched their men die of black lung or become maimed or killed
in the coal mines. For the women in this film this was the first
time that they really came out and did anything in a mass. The
courts said that there could only be six miners on a picket line.
Once they came out there was no way to stop them. It was some-
thing deep down that they had been hearing about all their lives.

They also had their own club, called the Brookside Women’s
Club. They did other things. For Thanksgiving they cooked turkeys
in a big hall where everybody had Thanksgiving dinner together.
Questions were raised, study groups were formed, we started a
newspaper, people learned how to use an AB Dick machine. Every-
body wrote and everybody was supposed to write, whether it was
about food stamps or day care or the school system or just every-
day kinds of oppression.

G: There seemed to be some tension in the film between men
and women. Was there more you chose not to show?

B: I think that the conflict you’re talking about was a result of
low morale. Attacks on the miners by the strike breakers were
stepped up. They were shooting into people’s homes. It was a long
time on the picket line, and they were getting very scared. So the
striking families started fighting among themselves.

As far as men endorsing the fact that women were going on the
picket line, there were problems in some of the homes, but the
women did it in a mass. The men knew of no other way that they
could win the strike if it wasn’t for the women. But when things
got really violent the men didn’t want the women there.

G: But then, at one of the meetings, Lois, who appears to be the
most militant person in the film, pulls a gun out of her dress.

B: And one of the men says “What’s taken you so long?” So you
start to see not only a change of tactics by the miners and the
women, but also a change in understanding. The miners need the
women out there.

G: Do you think the fact that your film crew and production crew
were largely women had any significance in the final product?

B: As far as women working on the film, that wasn’t anything
intentional. It just so happened that the women who worked on the
film were people who were involved and committed to the subject.
There were a lot of men that were committed political people too,
and there wasn’t in my mind any distinction between men and
women. It was people who really cared and wanted to move things
forward on that level.

G: Mountain music, coal miner’s music, permeates the film.
Who wrote and performed the music?

B: Well, at one of the rallies in the film you see Florence Reece, who wrote "Which Side Are You On?" during the labor struggles of the '30s in Harlan, singing it again in the '70s. Then at a couple of points in the film you see Nimrod Workman. He'd tell us old stories about the things he went through in the '30s and '40s, and then he'd just burst into songs that he wrote himself. His daughter, Phyllis Boyens, sings with him in one segment. Hazel Dickens is really the main singer throughout the film, even though you don't see her. She's a coal miner's daughter, and she wrote songs like "Mannington", "Black Lung", "Cold-Blooded Murder", and the last song of the film, "They'll Never Keep Us Down". She wrote the last one especially for the film in a week. All the music in the film, except Merle Travis's "Dark as a Dungeon", was written by coal miners, miners' wives, and their daughters.

*Confrontation between strike supporters and Sheriff in Harlan County.*

G: There are only a couple of moments in the film where we see black miners, and one is a particularly racist incident with the strike breakers. Are there many blacks living in Harlan County, and is racism an issue?

B: In Harlan County there's a very small black population, there is some racism, but there's a united feeling among the progressive miners. During the '30s the coal operators would go to the South and bring trainloads of black miners to use as strike breakers. When the black miners found out what was happening, they became the most militant on the picket lines. Recently racist issues have been stepped up by Klan activities.
G: What happened when you screened HARLAN CO. down there? What was people's response to the film?

B: We were to screen HARLAN CO. at the multi-purpose center where everything happened in Harlan—the meetings, the funeral of Lawrence Jones, who was the miner killed during the strike, and the contract signing took place there. A goat was hung by the center, so armed miners stood at the door before the screenings.

For me it was the most important screening that I could have ever witnessed. The people lived through the strike again. They screamed at the strike breakers, they cried through the funeral of Lawrence Jones. A man who was dying of black lung was wheeled in on a big silver hospital bed. It was incredibly dramatic. I was extremely nervous wondering what they would think about some of the scenes. I sat in the back with my hands over my face, but they really liked it. I left them a print, a projector, plus reews and materials they would need to clean and repair the film. It's being shown all over the coal fields. Miners and their wives are going around as speakers with the film. They're using it for study groups to raise consciousness—and funds. It's bringing the people in the coal fields closer together.

G: How was the film funded?

B: It was extremely difficult. We were given $9,000 to begin working on something to show other potential donors. Money was raised from foundations, church groups, individual donors, and loans. I did massive amounts of proposal writing, sometimes applying to the same foundation three times. I wrote desperate letters from the coal fields to wealthy liberal people...117 letters with proposals. When they didn't write back I did follow-up letters. It's a tremendous amount of work. Astonishingly enough, I got a Master Charge card and for two straight months we lived on Master Charge. We got film and everything that we needed. My bill is astounding; I'm still paying it off.

I think one of the most important things in raising money is that you have to meet the people who might fund you, and you have to be able to show them past work so they sense you know what you're doing. You have to learn how to write proposals and answer all the different kinds of questions that foundations might ask you about distribution or your production plan. You've got to really learn how to do a budget and how to be able to put things together concretely in terms that they understand. It's a very hard and long process to get funding, and it came in little tiny bits. I'd get anywhere from $5 to $27,000 as grants. Some of this will be made easier, I hope, by a new group in Cambridge, the Film Fund, a foundation for social-change films.
G: HARLAN CO. was the last film shown at the New York Film Festival last year; and it got the first standing ovation of the festival, plus rave reviews. Did that surprise you?

B: Yes. We'd been working very hard. Editing had taken nine months. And trying to figure out how to structure it and get all the things we wanted in it was very draining. Our morale was low. We had a "rough cut", but it wasn't all fitting together; yet we decided that we would show it in rough cut to the N. Y. Film Festival, and thought maybe that would be the final impetus we needed to finish after four years of working on it. When the selection committee screened it, they loved it. The film was finished the day before the festival, and we had a press screening that for us was the greatest thing. The miners' wives and some of the miners came up, and Hazel Dickens, who wrote a lot of the music, came up with her group and sang. Psychologically it was wonderful. It was a very scary time for me, because it was something I'd hidden in the closet for four years and had no idea what the reaction of other people would be. Plus talking in front of a lot of people, being responsible for what we were doing in bringing the coal miners and their wives there. I didn't know how they would feel about it. I mean they might have hated the film, right? But it was a wonderful couple of days.

G: How is the film being distributed?

B: The film was $60,000 in debt, and I had the choice of self-distribution or going with a commercial distributor. Self-distribution would mean trying to borrow a tremendous amount of money, and maybe at the end of a year being over $200,000 in debt. And I guess I needed to let go a little bit and go onto something else, so I chose a commercial distributor.

The film has been running for several weeks in New York, and is scheduled to open in Washington, Lexington, Charleston, and Cincinnati in the next month. And, of course, it is being screened for rank-and-file groups and community groups wherever people want it. That was one agreement I fought for with the distributor.

Time will tell. It needs a lot of grass-roots and community support and rank-and-file support if it's going to do well. If it does well it will say that people in this country want some kind of alternative, that they want to see films that make them think and feel something. It will bring people in this country a lot closer together over issues and organizing.

There are a number of new films being distributed independently right now: HOLLYWOOD ON TRIAL, about the McCarthy period; UNION MAIDS, about three working women in the '30s and how they lived through those struggles; and ON THE LINE, about unemployment and the march for jobs and the rent strike at Coop City.
in New York. They are more professionally produced, well thought out, and not your usual kind of documentary where the camera is shaky and the sound is bad. They're produced by people who have really paid their dues working in the film industry, learning their craft so they can make the best kind of political films they can.

The films of the '30s, like SCOTTSBOROUGH BOYS and the LITTLE REPUBLIC STEEL STRIKE, were important to me. It was during a very rough time in this country. People's lives were on the line — people like those who started the Film and Photo League in New York, or like Leo Hurwitz, who did CHINA STRIKES BACK and NATIVE LAND. They were under gunfire and blacklisting, yet they were filming something valuable to our history.

G: What are your future plans?

B: I have two ideas. One is a film on a J. P. Stevens textile mill in North Carolina, where people have been trying to join a union for 13 years. J. P. Stevens owns 189 mills, and every time there's a disturbance at one of them they shut it down. That's usually the only industry in the area, so people are afraid to go on strike. The second idea would be a dramatic re-enactment of the Triangle Fire.

G: Do you think you've been changed by the experience of making the film on Harlan Co.?

B: The main thing I learned is that if you stick together you can win. The film would not have happened without a lot of committed film makers and friends playing a lot of different roles. In Harlan the strike wouldn't have happened nor have been won, and probably more people would have died, if there weren't a lot of committed people working together united with the same ideas. That's really important, particularly now in a country where people are sometimes afraid to change things. In Harlan, people who were totally oppressed in every kind of way were courageous enough to take their lives and their destinies in their own hands and fight to change things.
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Trade Union Strike Victory now!

