Eisenhower during his visit to São Paulo, 1960 (Source)
TIME cover, Feb. 13th 1956 (TIME)
After Brazil’s collaboration during World War II, leaders expected the United States to respond with increased support for the South American nation’s developmental projects, continuing what Brazilian officials saw as a “special relationship”. However, expectations were quickly disappointed. As Americans turned their attention to reconstructing Europe and Asia, Brazilians increasingly found it difficult to obtain U.S. financial support for the country’s plans. American administrations turned to a theory of economic growth, prioritizing private investments, as justification for their choices. Increasingly, their tone turned into one of schooling Brazilian officials into the new American dogma. Such a stance obviously clashed with the enormous amounts of state aid that was being provided in Europe. This new dynamic in the relationship, in which Americans tried to impose certain views on the Brazilian administration without consideration for local needs and preferences, increasingly created tension between the countries, spanning not only economic policy, but also later on labor policy. The Kubitschek administration pivoted into a new era of foreign policy for Brazil—one in which it no longer stood by American interests and away from Latin American cooperation, but rather took on an active role in building stronger relationships with neighbors and in promoting independent policies on the world stage. This generated increasing anxiety among U.S.-officials of the need to rein Brazil into close alignment.
Readings:
Stanley E. Hinton, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of a Special Relationship.” | English
Bevan Sewell, “Early Modernization Theory? The Eisenhower Administration and the Foreign Policy of Development in Brazil.” | English
Cliff Welch, “Labor Internationalism: U.S. Involvement in Brazilian Unions, 1945-1965.” | English
Documents:
Juscelino Kubitschek, “Operation Pan-American” (1959). | English