US Role in Africa
This wall mural was done by the children of a neighborhood association, under the direction of an artist who lives in the neighborhood. They are usually in bright colors, and the themes grow out of neighborhood political struggles. This one reads, “The people and only the people are the engine that moves history. NO! to the partial plan!” The “partial plan” is a redevelopment plan that would destroy the neighborhood and erect a commercial high rise in its place. This is the neighborhood of Palomeras, a working-class district on the edge of Madrid.
Return to Spain

Jose Delgado-Guitart

When I left Spain six years ago, Franco was alive, and repression against the Basque militants was reaching its peak. I exited through the French border, through the Basque country, during the state of siege. Secret police were everywhere, searching everyone. While they searched, the Guardia Civil covered us with their sub-machine guns. Though I was leaving my home, I was not an exile in the full sense of the word. But as I stepped into France, I felt accumulated years of tension disappear.

Now, returning to Spain, I tried to remember my fear, and the new-found feeling of freedom I had felt when I crossed into France. “Freedom tickles”, I had told a friend as I took the train for Paris. Now, on the plane to Madrid, I think of the years in Spain, the repression, fears and frustration. I wonder about my friends in Madrid and how they feel now. I know there have been some changes since Franco’s death, and there seems to be a tendency toward democracy. But I am anxious to talk to people, to find out what they expect in the future.

ARRIVAL

As I walk through customs, I am looking around for changes. So far Spain looks the same, with the same noisy Spaniards. On the way from the airport to Madrid, I have my first surprise. Slogans and drawings on the walls are not covered up by the police, as they

All photos in this article by Jose Delgado-Guitart.
used to be. Graffiti of all kinds and tendencies is everywhere. Much of it is related to recent political events — the referendum, the arrest of the leader of the Communist Party — and much of it is just party logos or slogans. My friend who was driving said, "Madrid is a mess, but wait to see what happens during the elections."

THE STREETS

The first few days I wander around Madrid. There are more people than ever in the stores and streets, The cafeterias, cafes and bars are filled with smoke and political talk. The symbols of the Franco years are in the process of being removed. The main street in Madrid, for example, is La Gran Via. During the Franco years, it was renamed Calle José Antonio, after the leader of the Falange. Now it's La Gran Via again. Or again, the falangist symbol, the symbol of Spanish fascism, is being slowly removed from the trade-union headquarters, the Sindical Building. It seems as if people want to erase history quickly, that they have been living in a bad dream that lasted forty years.

The bookstores and newsstands have all kinds of political books, from extreme left to extreme right. Books about the Spanish Civil War, which could not have appeared two years ago, are best sellers. Sex magazines are now everywhere, and nudity is not censored in films anymore. In Madrid you can now go to a party meeting or a strip-tease. Political concerts, banned before, are now sold out in advance. A recording of the "Internationale" is about to be released: and Radio Nacional, the only radio network allowed to carry news, now includes stories about strikes and riots. There is a general feeling of freedom, and Spaniards are beginning to enjoy something they haven't known for years.

The slogan reads, "There is no liberation of women without revolution; and there is no revolution without the liberation of women."
CONVERSATIONS

I talked to many people I used to know. Some of them I had known in University, some I had grown up with, and some were comrades from work. I was surprised by how open they were, how much they wanted to talk about what was going on.

Ignacio is a printer. He is in his forties. When we worked together before, he just minded his own business, “I’m just trying to make a living,” he said. Now he had opinions. “We don’t owe any-thing to Franco,” he said. “It is true that the economic level of the country is better, but this is not due to an economic miracle or tourism, as we were told, but to the work of many people like me that had two jobs in order to survive. All this extra work paid with a minimum wage is what made Spain richer. But all this money went into the hands of a few. We built the roads, the dams, the ho-tels, waited on the tables.... We did it, and not the dictator. Now we will continue to work and to fight for a better and more just country.”

Manolo is a drogero. He started with a little store, selling paints and brushes. He worked long hours, and expanded his busi-ness. His store sells everything from soap to spray paint. I have known him since I was a child. He was friendly, and we often talked about art. But never about politics. Now he seems like an open radio, and never stops talking about politics. “This country will go socialist,” he said. “It is impossible to stop things. Even here, in a middle-class neighborhood, people talk about it. It’s necessary to put a stop to all these crooks who make a lot of money out of the workers. There must be a limit on how much one person can earn, like in Cuba. But I don’t think that Spaniards would take a Stalinist government. We had too many years of dictatorship, and now we want freedom. That’s why I think that a democratic socialism will be good and will come to Spain.”

He could tell the political temperature by what sold in his store. “Lately I have sold a lot of spray paint,” he said. Santiago Carillo, the Secretary of the Communist Party, had just been arrested, and within a day all his spray paint was sold. “I have a friend who has a droguero in a working-class neighborhood, and he has sold out of spray paint too. It’s for graffiti, political graffiti.”

Carlos was a militant in the communist Party. Six years ago he was a worker in an electronics factory, a multi-national. I met him while I was at the university, through a student-worker committee that was related to one of the workers’ commissions. Now he and some friends have organized a cooperative to print political posters and distribute political records. Two or three of the workers are anarchists, and one is in the socialist party. They argued about politics in a friendly way, while Carlos said: “We must give credit to Suarez (the president). After all, he let Carillo go free. We nev-er expected this from him, but he is surprising everybody. We will
continue to push for changes, but as long as the government shows some cooperation with us, we will be cooperative with them. If not, we will use force."

Carillo has been accused of being responsible for some executions during the Civil War. There had been pressure on the C.P. to oust him, and to select a leader without any connection to the Civil War. "I know that everybody asks about that," said Carlos, "But we will not change our leadership under pressure from the Right. If there are changes in the Party, it will be following the normal procedures of the Party."

Paco is a free-lance writer. He was from my neighborhood. After a year at the University, he disappeared. Now he has become an anarchist. He drives in a wild way as he takes me to see the murals in the working-class neighborhoods. The murals are the work of the neighborhood associations, which are very important in Spain. They began as organizations of housewives, but now involve whole families. Families are organized into street or building associations, and a federation of these form a neighborhood association. The housewives initiated their organizations around market boycotts, because of high prices. Now they try to improve roads, lighting, and other neighborhood problems. "We are for autonomy and 'autogestion'", said Paco. "We don't want somebody to tell us what to do from the top, and there are many who think like me. The CNT (the anarchist union) is growing, and the Communists are losing power because they are beginning to negotiate with the government and the King, who were imposed on us by Franco. The economy is a disaster, and the Communists want to work out a deal with the capitalists. The neighborhood associations are infiltrated by the Communist Party, but now many are turning anarchists because they are getting disillusioned with the Party. Look! Many of the murals are made by anarchists," he said, pointing to the Anarchist logo on many of the walls, "I am doing a lot of research about political organizations in Spain," he said. "There are about 200 right now. If we don't collaborate we will get smashed by the Right. So you'll see a lot of collaboration between anarchists, communists and socialists."

THE TRAGIC WEEK

The week before I left Madrid to return to Boston, one general was kidnapped, and ten people died in violent political events. Everything started in a demonstration for political amnesty. Crowds in downtown Madrid were dispersed by the police, who turned the demonstration into a riot. As the violence rose, I decided to go home, I managed to catch a bus, which was like a public forum discussing the demonstration.

"This is nice. It's nice to see how people start screaming for their rights, and look! The police! They are acting like sadists."
"In the Franco years this would never happen," said a middle-class woman. "Now you see trouble around every day."

"C'mon, lady, cut it out," someone said. "You never saw any trouble because you live in a fancy neighborhood. But let me tell you about my 'barrio'...."

"Look at that!" We passed a crowd of police who looked like science-fiction soldiers, dressed in their tear-gas masks. In the meantime the conversations went on. Finally we got out of the riot area, passing a church where people were coming out of the Sunday mass.

"And why don't they beat up these people?"

"They are asking God for things, and not the government. That's legal."

"Of course, because you don't really get anything from God."

"You see, I never heard such things in the Franco years," said the middle-aged woman again. "I hope to go back to things like they used to be."

"What is going to happen is that you are going to lose your pants running," someone said, and everybody started laughing. I finally got to my stop and got down after saying goodbye to everyone.

As I watched the news on TV, I heard that one student had been shot by a person shouting "Long Live Christ the King!", and that many people had been injured in the riot. The demonstrations went on during Sunday afternoon, spreading to different sections of the capital. The next day one woman died of injuries, her skull fractured by a tear-gas canister.

One old flamenco song goes, "We the gypsies are like birds. The civil guards and the Castilians don't allow the gypsies to have their own shadow." In this photo, the popular singer Enrique Morente is accompanied by Jose "The Bean." A current popular song goes, "Proud and open Andalusia, of clean clothes and white-washed walls. Bitter land of olives, exposed to the sun and frost. Land of men who cry their lost hope Ground by the bosses' mill wheels, cruelly robbed of their peace and quiet. Bitter Andalusia, land of men who cry their lost hope."
That same day General Villaescusa was kidnapped by the obscure group called GRAPO (Anti-Fascist Armed Groups of the First of October). The next day, nine labor lawyers were shot by a right-wing commando group in their offices. Five of them died. The spiral of violence culminated with the killings of two policemen and one civil guard by the GRAPO on Friday. Everyone was thinking that the Calvo Sotelo shooting, which led to the events of the Spanish Civil War, was nothing compared to what was happening now in Madrid. Everyone expected the worst; but in a surprise move, and for the first time in forty years, the opposition forces and the government released a joint communiqué condemning the extremist violence, and stated that those who had incited the acts were intent on stopping the progress toward democracy. The military called for discipline and the subordination of the military to the civilian government; and President Suarez said: “We won’t step back on our way to Democracy.”

All of these events support the theory, widespread in Madrid, that there is a well-organized plan to make democracy impossible in Southern Europe, and especially in Spain. The actions of extremist groups such as GRAPO and the “Warriors of Christ the King” are intended to prevent the creation of an elected government. But who are behind all of these groups? The rumors that one hears everywhere blame the Fascist International (including groups from Chile, Italy, Brazil and Argentina, as well as Spain).
After a meeting of the IF last October in Rome, a few members were seen in Spain, and many believe that they are involved in the recent events. Many think that GRAPO is really a right-wing organization, created to confuse public opinion and create disorders that will lead to a Chilean-style coup. Many others think that the KGB is at work. It is in the interest of the Soviet Union, some say, to keep Spain out of NATO and the Common Market, and the easiest way to do this is to prevent a democratic government from developing. Many people even think that Algeria, a supporter of left groups and a country with a strong interest in forming a third-world Mediterranean bloc, is supporting some of the extremist groups. Surprisingly, no one is blaming the CIA, believing that while the multi-national companies might benefit from cheap labor under an authoritarian regime, the interests of American capitalism as a whole are to integrate Spain into a liberal-capitalist Europe.

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The University of Madrid is covered with murals. These are usually about national politics and repression. The style is usually more surrealist than realist, and they are done in vivid color.
Turmoil in Spain:
The Communist Party
and the Mass Movement

Temma Kaplan

Spain once again dominates headlines. Scarcely a week goes by
without news of kidnappings, assassinations, and mass demonstra-
tions. But these events and the recent "liberalization," including
legalization of certain political parties, often obscures the impor-
tance of the left-wing mass movement of workers, women, students,
and regional autonomists that has developed in the past thirty years
in an authoritarian capitalist state with fascist police and labor
organization. The Spanish Communist Party (PCE), which has been
outlawed for nearly forty years, has continuously maintained an
underground structure in Spain. Militants from it have supported
autonomous struggles of the mass movement and have, in turn, re-
cruited such people into the underground party. The PCE has
changed several times in the past forty decades, in part because of
the mass movement that has shaped it and seems to be moving it
again, this time in the direction of social and political reform, but
not communism.

The PCE is a Euro-communist party, a name applied to a vari-
ety of strategies for establishing democratic communism in ad-
vanced industrial countries such as Italy, France, and Spain. The
Communist Parties of these three countries have rejected Stalinist

As always, I am grateful to my comrade Jon Wiener for his help.
centralized bureaucracies and vanguard militarized parties in favor of some internal democracy and mass, popular organizations. They have all rejected the notion of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," and (some would say) the class struggle along with it. But the similarity between the PCE and the other two ends here. France and Italy defeated fascism; Spain still lives under it. The French and Italian Communists have functioned legally for more than thirty years; the PCE is still illegal. The so-called popular organizations of the French and Italian Parties are front organizations, created by and for the Party. These Parties have not been willing or able to meet the needs of new constituencies such as women demanding divorce and legalized abortions. The Spanish mass organizations grew up autonomously, though Communists and other leftists have worked in them. The PCE has adopted programmatic suggestions from its constituents, for instance the goal of abolishing laws such as the adultery law that discriminates against women and makes adultery a criminal offense.

Whatever the reasons for it, the proof that the PCE is doing something right is that, though still illegal, its membership numbers approximately one million people, which will probably grow by at least another half-million before the general elections in June. The Maoists and Trotskyists combined have approximately 10,000 members. The question to ask is why so many Spanish women, workers, tenants, and regionalists now feel compelled to join the clandestine PCE rather than the more revolutionary parties to its left. The answer may lie in the choice of constituency: The Maoists and Trotskyists still focus on the industrial proletariat narrowly defined, while the PCE takes the entire popular movement as its potential base.

Class Struggle and Mass Organization

Profound transformations in the economy and class structure of Spain have created new class struggles and new mass formations. Under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, the capitalist class acting through the state carried out a "revolution from above" that completed the transformation of agriculture begun in the nineteenth century. (1) The government helped landowners consolidate their already large landholdings, mechanize, introduce new crops such as sugar beets, cotton, and corn. They drove small peasants and rural proletarians into the factories. Through the fascist trade unions, which set wages, they "organized" labor, militarized the workforce, and court-martialed strikers. This superexploitation of labor permitted the capital accumulation that underwrote the first stage of the much-heralded Spanish "economic miracle" of the past thirty years.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund helped ini-
tiate the second stage that by 1975 had transformed Spain into the
ten most industrial power in the world and integrated it into the
monopoly-capitalist network dominated by United States imperi-
alisr. The 1953 Defense Pact with the United States had given
bases in the western Mediterranean in exchange for American in-
vestments. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
after 1962 began investing heavily in Spain to take advantage of its
cheap and supposedly docile labor supply. Their development plans,
organized through Spain’s National Industrial Institute, called for
construction of new centers of electronic, chemical, and metallur-
gical industries, away from the traditional areas of labor militance
in Catalonia and the Basque Country. They built new plants close
to large supplies of cheap labor in Galicia, Navarre, and Old Cas-
tile. British Leyland and Fiat, for example, constructed their auto
plants in Pamplona and Avila; Madrid became a center of metal-
urgical industries.

Between 1939 and 1965 the Spanish industrial proletariat doubled,
ingcreasing by two million new workers, especially in Barcelona,
Madrid, and Bilbao. The number of women in the industrial work
force increased from 12 per cent in 1930 to 19 per cent in 1970,
largely in textiles and electronics. By 1975, scarcely 25 per cent
of the population was engaged in agriculture, mostly as hands for
agribusiness, In 1964 alone, a quarter of a million people left the
countryside. This new proletariat came from among the small
peasants of Castile, formerly the backbone of the Falange. Part of
the economic miracle was achieved by exporting Spanish workers
to northern European industry, hungry for cheap labor. In 1964,
from the cities and rural areas of Andalusia, Extremadura, and
Galicia in particular, 293,000 Spanish men and women migrated to
Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden in search of work. Their wages
sent back to families in Spain accounted for a large part of Spain’s
foreign exchange. (2)

Franco harnessed Spain’s leading natural resource, the sun, as
another source of foreign capital. The government promoted the
tourism that transformed the fishing villages north of Barcelona,
off the Alicante Coast, and near Malaga into the tawdry tourist
horrors of the Costa Brava, Benidorm, and the Costa del Sol. The
peasants around these centers became construction workers, wait-
ers, and maids, serving the tourists whose spending accounted for
one-third of the Gross National Product by 1970. (3)

The Working Class

Despite Franco’s fascist organization of labor through direct
force, an independent labor movement began to revive in the late
forties. At that time, the slow rebirth of Spanish industry triggered
inflation, which in turn promoted strikes. In 1949, female textile
workers organized an industry-wide strike, the first since Fran-
co's victory in 1939. (Then as now, about two-thirds of all textile workers are women.) That same year, a general strike in Biscay was soundly defeated. In 1951, students in Barcelona organized a bus boycott to protest against municipal fare increases. Thousands followed their lead, and the boycott led to the first post-war general strike in Barcelona. The fascist labor syndicate CNS (National Syndical Confederation) kept wages as low as possible, so low that in 1954 the buying power of the average Spanish worker was half what it had been in 1936. Further wage squeezes in 1956 led to strikes in Basque Country and Catalonia. Simultaneously, university students struggled against their forced membership in the fascist student organization. (4) Male and female working-class agitation around wages finally forced the government to grant a collective-bargaining act in 1958, but this merely compelled the CNS to negotiate wage agreements with industry rather than unilaterally set wages. (5) Those employed by the post office, railroads, telephone company, hospitals, and other public works were prohibited from organizing in any way. The state rather than the CNS directly set their wages.

Militants organized secret workers' commissions, or independent shop unions around the coal mines and iron foundries of Asturias beginning in 1962, but these were ephemeral. In 1964, metal workers in Madrid formed relatively stable factory committees to improve shop conditions. They also spread the word to other regions and consolidated the committees into district and provincial commissions that nevertheless retained autonomy. Their leaders were old militants of every political persuasion, some of them, like Marcelino Camacho, members of the underground PCE. As a young man, Camacho, the son of a trade-union leader, had been sentenced to six years in prison at the end of the Civil War. He spent one year in jail and five at hard labor in Spain and Spanish Morocco. From Morocco he escaped to Algeria, where he remained from 1943 to 1957, when a partial amnesty freed him to return to Madrid. He began to work as an engineering aid at Perkins Motor Iberica, a Canadian-owned company. He gained national prominence in June 1966, when he led a group of workers to the Labor Ministry. They demanded wage hikes to $3.50 (250 pesetas) for an 18-hour day. They also demanded the right to strike. Camacho was imprisoned then and repeatedly between 1967 and 1972. In that year, the government tried to crack down on the Workers' Commissions and charged ten workers, Camacho among them, with leading the illegal trade unions of Spain. They were given long sentences, but were freed by the partial amnesty decreed by King Juan Carlos I following Franco's death in November 1975.

Today, the Workers' Commissions, supposedly dominated by the PCE, have hundreds of thousands of members. The exact number is secret, since the commissions and the PCE are both illegal. The social-democratic Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) also
has a union, the UGT (General Workers' Union). Some groups to
the left of the PCE claim that the steady growth of the UGT in the
past few years is due to PCE militants who have worked in the
UGT of their opponents in order to build up a more moderate al-
ternative to the Workers' Commissions, which they view as too
independent. Others to the left say that the PCE want to appear
weaker than they are, and thus want Spanish and foreign liberals
to think that the PSOE and its UGT are viable alternatives to the
PCE and the Workers' Commissions. The Christian Democrats al-
so have an independent union. Recently, the old anarcho-syndical-
ist CNT (National Labor Confederation) has been revived with the
support of very young workers and students in Madrid. More and
more in the past year, the clandestine unions have called joint
strikes and have coordinated demonstrations.

Neighborhoods

The working class and the petty bourgeoisie of the new indus-
trial suburbs have been mobilizing themselves into neighborhood
associations since the early seventies. New working-class neigh-
borhoods have grown up around the new factories, generally on the
outskirts of the cities. These new suburbs were built as slums by
Franco and his closest friends and ministers, who made their per-
sonal fortunes largely through real-estate speculation. Housing for
the new working class was gerry-built, along unpaved roads. Sew-
age runs into ditches where children play. Water supply and elec-
tricity are irregular. Garbage is collected infrequently. Bus ser-
vice is bad. People wait months, even years for phones, if they can
afford them. Medical facilities are far away.

Residents, mostly housewives, began in the seventies to organize
associations of neighbors to protest against their living conditions
and bad health care. For instance, in 1971 in Santa Coloma de Gra-
manet in Catalonia, the women of the neighborhood association
demonstrated for schools, clinics, and drainage of the swamp upon
which they lived. Many of the associations have struggled for
child-care centers and for price controls on the always-increasing
price of bread. Militants from all the clandestine unions live in
these neighborhoods and attempt to recruit out of them. Everyone
in Spain agrees that the PCE has been the most successful, alleg-
edly with almost half a million housewife members who draw in
further recruits from the neighborhood.

Women

Like other fascist and proto-fascist states, the Franco regime
attempted to absorb the family into the state by controlling women.
Divorce was abolished. Birth control and abortions were declared
illegal. Unmarried women between the ages of 16 and 34 were forced to participate for six months in the fascist female section unless they were nuns. Without proof that they had performed this social service, they could not get passports, driver’s licenses, clerical jobs, or places as students in the university. Inadvertently, through the women’s section, the Franco regime mobilized large numbers of women out of the family and into politics. Luck, opportunism, or insight (probably a combination of them) has persuaded the PCE that they must win these women to the left in order to overcome fascism in Spain. PCE female militants make a special effort to bring these women into the neighborhood associations, ostensibly to win necessary social services.

The most important women’s organization in Spain today is the Communist Party’s Democratic Movement of Women (MDM). Founded in Madrid in 1966 by female Communists at the university to carry on support work for political prisoners, in its present incarnation the MDM works in the association of neighbors. (6) In the late fall of 1976, the women’s caucus of the PSOE, the Socialist Workers Party, apparently submitted a position paper criticizing their party’s treatment of women and proposing a new strategy, especially in relation to the MDM. The report was suppressed by the party, but many in the MDM claim that it signals rejection of women’s importance to political struggle by all but the PCE. One woman from a Madrid neighborhood association told me that she joined the PCE precisely because of its special support of women.

Along with the demand for amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles, the demand for the abolition of the adultery law has become the focus of popular agitation. Although there is no civil divorce in Spain, there are many legal separations. Children generally go with their mothers, but if the father or his family want the child, they go to court where they attempt to discredit the mother’s morality. Rather than risk this public shame, most women have given up their children without struggle. The common practice if the woman chooses to fight the husband is for him to accuse her of adultery. Adultery, however, is a criminal offense in Spain, punishable by up to six years in jail and fines exceeding a thousand dollars. A man can be an adulterer only if he tries to bring his mistress into the conjugal home. A woman can be convicted of adultery if she is found lying fully clothed next to a male to whom she is not married or if she is traveling with a man other than her legal husband.

There have been organized protests around 18 different adultery cases in Spain in the past year. The PCE by no means organized these demonstrations, but they support them; and the MDM and the PCE have gained recruits because of the visibility of their female militants as spokeswomen for these cases. For instance, there were mass demonstrations of 5,000 people in Barcelona in November 1976 protesting against the trial of María Angela Muñoz, a 28-
year-old cleaning woman charged by her husband with adultery. The women of the neighborhood associations in Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona joined in protest, chanting "Down with discriminatory laws. Amnesty for all political prisoners. Amnesty for all women."

Regional Nationalism

Throughout Spain, but particularly in the Basque Country and Catalonia, regional assemblies of workers, women, and bourgeois have organized themselves to fight for political self-determination in a federalist, democratic Spain. The Basque and Catalan questions are no mere atavisms. More than half the wealth of Spain is produced in these two regions. Their citizens own almost all the national banks, Seven million people, or one-fifth the entire population of Spain, live in Catalonia, It produced one-third of the GNP last year, yet only one-thirtieth was reinvested in its hospitals, roads, or schools. This is a grievance that unites the regional bourgeoisie with the working class.

One need search no further back than the Second Republic of 1931 to 1939 and the Franco Regime that followed for the origins of contemporary grievances. Under the pre-Franco Republic, the Statutes of Autonomy gave Basques and Catalans self-government through provincial bodies. They were permitted to employ their own languages in their public institutions, control their own police, and administer their own revenues. When Franco triumphed, he destroyed all regional independence. After the war, he treated Catalonia and the Basque Country as occupied areas, with standing armies to keep order. It was illegal to speak either Basque or Catalan, to dance the traditional dances, to sing the regional folk songs.

The regional assemblies associate the development of monopoly capitalism with Franco's centralist tendencies that have bled the richer regions to accumulate capital to invest in multi-national corporations elsewhere in Spain. Profits from these enterprises have contributed to a capital outflow of almost 25 per cent of all circulating capital in Spain this year. (7) The regionalists would like to see these corporations taxed to provide money to invest in the rest of Spain and to stop the flow of resources from Catalonia and the Basque Country to the other regions. The working class and the bourgeoisie of the Basque Country and Catalonia consider themselves victims of neo-imperialism, and view the struggle for self-determination as a fight for democratic control of resources by the regional assemblies. The regional autonomist movement clearly rests upon an unstable class alliance, but one that has supported the first stages of national liberation elsewhere. Even outside Catalonia and the Basque Country, in regions where there has traditionally been no drive toward decentralization, in Segovia and
Andalusia for example, regional autonomist movements have recently become powerful. It is widely held that local control of factories, neighborhoods, police, and courts can be won if power is lodged in regional governments, which are believed to be more amenable to the pressures of direct action.

In Catalonia, the united movement for self-government finds expression in the Provincial National Assembly of Catalonia, made up of centrists on the right, to the Spanish Labor Party (PTE), a Maoist group on the left, Catalonia has its own Communist Party, the PSUC (United Socialist Parties of Catalonia). The PSUC has members who sit on the executive board of the PCE, but the PCE itself is not represented in the PSUC. The PCE has always been uneasy about this arrangement, but even the Third International, whose tendency was always to subsume national (or regional) questions to class, recognized two Communist Parties in Spain. Members of the PSUC distrust the PCE over the question of self-determination, since the PCE has always been reticent to support a federalist solution to Spain's political problems. PSUC members view themselves as Catalan rather than Spanish communists; they stress the need for self-determination over all other political demands, while the PCE makes more vague proposals about democracy in general. For instance, the PCE and its leader Santiago Carrillo have generally supported the government of President Adolfo Suárez in its recent efforts to achieve moderate political reform. Their strategy is to give critical support and push for further concessions. Within the Provincial National Assembly of Catalonia, the PSUC and the Maoist PTE oppose the slow reformism of the national government and argue in favor of winning a socialist government complete with regional self-determination as a prerequisite to real democratic reform in Spain.

The alliances in the Basque Country are different from those in Catalonia. The fight against Franco in the late sixties was led by ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom), a loose coalition of conservative Catholic separatists who merely wanted autonomy for the Basque Country in a Spanish federation, and a socialist wing out of which grew a terrorist group that has become synonymous with ETA itself. Influenced by the Tupamaro and other urban-guerrilla movements, ETA since the early seventies has carried out daring attacks on foreign businessmen kidnapped for ransom, and on police, particularly the hated Civil Guard. A long tradition of relatively conservative support for autonomy, combined with the financial power of the national bourgeoisie of Basque businessmen, made it doubly important for Franco to quash any insurgency in the Basque Country. He unleashed the full force of the police and the army to make an example of the Basques. In the process he won for ETA the kind of support from the middle classes that as a terrorist group it could never have won for itself.

ETA's most daring exploit was "Operation Ogre," the assassina-
tion of Premier Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s closest political confidant and his designated political successor in December 1973. They set charges under the Madrid street where Carrero attended mass every morning. When he entered his car, they blew him two stories high. The assassination brought down the wrath of the government; throughout Spain, leftists were arrested and tortured. Many, including Eva Forest, remain in jail today. (9)

Since the assassination of Carrero Blanco, there has been virtual civil war between the government and the Basques. Police roundups and attacks on those who protect ETA led to the walkout of 200,000 workers in December 1974. The police continued their attacks, in April 1975, the government declared martial law. The army imposed curfews, searched houses and cars without warrants, and arrested hundreds of alleged ETA supporters. By May 1975 thousands, including priests and nuns, were in jail. Demonstrations and ETA attacks continued. In August 1975 the government passed an anti-terrorist law aimed at “those communists, anarchists, separatists, and other organizations that promote or use violence as instruments of political action...and those who in any manner aid such groups and organizations.” The law permits police to enter any house and to hold prisoners up to 10 days before booking them, leaving time for extensive torture. Using this law, the government executed three young Basques and two alleged Maoist terrorists in October 1975 despite world-wide demonstrations. Continued warfare has led to general strikes throughout the Basque Country, particularly in Vitoria, San Sebastian, and Bilbao, but the repression continues. Half of the 200 permanent political prisoners in Spain today are Basques.

Communist Strategy and the Mass Movement

Leftists since Rosa Luxemburg have tried to explain the connection between massive eruptions of popular activity and the communist party. The PCE claims to draw its views from Antonio Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti, but it in fact owes a great debt to the anarcho-syndicalist strategy that developed in Spain. The popular anarcho-syndicalist movement, which flourished from the late nineteenth century until Franco’s victory in 1939, succeeded in wedding workers with the larger community, made up of the unemployed, housewives, and many members of the petty bourgeoisie. This kind of populist alliance is always unstable, since it attempts to mask class conflict between the working class and the petty bourgeoisie. (10) But organizations such as these, which blur class lines and unite people around what is perceived as common oppression, have tremendous powers of mobilization.

The chief weapon of the mass party is the general strike. Where workers lack the right to strike (as they do in Spain), the general strike is the only means by which labor can put pressure upon em-
ployers or upon the state. It is the universally accepted tactic of
direct action. In theory, the general strike demonstrates that those
who work create society's wealth, but it is never that simple, since
people work at different things. In most societies, a relatively
small proportion of people are actually industrial proletarians, and
as the productive forces improve, the number of proletarians tends
to decline. Housewives, children, the aged, the self-employed, and
the unemployed often share political and economic problems with
industrial workers and are frequently more numerous. The general
strike as developed by the anarcho-syndicalists moved struggle out
of the factories and into the streets, and pitted the numbers of the
entire community of the oppressed against the might of the state.
Between 1868 and 1977, there have been only about forty years
when Spanish workers have had the right to organize legally; thus
the general strike, rather than the trade union, has become the
traditional class institution for the working-class community. The
general strike has never been the preferred tactic of communists;
but without the right to organize legally and to build other institu-
tions, the PCE has been forced to support general strikes as they
emerge and to adopt this tactic as its own.

The general strike as it has developed in Spain in the last hun-
dred years has been a defensive rather than an offensive tactic.
It is used to defend rights that are threatened or to protest against
the withdrawal of de-facto rights. When the Basque community, the
auto workers of Pamplona, or the school teachers of Madrid walk
off the job, they hope to put political pressure on the state rather
than overthrow it. They and the rest of the liberal community have
used the tactic of the general strike to protest against right-wing
violence and police repression. For instance, in late January 1977,
following right-wing attacks on leftists that left two people dead,
65,000 auto workers in Madrid and Barcelona simply walked off
the job. The following day, the PCE organized what was called a
peaceful general strike — actually a peace march — throughout
Spain. (11)

The PCE has changed since 1970 largely in response to the mass
movement. Until 1968, the PCE was fiercely loyal to Moscow. In
1965 Santiago Carrillo, head of the PCE exiled in France, expelled
Fernando Claudín and George Semprún, subsequently the screen-
writer of LA GUERRE EST FINIE, Z, and STATE OF SIEGE. Clau-
dín and Semprún argued against Moscow's line that Spain was a
feudal country in need of a bourgeois revolution. The two, who had
spent over a decade in the PCE underground, argued that Spain had
become an advanced industrial country and that the government
would be forced to grant certain reforms if only to reduce censor-
ship and to curtail open police brutality that offended the tourists.
They suggested diluting the revolutionary line in favor of a re-
formist struggle for democracy. (12) Between 1965 and 1968,
Franco did relax press censorship somewhat. Inflation also led to
a series of general strikes in 1967 and 1968. These, rather than a change of heart, forced Carrillo’s hand. When the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Santiago Carrillo took a calculated political chance and denounced the invasion. The Russians in turn tried to pry control of the PCE from him, but by 1970 he had broken with Moscow without splitting the Party. By that time he had adopted the Claudín-Semprún program, a strategy that favored alliance with the progressive bourgeoisie to create a democratic Spain without political rupture.

The PCE is probably the most pragmatic Communist Party in Europe. Carrillo may not be another Lenin, but he is an extremely astute politician who is able to assess the way the wind blows. But these qualities would not suffice if the underground were not inextricably linked with the forty-year-long struggle against Franco. It is nearly impossible to separate the PCE’s program from the demands of the mass movement: amnesty for political prisoners and the return of political exiles; legalization of independent trade unions; reform of discriminatory legislation (especially the adultery law); and the creation of better social services for the working-class neighborhoods. All anti-fascists want abolition of the CNS. The amnesty issue has been the PCE’s constant demand since the fifties. The other two issues are dear to the mass movement, and hence have been adopted by the PCE. The PCE’s best and worst qualities lie with the popular masses in Spain. If it is not more revolutionary, that is largely because, correctly or not, it does not think the mood of the Spanish populace is at the moment revolutionary.

The Left

The groups to the left of the PCE are divided into about 6,000 Maoists and 4,000 Trotskyists. The Maoists have a bewildering assortment of organizations of which the largest are the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Spain (PCE-M-L), the Spanish Labor Party (PTE), the Revolutionary Workers Organization (ORT), and the Anti-Fascist and Patriotic Revolutionary Front (FRAP). There are at least five other splinters, most of which have “communist” in their titles. The main Trotskyist organization is the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), whose largest branch is in Vitoria and is known as LCR-ETA-VI from its alliance with a working-class wing of ETA. (13)

As relatively small groups compared to the approximately one million in the PCE and PSUC, the Maoists and Trotskyists are forced to focus their activities in particular cities and industries. All left groups work in Madrid’s factories. The building trades, metallurgy and auto are heavily organized by the PCE and by the groups to the left. The Trotskyists are particularly strong in Vitoria and Pamplona, centers of extremely militant strike waves in
the Basque Country. Their ties through LCR-ETA-VI have led them to support the movement for self-determination in the Basque region and to argue for "the sovereign right of the trade-union organizations of each oppressed nationality to define their own status and action programs for their own area of activity, as well as their right to adopt the organizational forms best suited to their own needs." (14) Ironically, the Trotskyist demands on behalf of the Basque workers are nearly identical to those of the PSUC, the Catalan Communist Party's demands on behalf of the entire popular community. Despite orthodox positions on other questions, all of the Marxist parties in Spain support regional autonomist movements.

Some left groups favor terrorism over mass organizing as a tactic. On October 1, 1975, in retaliation for the execution of the leftists of FRAP and ETA, GRAPO (the October First Anti-Fascist Resistance Group) began its public life by killing four armed police in Madrid. On December 11, 1976, they moved again. This time they kidnapped Antonio María de Oriol y Urquijo, President of Spain's Council of the Realm. Refusing money ransom, they demanded total amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles. When right-wingers killed leftist demonstrators on January 25 and 26, 1977, GRAPO stepped up its activities by kidnapping Spain's highest-ranking military judge, Lieut. Emilio Villaescusa, and killing three more policemen. On February 10, a newly-formed anti-terrorist police force, led by the commander of the allegedly-dissolved political police, released the hostages and arrested GRAPO. The government claims that it is the terrorist wing of the Reconstituted Spanish Communist Party, another splinter from the PCE. (15) The word from Spain, always filled with rumors of political conspiracy, is that GRAPO is an agent of the Algerians, the KGB, or the Spanish police. There is no question that the police took their time finding GRAPO, it is also true that GRAPO's activities might have contributed to an army coup the last week of January. Objectively, GRAPO served the right: but subjectively, they probably considered themselves leftists.

The terrorism and the splinters to the left are evidence of the difficulty of organizing in what is still a police state. But they also demonstrate the frustrations that revolutionaries have in dealing with a mass movement that does not seem disposed to follow them to the barricades. The left blames the PCE and its reformism for the defensive posture of the Spanish working class, but there is a lot of evidence to indicate that the story is somewhat more complicated, if equally unpleasant.

Between 1968 and 1976, the PCE tried to build a political alliance of progressive bourgeois, Christian Democrats, socialists, and the PCE. From small groups, they welded together the Democratic Coordination (known as "the Opposition") on March 29, 1976. The police responded by arresting the leaders that same day. (16) They
called for a peaceful mass picnic in the Casa del Campo Park in Madrid to celebrate May Day. The picnic was supported by the independent trade unions. After a peaceful day, marred only by occasional right-wing heckling, the thousands of celebrators left the park. As they filed out of the exits, the police attacked, arrested 150 immediately, and arrested another thousand in the aftermath. (17) Many of those arrested belonged to the Maoist ORT, which had called for militant street demonstrations, but were largely ignored by the working-class picnickers.

Last spring's events outline the reformist strategy of the PCE and the reason some of its militants withdraw to join leftist sects. Maoists and Trotskyists criticize the PCE for concentrating on political reform rather than working-class struggle. They argue that the party is using “the Opposition” to pursue a social-democratic road to power. The groups to the left of the PCE claim that the only way to defeat Francoism is to carry out political general strikes leading to the overthrow of the state and the establishment of working-class power. They charge the Communists with dampening working-class fervor by taking workers on picnics rather than leading them in militant struggle.

The extreme left blames the Communists for the failure of the November 12, 1976 general strike, called by all the clandestine trade unions, to protest against growing inflation, wage freezes, unemployment, and continued repression of union militants. They planned the strike to coincide with debates in the Cortes (Parliament) about reform, particularly with the discussions of legalizing trade unions. By the standards of most countries, it was a success. More than two million men and women went out. But the Spanish left considered it a failure, since only half the predicted number of Basque and Catalan workers participated. The Trotskyists accused the Communists of misleadership, claiming that the Party attempted to stress economic rather than revolutionary demands by the workers. They further charged that the Party discouraged workers from joining the strike at all. (18) One is left with the image of the working class chafing at the bit to carry out armed struggle while the PCE holds it in check.

In fact, the working class of Catalonia itself refused to support the general strike despite agitation by the PSUC. The key to Spanish general strikes is always the municipal transport workers. If people cannot get to work, strikes become generalized. The PSUC engaged in round-the-clock negotiations with public-transport workers in Barcelona on November 10 and 11, but to no avail. The municipal workers announced on the evening before the general strike that they would not support it. (19) Gerona, Barcelona, and the industrial suburbs of Sabadell, Tarrasa, and Llobregat were plastered for weeks with posters calling on the entire population to strike. The Democratic Movement of Women called meetings to plan neighborhood-association participation in the demonstra-
tions. But when the day came, only two groups in Catalonia solidly supported the strike. They were the building-trades workers and the school teachers, the foundation of PSUC strength. In Valencia, Madrid, and Seville, Communist school teachers also went on strike. This is some indication that the PCE and PSUC can only follow, not lead, the mass movement.

The Right

The mass movement supported by the PCE is concerned more with the threat from the right than with the criticism from the left. Working from extreme right to center on the current political spectrum, one finds the New Force, the traditional Falange and Francoists, the Popular Alliance, the Popular Democratic Party, and a wide variety of Christian Democratic groups. The New Force, a revived and activist fascist party, is led by a respected leader of the Cortes. His party consists largely of young thugs who vandalize left bookstores, attack leftist demonstrators, and terrorize cafe leftists, beating them and forcing them to give the fascist salute and to sing the old fascist anthem “Face to the Sun.” They have gone so far as to attack worker priests and nuns. The “Guerrillas of Christ the King,” Spain’s most prominent right-wing terrorist organization, which claimed responsibility for killing demonstrators at the end of January 1977, may well be an arm of the New Force. It seems likely that the New Force has considerable support within the national police force.

The Falange and the Francoists, officially united in the “National Movement,” have become increasingly antagonistic since the death of the Caudillo (Leader). The Falange, the official fascist party of Spain, was supported by Hitler and Mussolini. It has stayed loyal to its founding principles, while the Francoists’ loyalty has been primarily to the person of Franco, whose bureaucracy they staffed. The two groups remained distinct, and mutual hostility always lurked beneath the facade of official unity. The Falange has always been militantly anti-clerical, while the Francoists have been religious and even fanatical Catholics. As the Church in Spain has moved away from right-wing politics and toward the Christian Democrats, the Francoists have lost a bastion of support. Small Francoist bands now regularly harass the Bishop of Madrid, a leading moderate figure, chanting “Franco, Franco” at him in the streets. But with Franco’s death, the Francoists have lost their organizing principle. They constitute the great mass base of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois supporters for which the new center parties are vying.

One right party that hopes to organize the Francoist supporters is the Popular Alliance, whose leaders are associated with the lay Catholic organization OPUS DEI, widely viewed as the central or-
ganization of international finance capital in Spain, OPUS DEI, called "God's Octopus" by the left, has a "technocratic" politics; its members view themselves as planners putting forth apolitical technical solutions to social and economic problems. But their claim to be apolitical masks a profound conservatism, especially about labor's participation in politics. Since the mid-sixties, OPUS has favored moderate programs of liberalization, designed to buttress Spain's image in Western Europe in order to qualify as full members of the Common Market and NATO. For the moment, the Popular Alliance wears a democratic mask. But during the interregnum between Franco's death in November 1975 and the appointment of Adolfo Suarez as President in July 1976, when many members of the present Alliance were in the cabinet, the government viciously repressed Basque workers. Recently the Alliance has been engaging in scare tactics behind the slogan "Us or Chaos."

Another party of the right that wishes to appear otherwise is the Popular Democratic Party, approved under a new law of political association in February 1977. It represents more traditionally conservative and less technocratic tendencies. The party claims to be "an interclass, democratic party, born to provide society with institutions that will permit all Spaniards to be free men in a society with justice and solidarity." (20) This group wishes to enter an electoral coalition with Christian Democrats.

The leading Christian Democratic group, EDCEE, is slightly to the left of the Popular Democratic Party, even though its leader-
ship has sterling right-wing credentials, Joaquin Ruíz-Jiménez, the leader of the party, was Minister of Education in the early fifties, when he was responsible for the fascist organization of students. He resigned in the wake of student rebellion, bloody repression, and a religious conversion (even Spaniards can be born again). Personal commitment to the goals of liberalized Catholicism have led him to Christian Democratic politics. The Christian Democrats hold titles to the new and old petty bourgeoisie that supported Franco. Because the right believes this, and because the EDCEE is supported by its European counterparts, particularly the Germans, all the center-right factions hope to ally with it in the coming elections in June 1977. The often-reliable liberal news weekly CAMBIO 16 predicts, however, that the Christian Democrats will make their alliance with the social democrats of the PSOE, which was legalized in February 1977.

The only recent test of the political strength of the true right — the New Force, the Falange, and the Francoists — came in the national referendum of December 15, 1976. The electorate considered by a “yes” or “no” vote whether it wanted the government to proceed with electoral reforms. Franco’s Organic Law of 1966 established the procedures that dictated the discussions in the Council of the Realm and the Cortes and even the referendum itself. President Suarez and King Juan Carlos I achieved a minor miracle by guiding it through the first two bodies, whose members had been appointed by Franco. An overwhelming 94 per cent of the electorate supported the government in the referendum. That support expresses vague approval for liberalization, but little else. Franco himself had held national referendums in 1947 and 1966, in which he was supported by even wider margins.

The referendum proved the electoral weakness of the far right. The New Force, the Falange, and the die-hard Francoists, including his still-powerful family, all urged a “no” vote, with the slogan “Franco would have voted ‘no’.” The government conceded in advance that about 10 per cent of the voters would oppose the reforms. On election day, however, fewer than three per cent voted “no.” Incidentally, the referendum also indicated that whatever we may think about electoral politics, most people in Spain want to vote and are afraid to disobey government orders. The left from the Maoists and Trotskyists to the PCE and the PSOE carried on a half-hearted campaign urging people to abstain. While about 20 per cent of the eligible electorate did not vote at all, only about three per cent actually abstained.

The organized right wing, though numerically small, is strategically situated within the national police force (as it is in Argentina). The Armed Police are an urban riot force, known as the gristapo because of their gray uniforms and their Nazi ways. The paramilitary Civil Guard has jurisdiction over rural areas and remote suburbs. Theoretically, under the command of the Minister
of the Interior, both police forces are really domestic armies. They are widely believed to support, and when off-duty to staff, the “Guerrillas of Christ the King.”

The reform-minded government of Suárez and Juan Carlos I is acutely aware of the right-wing views of the police, and has moved to weaken their capacity for independent political action. On December 17, 1976 nearly 200 policemen demonstrated for higher wages and better pensions. 280 were arrested and sentenced to two months in jail. Those without tenure were discharged. In a clean sweep just before Christmas 1976, the government replaced the chiefs of the major forces and fired the Director General of Security, the civilian director responsible to the Minister of Interior. The new director of the Civil Guard plans to reorganize the paramilitary force, but no one is optimistic about success. (21) The December ouster clearly represents an attempt by Suarez’s government to take political control of the police. It is, however, unlikely that they can reform a corps so loyal to the ideas of Spanish fascism.

The Spanish right may also draw upon the “Fascist International.” The last week in January 1977 left seven leftists and three cops dead in Madrid. In early February 1977, the police arrested several thousand leftists and eleven right-wingers. Of these, nine were foreigners, including anti-Castro Cubans, members of the Triple A (the Anti-Communist Apostolic Alliance) death squad from Argentina, and fascists from Colombia and Lebanon. At least since 1959, Spain has been a haven for foreign fascists, organized around the rich gusano community in Madrid. Peron and his supporters mixed freely with this group. When he left, many Argentines who had come with him to Spain remained behind, but they maintained their ties to Argentine rightists.

After a particularly audacious and brutal attack on a Madrid labor office in late January 1977 that left five dead, rumor connected the action with Italian fascists who have used Madrid as a base. They are believed to be the same men who killed a leftist lawyer in Florence in July 1976. The Italian prosecutor apparently supports this view, and has sent copies of his investigation to the Spanish police. (22) All right-wingers will lose their haven if Spain moves to the left. The chances that the police as constituted will clean out the fascists are non-existent. If the right is to be defeated, it will require the threat of a mobilized mass movement, organized into armed militias. Although no one in Spain is talking openly about this eventuality, it is widely believed that in fact many of the Workers’ Commissions and the associations of neighbors have been gathering arms and have been trained to use them.

The Near Future

In February 1977, the government decreed a new law of political parties. Within ten days of submitting their statutes, the parties
either receive approval from the Minister of the Interior or their case is sent to the supreme court to determine whether it is a "totalitarian party directed by foreign agents." On February 18, 1977 the government legalized the PSOE, the EDCEE, the Popular Democratic Party, and four smaller socialist and liberal parties. (23) Ironically, the only party that mentioned class struggle in their statutes were the Falangists. The PCE and PTE applied, but their applications were sent to the supreme court. In the unlikely event that the PCE is legalized before the June elections, they will probably run Nicolas Sartorius and Marcelino Camacho of the Workers' Commissions; Ramon Tamanos, the charismatic playwright businessman economist who is a member of the PCE executive committee; and possibly some members of the Democratic Movement of women and the neighborhood associations. They may present joint slates with the PSOE and even with the Christian Democrats. If the party were legal, it is estimated that it would get more than 25 per cent in Catalonia, but only 10 to 15 per cent in the rest of Spain. This would not be enough to give it a place in the government.

A freely-elected government would probably be centrist. It is not at all clear that the PCE wants to risk elections at the national level, though it certainly wants to run in local elections when they are held. In national elections, even card-carrying Communist workers (many of whom still consider themselves "anarchists at heart") will probably vote for the PSOE— but they will certainly vote. It may well be that the Party will get its strongest support from the women of the neighborhood associations and the Democratic Movement of Women, who have been given political identity by the PCE and are very loyal.

Since the Communists are strong in Catalonia, they are likely to have secure positions in the regional assembly or Generalitat, which many expect to win within two years. With autonomy, the Generalitat will control the police, schools, health, welfare, social security, road building, sewer construction, garbage collection, and public transportation, not only in Barcelona but in all the cities of Catalonia. Since the region produces one-third of the entire GNP, it could raise money for these ventures by reducing the revenues it pays to Madrid, a necessary requirement for the federalist solution to Spain's structural political problems. The communists of the PSUC would thus have the opportunity to perform desperately-needed public services and, in the process, build even further support in the Workers' Commissions, the neighborhood associations, and the Democratic Movement of Women. "Community control" may ultimately be the only way to divide and conquer the police, the only way to destroy them short of armed struggle.

The description here is not necessarily an endorsement of the PCE, but is an attempt to explain the relationship between the Party and the mass movement. Given the extent of political activity in Spain these days, it is hard to remember that it is still a fascist
country. The Spanish left remembers this almost every day. The older militants have spent half their lives in jail or exile. The younger militants of all political persuasions have been beaten up countless times. From a distance, the American left is haunted by political ghosts, particularly Chile; but the Spanish left is more concerned with Argentina. Spanish leftists regularly learn from leftist Argentine exiles about the fascist death squads that murder working-class militants, including those who have fled from Chile and Uruguay. The Spanish working class have watched as the heroic Argentine “factory guerrilla” movements led by Trotskyists, Maoists, and independent Communists have been definitively crushed in the past few months. Trotskyists and Maoists continue to be very brave about what they know will befall them if they promote armed struggle and lose.

The impression I get from spending several months in Spain recently is that the mass movement aided by the PCE is prepared to fight if there is an army coup, but is wary of provoking the army or police if it can avoid armed confrontation. The women of the neighborhood associations, who face the police over the adultery cases and demands for social services, are frightened by the groups to the left of the PCE and eager for what we consider bourgeois civil rights and social services. Lenin said that without communist leadership, workers on their own only develop trade-union consciousness—a statement that seems to be borne out in Spain if we acknowledge that the PCE is not a Leninist communist party. But what about a mass movement and a party at least some of whose members are striving to serve the mass movement? If the PCE is really responsible to the masses of workers, housewives, tenants, students, and regional autonomists, and if it is really democratic (which remains to be seen), what are its obligations to that population? Maoists and Trotskyists in Spain tend to draw only upon young industrial proletarians, many of whom are quite revolutionary. But they do not work in the mass organizations, do not support the women’s movement except rarely as individuals, and speak only of factory democracy. They have no analysis of where women and housewives who are not factory workers fit into the revolution and communism. If the PCE is the first communist party to attempt to come to terms with feminist issues as part of its formulation of social policy, it is a historical accident. But accident or not, how the PCE resolves its relationship with the popular forces in Spain may well set the tone for more democratic mass politics in other advanced industrial countries.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a cross-section of views concerning the development of capitalism in nineteenth-century Spain, consult Josep Fontana, LA QUIEBRA DE LA MONAR-


3. A moving account of such development in Andalusia can be found in Ronald Fraser's TAJOS: THE STORY OF A VILLAGE ON THE COSTA DEL SOL (New York, 1973).


8. See the discussion about the separatist movement in Andalusia in the NEW YORK TIMES, February 16, 1977.


17. MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, May 7, 1976.

18. IMPRECOR, 64 (December 9, 1976), p. 6.

19. AVUI (Barcelona), November 11, 12, 13, 1976.


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Report on Proposition 14: 
Farmworkers vs Big Growers, 
Big Money and Big Lies

Jorge Corralejo

Last November Californians voted on Proposition 14, the collective-bargaining referendum for the state's farmworkers sponsored by the United Farmworkers of America (UFWA). The election was more controversial than the Presidential campaigns and generated conflict over the power of the agricultural industry in California. The defeat of Proposition 14, by a 3-to-2 margin, raises important questions about the meaning of the campaign for the future of farm-labor organizing in California and elsewhere.

Proposition 14 arose out of difficulties with the California Agriculture Labor Relations Act passed in June 1975, which created a five-member Agriculture Labor Relations Board and a General Counsel. The Board was charged with implementation of the act; with setting up regulations and carrying them out by holding elections; with settling disputes; with offering solutions to problems and compensation to violated parties. The general counsel was authorized to take legal action against those guilty of unfair labor practices. The law was pushed by then-new Governor Jerry Brown, and represented an uneasy compromise between the UFWA and growers.

For years, grower propaganda had claimed that farmworkers
were content and wanted no union. More recently, the Teamsters had claimed that as a "real union" they could best represent farmworkers. But, when given the opportunity, farmworkers voted overwhelmingly for the UFWA and Cesar Chavez (68.5% of the vote in the final nine months went for the union). The growers responded with a policy of disrupting and discrediting the ALRB in order to halt the victories of the campesinos, and the Teamsters began to hesitate about participating in so many losing elections. It became apparent that, as long as the Board was allowed to function, farmworkers were going to vote for the UFWA, not for the grower-
approved Teamsters or for no union. The growers then called upon their allies in the state legislature to block additional funding until there were changes in the law and replacements on the Board.

Thus, by February of 1976, Republicans and rural democrats successfully stopped funding which allowed for more elections, more hearings and more grievances. In short, farmworkers once again had neither representational rights nor protection from employer reprisals.

The Union retaliated by mobilizing its large boycott staff and its long-standing coalition of liberal-left-church and labor support. In six weeks more than 700,000 signatures were collected in California cities and towns in support of the initiative to put Proposition 14 on the November ballot. The Proposition was devised by the union as a method of incorporating into the California constitution the rights temporarily gained by the 1975 law. It was not fundamentally different from the earlier legislation. It called for a similarly constructed but new board. It required growers to provide employee lists for the organizing unions in an effort to prevent growers from substituting “ringer” crews at election time. Most importantly, it required that the legislature adequately fund the ALRB. The funding would be constitutionally guaranteed so that grower pressure could never again so easily direct the legislature to cut off or seriously reduce funding.

In an effort to head off the referendum, the Legislature voted in July to reinstate funding for the ALRB. Despite subsequent pressure to drop the issue, the UFWA decided to “take the issue to the people” in a show of strength as well as an effort to institutionalize the ALRB. The campaign began in late August, with the union pouring all of its not-inconsiderable staff and volunteer support into the electoral campaign to register potential voters and to convince the people of the need for passage. The rest of the union was reduced to minimal functioning.

But the growers also mobilized, spending almost one and a half million dollars on media charges that the proposition would provide “blank-check funding” of the ALRB, with the implication that voting rights for farmworkers would drain the state treasury. The UFWA argued that the provision was only to insure that farmworker rights would not be suspended because of an inevitably excessive work-load for the board. The Proposition only served to insure continual operation of the board and to head off attempts by the growers or Teamsters to bankrupt the board by filing numerous complaints and requesting unneeded hearings.

By far the most volatile issue of the campaign was the “access” provision, which was retained from the original law. The access rule allowed for union organizers to enter grower property to inform workers of their rights and of the particulars of voting for the union. Access is an especially important element in farmworker organizing because so many farmworkers live in camps, or even
less suitable housing, on company property. "Access" is necessary to allow workers on the inside an opportunity to hear the union side.

The original ALRB had instituted the access rule in order to correct these imbalances. Access was sharply limited, however, to one organizer per fifteen workers, permitted with the knowledge of the growers and the ALRB. Organizers were allowed to visit interested workers for one hour before production begins, one hour at lunch, and one hour at the end of the workday. Of course this actually amounted to an even shorter time per day, since farmworkers, like workers everywhere, do not arrive until just before the beginning of the workday, nor do they stay around long after a hard day.

But such limitations were not enough for the growers. They still had countered that access was trespass and a constitutional violation of private property rights. The California Supreme Court had overturned a Fresno court's ruling and upheld the access rule in 1975. Despite the ruling, shotgun-wielding vigilantes and sympathetic police continued their attacks and arrests of union organizers.

Proposition 14 allowed the growers a chance to take their "defense of private property" to the voters. Although not a real issue (the access provision had been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court weeks before the election), the growers' propaganda continued to focus on the need to protect property rights. They insinuated, in an appeal also imbued with racist overtones, that passage of Proposition 14 would mean an invasion of farmworkers into California living rooms. Ads were run which featured small farmers appealing to the people for help in preserving them and their families' way of life.

Once again the ten-billion-dollar agribusiness industry hid behind the myth of the yeoman farmer. A better indication of who would profit from the defeat of Proposition 14 would come from the rolls of the contributors to the "no on 14" campaign, which included, in addition to the growers themselves: Southern Pacific Railroad and Supreme Oil Company (both of which own large agricultural holdings in the California Central Valley); the California Chamber of Commerce; J. G. Boswell, the world's largest cotton grower; Newhall Land Company; and Weyerhauser Paper Company.

While the defeat was clear, its meaning was not. A number of factors make the jubilation of the growers a bit premature, although the UFWA had undeniably suffered a setback.

Substantively, Proposition 14 was a "no win" situation for the growers. The new collective-bargaining law would have been stronger than its predecessor, but the campaign itself may have actually served to strengthen the existing law. The passage of the referendum petition itself had already released the needed funding. In fact, many "moderates" had not argued against the principle of
Proposition 14, but had said that it was unnecessary because the ALRB was again operable. This apparently made sense to many voters who would otherwise have been sympathetic to the cause of the campesinos. And in the short run, the election and hearing process were on-going.

The campaign also brought much-needed attention to the Agriculture Labor Relations Act. Many Californians are now as never before aware of the provisions of the law and have a “wait and see” attitude concerning changes in the law. This has undermined the efforts of the growers who had previously tried to obtain the changes they wanted through blackmail by withholding funding. There now seems to be an atmosphere of greater public scrutiny of the law. It would be a dangerous political move now for the growers to attempt to sabotage the existing law. Doing so would only provide farmworkers with the basis for building a case for a similar referendum in 1978 with greater public support. Up to now access has been retained by the existing ALRB, and there have been no reports of farmworkers squatting in anyone’s living room.

But these are the victories needed for the functioning of a successful trade union. The broader support on which the UFWA has drawn over the years has been tried and found ultimately wanting. Recent staff shifts within the union would seem to indicate that there is tension between those who want to continue the more far-reaching course which has always been a part of Chavez’s strategy and those who want to attend to the business of building a union. The election may have helped to speed up the already on-going process through which the UFWA and Cesar Chavez are pushed into more and more conventional trade-union behavior. No other American union would have even tried, in 1976, to get a “vote of support” from the majority of voters. The UFWA did, and lost. While the full effects of the defeat on the union’s direction are still unclear, it may well mark the end of the UFWA’s attempt to present itself as “more than a union, as a movement”.

But the union itself does not see it this way. Its view is that the initiative consolidated many statewide support committees and tapped new resources with liberal clergy and labor groups. It argues that the organization has thereby been strengthened for the boycott campaigns which will be necessary to bring the growers to terms.

The union and its supporters look to the changes in the political condition of farmworkers during the last fifteen years and see the support of 2,849,197 voters as a remarkable feat. In the face of the unending series of blows by growers, Teamsters, police and politicians, the UFW feels that it has demonstrated once again that it is willing to stand up to the growers and fight for the rights of farmworkers. What remains to be seen is whether it will continue to do so within the context of a broad-based movement or in the more traditional manner of a progressive trade union.
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